BEBERAPA TEORI HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
BAHAN BACAAN TENTANGTEORI HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
DIKUMPULKAN OLEH :
Prof. Dr. Abdullah, SE., MM.
KATAPENGANTAR
Center of International Studies Universitas Prof. Dr. Moestopo (Beragama) mengundang saya untuk mengikuti kuliah terbuka dengan topic ” Signifikansi GerakanAktor Non-State dalam era Globalisasi : Studi Kasus Mayday dengan pembicara Bismo Sayoto.
Saya sendiri adalah sangat awam mengenai topik-topik yang tercakup dalam hubungan internasional karena studi yang saya lakukan selama ini adalah studi tentang manajemen. Perkembangan manajemen sendiri sekarang telah menunjukkan perkembangan yang sangat cepat dengan kemunculan topik-topik tentan manajemen keuangan internasional, manajemen sumberdaya manusia internasional, manajemen produksi atau manajemen manufaktur internasional, dan manajemen pemasaran internasional. Topik-topik ini tidak dikenal tatkala saya menjadi mahasiswa pada Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia Jurusan Manajemen Perusahaan pada tahun 1956.
Usaha mempelajari topik-topik hubungan internasional dalam rangka akan mengikuti kulitah tersebut di atas dilakukan dengan cara mengumpulkan teori-teori tentang hubungan internasional. Informasi yang dapat dikumpulkan telah dapat mengungkap bahwa studi hubungan internasional adalah sangat luas dan beraneka ragam. Teori-teori tentang hubungan internasional (international relations theory) saja juga luas dan mencakup lima kelompok teori yaitu teori idealism, realism, marxism, functionalism, dan critical theories. Idealism mencakup teori tentang liberalism dan neoliberalism. Teori realism mencakup juga teori neorealism. Marxism mecakup dependency theory dan world systems theory. Teori functionalism mencakup juga teori neofunctionalism. Critical theories mencakup costructivism dan feminism.
Hubungan Internasional menarik bahan dari berbagai bidang seperti ilmu ekonomi, sejarah, hukum, filsafat, geografi, sosiologi, antropologi, psikologi, dan studi budaya. Hubungan internasional melibatkan berbagai isu termasuk tetapi tidak terbatas hanya pada globalisasi, kekuasaan negara, ekologi, nuklier, nasionalisme, pembangunan ekonomi, keuangan global, terorisme, kejahatan terorganisasi, intervensi negara asing, hak-hak azasi manusia, korporasi multinasional, investasi global, dan neraca pembayaran.
Bahan-bahan yang dikumpulkan melalui internet ini mungkin bermanfaat bagi para mahasiswa yang sedang mengikuti studi hubungan internasional dan para mahasiswa program pascasarjana yang sedang mengikuti studi kebijakan publik. Bahan-bahan ini dapat dikembangkan lebih lanjut bagi mereka yang memahami pemanfaaan internet berdasar atas tanda-tanda yang terkandung dalam bahan bacaan ini.
Mereka yang ingin memperluas pengumpulan bahan bacaan ini dapat memanfaatkan bahan ini dengan cara mengaktifkan internet, mengaktifkan bahan bacaan ini dan kemudian menekan tombok Ctrl dan mengarahkan kursor pada bagian-bagian yang akan menimbulkan gambar tangan. Langkah selanjutnya adalah langkah menekan tobol mouse sebelah kiri sehingga unsur tersebut diaktifkan melalui internet. Langkah terakhir adalah menyimpan arsip bahan yang telah aktif. Contoh : Informasi mengenai multinational corporations ingin diperoleh. Langkah-langkah di atas dapat dilakukan sehingga arsip mengenai multinational corporations disajikan.
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
International relations (IR) represents the study of foreign affairs and global issues among states within the international system, including the roles of states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (MNCs). It is both an academic and public policy field, and can be either positive or normative as it both seeks to analyze as well as formulate the foreign policy of particular states. It is often considered a branch of political science.
Apart from political science, IR draws upon such diverse fields as economics, history, law, philosophy, geography, sociology, anthropology, psychology, and cultural studies. It involves a diverse range of issues including but not limited to: globalization, state sovereignty, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, global finance, terrorism, organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism and human rights.
Contents
• 1 History
o 1.1 Study of IR
• 2 Theory
o 2.1 Epistemology and IR theory
o 2.2 Positivist Theories
2.2.1 Realism
2.2.2 Liberalism/idealism/Liberal Internationalism
2.2.3 Neoliberalism
2.2.4 Regime Theory
o 2.3 Post-positivist/reflectivist theories
2.3.1 International society theory (the English school)
2.3.2 Social Constructivism
2.3.3 Critical Theory
2.3.4 Marxism
o 2.4 Leadership Theories
2.4.1 Interest Group Perspective
2.4.2 Strategic Perspective
• 3 Poststructuralist theories
• 4 Concepts in international relations
o 4.1 Conjuncture
o 4.2 Systemic level concepts
4.2.1 Power
4.2.1.1 Polarity
4.2.2 Interdependence
4.2.3 Dependency
4.2.4 Systemic tools of international relations
• 5 Unit-level concepts in international relations
o 5.1 Regime type
o 5.2 Revisionism/Status quo
o 5.3 Religion
• 6 Individual or sub-unit level concepts
• 7 Institutions in international relations
o 7.1 United Nations
o 7.2 Economic institutions
o 7.3 International legal bodies
7.3.1 Human rights
7.3.2 Legal
o 7.4 Regional security arrangements
• 8 See also
• 9 References
• 10 Further reading
History
The history of international relations is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, where the modern state system was developed. Prior to this, the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Westphalia instituted the legal concept of sovereignty, which essentially meant that rulers, or the legitimate sovereigns, had no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors as the ultimate authority within the territory's sovereign borders. A simple way to view this is that sovereignty says, "I'm not allowed to tell you what to do and you are not allowed to tell me what to do." Classical Greek and Roman authority at times resembled the Westphalian system, but both lacked the notion of sovereignty.
Westphalia encouraged the rise of the independent nation-state, the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. This particular European system was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the "standards of civilization". The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonization during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat over-simplified. While the nation-state system is considered "modern", many states have not incorporated the system and are termed "pre-modern". Further, a handful of states have moved beyond the nation-state system and can be considered "post-modern". The ability of contemporary IR discourse to explain the relations of these different types of states is disputed. "Levels of analysis" is a way of looking at the international system, which includes the individual level, the domestic nation-state as a unit, the international level of transnational and intergovernmental affairs, and the global level.
What is explicitly recognized as International Relations theory was not developed until after World War I, and is dealt with in more detail below. IR theory, however, has a long tradition of drawing on the work of other social sciences. The use of capitalizations of the "I" and "R" in International Relations aims to distinguish the academic discipline of International Relations from the phenomena of international relations. Many cite Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War as the inspiration for realist theory, with Hobbes' Leviathan and Machiavelli's The Prince providing further elaboration. Similarly, liberalism draws upon the work of Kant and Rousseau, with the work of the former often being cited as the first elaboration of democratic peace theory. Though contemporary human rights is considerably different than the type of rights envisioned under natural law, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius and John Locke offered the first accounts of universal entitlement to certain rights on the basis of common humanity. In the twentieth century, in addition to contemporary theories of liberal internationalism, Marxism has been a foundation of international relations.
Study of IR
Initially, international relations as a distinct field of study was almost entirely British-centered. In 1919, the Chair in International Politics established at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth (renamed Aberystwyth University in 2008), from an endowment given by David Davies, became the first academic position dedicated to IR. In the early 1920s, the London School of Economics' department of International Relations was founded at the behest of Nobel Peace Prize winner Philip Noel-Baker. The first university entirely dedicated to the study of IR was the Graduate Institute of International Studies (now the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), which was founded in 1927 to form diplomats associated to the League of Nations, established in Geneva some years before. The Graduate Institute of International Studies offered one of the first Ph.D. degrees in international relations. Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service is the oldest international relations faculty in the United States, founded in 1919. The Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago was the first to offer a graduate degree, in 1928. Other schools include the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, the School of International Relations at the University of St Andrews, the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University and the Fletcher School at Tufts University.
Theory
Epistemology and IR theory
IR theories can be roughly divided into one of two epistemological camps: "positivist" and "post-positivist". Positivist theories aim to replicate the methods of the natural sciences by analysing the impact of material forces. They typically focus on features of international relations such as state interactions, size of military forces, balance of powers etc. Post-positivist epistemology rejects the idea that the social world can be studied in an objective and value-free way. It rejects the central ideas of neo-realism/liberalism, such as rational choice theory, on the grounds that the scientific method cannot be applied to the social world and that a 'science' of IR is impossible.
A key difference between the two positions is that while positivist theories, such as neo-realism, offer causal explanations (such as why and how power is exercised), post-positivist theories focus instead on constitutive questions, for instance what is meant by 'power'; what makes it up, how it is experienced and how it is reproduced. Often, post-positivist theories explicitly promote a normative approach to IR, by considering ethics. This is something which has often been ignored under 'traditional' IR as positivist theories make a distinction between 'facts' and normative judgments, or 'values'.
During the late 1980s/1990 debate between positivists and post-positivists became the dominant debate and has been described as constituting the Third "Great Debate" (Lapid 1989).
Positivist Theories
Realism
Realism focuses on state security and power above all else. Early realists such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau argued that states are self-interested, power-seeking rational actors, who seek to maximize their security and chances of survival. Any cooperation between states is explained as functional in order to maximize each individual state's security (as opposed to more idealistic reasons). Many realists saw World War II as the vindication of their theory. It should be noted that classical writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes are often cited as "founding fathers" of realism by contemporary self-described realists.[citation needed] However, while their work may support realist doctrine, it is not likely that they would have classified themselves as realists (in this sense of the term). Realists are often split up into two groups: Classical or Human Nature Realists (as described here) and Structural or Neorealists (below).
Liberalism/idealism/Liberal Internationalism
Liberal international relations theory arose after World War I in response to the inability of states to control and limit war in their international relations. Early adherents include Woodrow Wilson and Norman Angell, who argued vigorously that states mutually gained from cooperation and that war was so destructive to be essentially futile. Liberalism was not recognized as a coherent theory as such until it was collectively and derisively termed idealism by E. H. Carr. A new version of "idealism" that focused on human rights as the basis of the legitimacy of international law was advanced by Hans Köchler.
Further information: liberal internationalism
Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism seeks to update liberalism by accepting the neorealist presumption that states are the key actors in international relations, but still maintains that non-state actors (NSAs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) matter. Proponents such as Maria Chattha argue that states will cooperate irrespective of relative gains, and are thus concerned with absolute gains. This also means that nations are, in essence, free to make their own choices as to how they will go about conducting policy without any international organizations blocking a nation's right to sovereignty. Neoliberalism also contains an economic theory that is based on the use of open and free markets with little, if any, government intervention to prevent monopolies and other conglomerates from forming. The growing interdependence throughout and after the Cold War through international institutions led to neo-liberalism being defined as institutionalism, this new part of the theory being fronted by Robert Keohane and also Joseph Nye.
Further information: complex interdependence
Regime Theory
Regime theory is derived from the liberal tradition that argues that international institutions or regimes affect the behavior of states (or other international actors). It assumes that cooperation is possible in the anarchic system of states, indeed, regimes are by definition, instances of international cooperation.
While realism predicts that conflict should be the norm in international relations, regime theorists say that there is cooperation despite anarchy. Often they cite cooperation in trade, human rights and collective security among other issues. These instances of cooperation are regimes. The most commonly cited definition of regimes comes from Stephen Krasner. Krasner defines regimes as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations."
Not all approaches to regime theory, however are liberal or neoliberal; some realist scholars like Joseph Greico have developed hybrid theories which take a realist based approach to this fundamentally liberal theory. (Realists don't say cooperation never happens, just that it's not the norm; it's a difference of degree).
Post-positivist/reflectivist theories
International society theory (the English school)
International society theory, also called the English School, focuses on the shared norms and values of states and how they regulate international relations. Examples of such norms include diplomacy, order, and international law. Unlike neo-realism, it is not necessarily positivist. Theorists have focused particularly on humanitarian intervention, and are subdivided between solidarists, who tend to advocate it more, and pluralists, who place greater value in order and sovereignty. Nicholas Wheeler is a prominent solidarist, while Hedley Bull and Robert H. Jackson are perhaps the best known pluralists.
Social Constructivism
Social Constructivism encompasses a broad range of theories that aim to address questions of ontology, such as the Structure and agency debate, as well as questions of epistemology, such as the "material/ideational" debate that concerns the relative role of material forces versus ideas. Constructivism is not a theory of IR in the manner of neo-realism, but is instead a social theory which is used to better explain the actions taken by states and other major actors as well as the identities that guide these states and actors.
Constructivism in IR can be divided into what Hopf (1998) calls 'conventional' and 'critical' constructivism. Common to all varieties of constructivism is an interest in the role that ideational forces play. The most famous constructivist scholar, Alexander Wendt noted in a 1992 article in International Organization (later followed up by a book, Social Theory of International Politics (1999)), that "anarchy is what states make of it". By this he means that the anarchical structure that neo-realists claim governs state interaction is in fact a phenomenon that is socially constructed and reproduced by states. For example, if the system is dominated by states that see anarchy as a life or death situation (what Wendt terms a "Hobbesian" anarchy) then the system will be characterised by warfare. If on the other hand anarchy is seen as restricted (a "Lockean" anarchy) then a more peaceful system will exist. Anarchy in this view is constituted by state interaction, rather than accepted as a natural and immutable feature of international life as viewed by neo-realist IR scholars.
Critics, however, abound from both sides of the epistemological divide: Post-positivists say the focus on the state at the expense of ethnicity/race/class/gender makes social constructivism yet another positivist theory. The use of implicit rational choice theory by Wendt has also raised criticisms from scholars such as Steven Smith. Positivist scholars of (neo-)liberalism/realism hold that the theory forgoes too many positivist assumptions for it to be considered positivist.
Critical Theory
Main article: Critical international relations theory
Critical international relations theory is the application of 'critical theory' to international relations. Proponents such as Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox and Ken Booth focus on the need for human emancipation from States. Hence, it is "critical" of mainstream IR theories that tend to be state-centric.
Marxism
Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories of IR reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation; instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. It makes the assumption that the economy trumps other concerns; allowing for the elevation of class as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. Thus, the period of colonialism brought in sources for raw materials and captive markets for exports, while decolonialization brought new opportunities in the form of dependence.
Linked in with Marxist theories is dependency theory which argues that developed countries, in their pursuit of power, penetrate developing states through political advisors, missionaries, experts and MNCs to integrate them into the integrated capitalist system in order to appropriate natural resources and foster dependence by developing countries on developed countries.
Marxist theories receive scant attention in the United States where no significant socialist party ever existed. It is more common in parts of Europe and is one of the most important theoretic contributions of Latin American academia, for example through Liberation theology.
Leadership Theories
Interest Group Perspective
Strategic Perspective
Strategic Perspective is a theoretical approach that views individuals as choosing their actions by taking into account the anticipated actions and responses of others with the intention of maximizing their own welfare.
Poststructuralist theories
Poststructuralist theories of IR developed in the 1980s from postmodernist studies in political science. Post-structuralism explores the deconstruction of concepts traditionally not problematic in IR, such as 'power' and 'agency' and examines how the construction of these concepts shapes international relations. The examination of 'narratives' plays an important part in poststructuralist analysis, for example feminist poststructuralist work has examined the role that 'women' play in global society and how they are constructed in war as 'innocent' and 'civilians'.
Examples of post-positivist research include:
• Feminisms ("gendering" war)
• Postcolonialism (challenges the euro-centrism of IR)
Concepts in international relations
Conjuncture
In decision making in international relations, the concept of International Conjuncture, together with freedom of action and equality are important elements. Decision makers must take into account the set of international conditions in taking initiatives that would create different types of responses.
Systemic level concepts
International relations is often viewed in terms of levels of analysis, the systemic level concepts are those broad concepts that define and shape an international milieu, characterised by Anarchy.
Power
The concept of power in international relations can be described as the degree of resources, capabilities, and influence in international affairs. It is often divided up into the concepts of hard power and soft power, hard power relating primarily to coercive power, such as the use of force, and soft power commonly covering economics, diplomacy and cultural influence. However, there is no clear dividing line between the two forms of power.
Polarity
Polarity in International Relations refers to the arrangement of power within the international system. The concept arose from bipolarity during the Cold War, with the international system dominated by the conflict between two superpowers, and has been applied retrospectively. Consequently, the international system prior to 1945 can be described as multi-polar, with power being shared among Great powers. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had led to what some would call unipolarity, with the United States as a sole superpower. However, due to China's surge of economic success after joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, combined with the respectable international position they hold within political spheres and the power that the Chinese Government exerts over their people (consisting of the largest population in the world), there is debate over whether China is now a superpower or a possible candidate in the future.
Several theories of international relations draw upon the idea of polarity.
The balance of power was a concept prevalent in Europe prior to the First World War, the thought being that by balancing power blocs it would create stability and prevent war. Theories of the balance of power gained prominence again during the Cold War, being a central mechanism of Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism. Here, the concepts of balancing (rising in power to counter another) and bandwagonning (siding with another) are developed.
Hegemonic stability theory (developed by Robert Gilpin) also draws upon the idea of Polarity, specifically the state of unipolarity. Hegemony is the preponderance of power at one pole in the international system, and the theory argues this is a stable configuration because of mutual gains by both the dominant power and others in the international system. This is contrary to many Neorealist arguments, particularly made by Kenneth Waltz, stating that the end of the Cold War and the state of unipolarity is an unstable configuration that will inevitably change.
This can be expressed in Power transition theory, which states that it is likely that a great power would challenge a hegemon after a certain period, resulting in a major war. It suggests that while hegemony can control the occurrence of wars, it also results in the creation of one. Its main proponent, A.F.K. Organski, argued this based on the occurrence of previous wars during British, Portuguese and Dutch hegemony.
Interdependence
Many advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence; the mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Advocates of this point to growing globalization, particularly with international economic interaction. The role of international institutions, and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system, reinforces ideas that relations are characterized by interdependence.
Dependency
Military exercises often help increase strategic cooperation between countries. Shown here are Indian Navy, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S Navy ships in formation, during a trilateral exercise in 2007.
Dependency theory is a theory most commonly associated with Marxism, stating that a set of Core states exploit a set of weaker Periphery states for their prosperity. Various versions of the theory suggest that this is either an inevitability (standard dependency theory), or use the theory to highlight the necessity for change (Neo-Marxist).
Systemic tools of international relations
• Diplomacy is the practice of communication and negotiation between representatives of states. To some extent, all other tools of international relations can be considered the failure of diplomacy. Keeping in mind, the use of other tools are part of the communication and negotiation inherent within diplomacy. Sanctions, force, and adjusting trade regulations, while not typically considered part of diplomacy, are actually valuable tools in the interest of leverage and placement in negotiations.
• Sanctions are usually a first resort after the failure of diplomacy, and are one of the main tools used to enforce treaties. They can take the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions and involve the cutting of ties and imposition of barriers to communication or trade.
• War, the use of force, is often thought of as the ultimate tool of international relations. A widely accepted definition is that given by Clausewitz, with war being "the continuation of politics by other means". There is a growing study into 'new wars' involving actors other than states. The study of war in International Relations is covered by the disciplines of 'War Studies' and 'Strategic studies'.
• The mobilization of international shame can also be thought of as a tool of International Relations. This is attempting to alter states' actions through 'naming and shaming' at the international level. This is mostly done by the large human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International (for instance when it called Guantanamo Bay a "Gulag")[1], or Human Rights Watch. A prominent use of was the UN Commission on Human Rights 1235 procedure, which publicly exposes state's human rights violations. The current Human Rights Council has yet to use this Mechanism
• The allotment of economic and/or diplomatic benefits. An example of this is the European Union's enlargement policy. Candidate countries are allowed entry into the EU only after the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria.
Unit-level concepts in international relations
As a level of analysis the unit level is often referred to as the state level, as it locates its explanation at the level of the state, rather than the international system.
Regime type
It is often considered that a state's form of government can dictate the way that a state interacts with others in the international system.
Democratic Peace Theory is a theory that suggests that the nature of democracy means that democratic countries will not go to war with each other. The justifications for this are that democracies externalise their norms and only go to war for just causes, and that democracy encourages mutual trust and respect.
Communism justifies a world revolution, which similarly would lead to peaceful coexistence, based on a proletarian global society.
Revisionism/Status quo
States can be classified by whether they accept the international status quo, or are revisionist, i.e. want change. Revisionist states seek to fundamentally change the rules and practices of international relations, feeling disadvantaged by the status quo. They see the international system as a largely western creation which serves to reinforce current realities. Japan is an example of a state that has gone from being a revisionist state to one that is satisfied with the status quo, because the status quo is now beneficial to it.
Religion
It is often considered that religion can have an effect on the way a state acts within the international system. Religion is visible as an organising principle particularly for Islamic states, whereas secularism sits at the other end of the spectrum, with the separation of state and religion being responsible for the Liberal tradition.
See also: Foundationalism
Individual or sub-unit level concepts
The level beneath the unit (state) level can be useful both for explaining factors in International Relations that other theories fail to explain, and for moving away from a state-centric view of international relations.
• Psychological factors in International Relations - Evaluating psychological factors in international relations comes from the understanding that a state is not a 'black box' as proposed by Realism, and that there may be other influences on foreign policy decisions. Examining the role of personalities in the decision making process can have some explanatory power, as can the role of misperception between various actors. A prominent application of sub-unit level psychological factors in international relations is the concept of Groupthink, another is the propensity of policymakers to think in terms of analogies.
• Bureaucratic politics - Looks at the role of the bureaucracy in decision making, and sees decisions as a result of bureaucratic in-fighting, and as having been shaped by various constraints.
• Religious, Ethnic, and secessionist groups - Viewing these aspects of the sub-unit level has explanatory power with regards to ethnic conflicts, religious wars, transnational diaspora (diaspora politics) and other actors which do not consider themselves to fit with the defined state boundaries. This is particularly useful in the context of the pre-modern world of weak states.
• Science, Technology and International Relations- How science and technology impact the global health, business, environment, technology, and development.
• International political economy, and economic factors in international relations.[2]
Institutions in international relations
International institutions form a vital part of contemporary International Relations. Much interaction at the system level is governed by them, and they outlaw some traditional institutions and practices of International Relations, such as the use of war (except in self-defence).
As humanity enters the Planetary phase of civilization, some scientists and political theorists see a global hierarchy of institutions replacing the existing system of sovereign nation-states as the primary political community. They argue that nations are an imagined community that cannot resolve such modern challenges as the “Dogville” effect (strangers in a homogeneous community), the legal and political status of stateless people and refugees, and the need to address worldwide concerns like climate change and pandemics. Futurist Paul Raskin has hypothesized that a new, more legitimate form of global politics could be based on “constrained pluralism.” This principle guides the formation of institutions based on three characteristics: irreducibility, where some issues must be adjudicated at the global level; subsidiarity, which limits the scope of global authority to truly global issues while smaller-scope issues are regulated at lower levels; and heterogeneity, which allows for diverse forms of local and regional institutions as long as they meet global obligations.
See also: International organization
United Nations
Main article: United Nations
The United Nations (UN) is an international organization that describes itself as a "global association of governments facilitating co-operation in international law, international security, economic development, and social equity"; It is the most prominent international institution. Many of the legal institutions follow the same organizational structure as the UN.
Economic institutions
• Asian Development Bank
• African Development Bank
• International Monetary Fund
• World Bank
• World Trade Organization
International legal bodies
Human rights
• European Court of Human Rights
• Human Rights Committee
• Inter-American Court of Human Rights
• International Criminal Court
• International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
• International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
• United Nations Human Rights Council
Legal
• African Court of Justice
• European Court of Justice
• International Court of Justice
• International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
Regional security arrangements
Main article: Collective Security
• ASEAN
• Arab League
• CIS
• European Union
• CSCAP
• GUAM
• Kurdish League
• Maritime security regime
• NATO
• RECAAP
• SCO
• SAARC
See also
• Development criticism
• Diplomacy Monitor, a tool for tracking Internet-based public diplomacy
• History of ideas
• Human condition
• Human history
• Human nature
• Human security
• Intercultural competence
• List of IR institutes and organisations
• List of IR schools
• List of scholarly journals in international relations
• Moral syncretism
• Political Realism
• Confidence-building measures
• Confidence-building measures in South America
References
1. ^ http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/POL10/014/2005/en>
2. ^ Eg, Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace, Oxford University Press, 2006. Donald Markwell, Keynes and International Economic and Political Relations, Trinity Paper 33, Trinity College, University of Melbourne. [1]
Further reading
• Norman Angell The Great Illusion 1909
• Ankerl, Guy. Global communication without universal civilization. INU societal research. Vol.1: Coexisting contemporary civilizations : Arabo-Muslim, Bharati, Chinese, and Western. Geneva: INU Press. ISBN 2-88155-004-5.
• Hedley Bull Anarchical Society
• Barry Buzan Regions and Powers 2003
• E. H. Carr Twenty Years Crisis
• Rubén Herrero de Castro & Robert Jervis La Realidad Inventada
• Robert Cooper The Post-Modern State
• Daniel Deudney Bounding Power: The Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village
• Hugo Grotius, The Laws of War and Peace
• Thomas Hobbes Leviathan
• Robert H. Jackson The Global Covenant 2002
• Mary Kaldor New Wars
• Immanuel Kant Perpetual Peace
• Kautilya Arthashastra circa 320 BCE
• Hans Köchler, Aussenpolitik und Demokratie (German), 1986 (Foreign Policy and Democracy)
• Hans Köchler, Democracy and the International Rule of Law. Vienna/New York: Springer, 1995
• Andrew Linklater Men and citizens in the theory of international relations
• Niccolò Machiavelli The Prince
• Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace, 2006.
• Donald Markwell, Keynes and International Economic and Political Relations, Trinity Paper 33, Trinity College, University of Melbourne, 2009.[2]
• Joseph Nye Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, PublicAffairs Ltd 2004
• Paul Raskin The Great Transition Today: A Report from the Future
• Jean-Jacques Rousseau The social contract Google Print
• Thucydides The History of the Peloponnesian war
• Francisco de Vitoria De jure belli Hispanorum in barbaros
• Kenneth Waltz Man, the State, and War
• Kenneth Waltz Theory of International Politics 1979*Alexander Wendt Social Theory of International Politics 1999
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_relations"
Notable political scientists
A
• John Aldrich - Political parties expert at Duke University, author of Why Parties?
• Graham Allison - Early proponent of the bureaucratic politics model, author of Essence of Decision, national security specialist, former Dean of Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
• Gabriel A. Almond - Originator of the culturist movement in Comparative Politics.
• Robert Axelrod - Expert on game theory and complexity theory, wrote extensively on the Prisoner's Dilemma, former president of American Political Science Association.
B
• Benjamin Barber - proponent of participatory democracy and local governance teaching at the University of Maryland School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland College Park.
• James David Barber - developed a classification system of the personality types of American presidents, successfully predicted Richard Nixon's resignation from the office of the president
• Stephen Barber - Noted for his work on political strategy and political economy, author of Political Strategy
• Simion Bărnuţiu - Noted for his work on political strategy in Austria and Romania.
• Larry Bartels - Democracy and voting expert at Princeton University.
• Gad Barzilai - Law and Politics, Human Rights and Politics, Communities and Law at University of Washington .
• Duncan Black - Responsible for unearthing the work of many early political scientists, including Charles Dodgson.
• Hans T. Blokland - Author of Freedom and Culture in Western Society and Modernization and its political consequences.
• Jean Blondel - Comparative politics at University of Siena, emeritus at European University Institute.
• Jean-Charles de Borda - 18th century mathematician who devised the Borda count.
• Steven Brams - Expert on voting systems.
• Ahron Bregman - Expert on the Arab-Israeli conflict.
• Ian Bremmer - Political risk specialist.
• Stephen Brooks - International relations scholar.
• Bruce Bueno de Mesquita - Pioneering game theorist with applications to international relations, author of selectorate theory, seminal book "The War Trap".
• Walter Dean Burnham - Expert in the field of realigning elections, emeritus at University of Texas at Austin.
• David Butler, pioneer of modern British political science, invented the concept of swing.
C
• James E. Campbell - American politics, election forecasting, theory of "surge and decline," SUNY-Buffalo, Author of "The American Campaign"
• George Catlin - (1896-1979) was an English political scientist and philosopher. A strong proponent of Anglo-America cooperation, he worked for many years as a professor at Cornell University.
• Ira Carmen - Co-founder of the social science subdiscipline of genetics and politics.
• Edward Hallett Carr - Noted international relations theorist.
• Alfredo Castillero Hoyos - Democracy and Human Rights. Former member of the United Nations's Human Rights Committee.
• Partha Chatterjee - Indian postcolonial critic, political and social scientist
• John Coakley - specialist in ethnic conflict and Irish politics
• Benjamin Cohen - leader in the field of International Political Economy
• James Smoot Coleman, early Africanist, founded the UCLA African Studies Center
• Josep Colomer - Institutionalist, comparativist, and game theorist scholar.
• Marquis de Condorcet - 18th century mathematician and philosopher who contributed the often used Condorcet criterion and devised the concept of a Condorcet method.
• Satyabrata Rai Chowdhuri - International Relations, Indology at Institute of Commonwealth Studies
• Philip Converse - Public opinion scholar, author of "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics."
• Clyde Coombs - Voting systems expert, designed "Coombs' method"
• Philip Cowley - Author of "Revolts and Rebellions".
• Ralph W. Conant - Author of "The Prospects for Revolution" and "Toward a More Perfect Union: The Governance of Metropolitan America".
D
• Robert A. Dahl - American politics specialist, author of On Democracy (Yale University Press)
• Daniel Deudney - Writer and associate professor at Johns Hopkins University; author of Bounding Power: Republican Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village
• Karl Deutsch - Political scientist, focused on political communication.
• Larry Diamond - Comparative democratization specialist. Professor at Stanford University.
• Jouke de Vries - Frisian politician and professor at the university of Leiden.
• Thomas Diez - Chair in International Relations at the University of Birmingham
• John DiIulio - American politics expert at the University of Pennsylvania; first director of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Groups
• Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (also known as Lewis Carroll) - Author of Alice in Wonderland and professor of mathematics at the University of Oxford; devised Dodgson's method of voting.
• Robert Donaldson - Professor at University of Tulsa and specialist in US/Russian foreign policy.
• Anthony Downs - has contributed to democratic theory, elections studies.
• Donald Downs - Professor at University of Wisconsin; researcher for Independent Institute
• Maurice Duverger - French lawyer and sociologist responsible for Duverger's law.
• Michael W. Doyle - International Relations theorist, author of "Empires".
• Daniel Drezner - Professor at Tufts University, specializing in international politics
• Murray Dry - Professor at Middlebury College, specializing in constitutional law
• John Dunn - Political theorist at the University of Cambridge.
• Rand Dyck - Canadian politics expert and professor at Carleton University.
• Thomas R. Dye - Elite theory vs. Pluralism; author of The Irony of Democracy and Who's Running America?
E
• David Easton - Originator of systemic theory
• Jon Elster - Norwegian social and political theorist authored works in the philosophy of social science and rational choice theory and a notable proponent of Analytical Marxism.
• Lee Epstein-- Judicial Politics
F
• Peter D. Feaver - International security expert.
• David Fellman - Constitutional scholar
• Richard Fenno - Congress scholar, author of Home Style: House Members in their Districts
• Thomas Ferguson - Politics and economics
• Samuel Finer - Academic and author on political science and history of government.
• Peter Fishburn - Operations analysis and probability theory expert.
• Keith Fitzgerald - Immigration politics expert.
• James H. Fowler - Expert on political participation, the evolution of cooperation, and social network theory (UCSD)
• Ernst Fraenkel
• Francis Fukuyama - International political theory and biopolitics.
G
• Anthony Giddens - Noted political sociologist originator of the Third Way.
• Robert Gilpin - International political economy specialist.
• Sheldon Goldman - Expert on American federal courts, Professor at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst
• Colin Gray - international security
• Amy Gutmann - political theory expert; (2004-present) President of the University of Pennsylvania
H
• Jacob Hacker - Professor of Political Science at Yale University.
• Harry Harding - China specialist.
• Thomas Hare - Devised Single Transferable Vote (also known as Hare's method).
• Jeremy Harris - American Politics Specialist
• Michael Hart - British twentieth century politics specialist.
• Louis Hartz - American author of The Liberal Tradition in America (1955).
• Colin Hay - influential British political scientist
• Marc Hetherington - Author of "Why Trust Matters" and offered new participation paradigm.
• Christopher J. Hill - International Relations scholar, Professor and Director of the Cambridge Centre of International Studies.
• Roger Hilsman - JFK Aid, Columbia University Professor, and prolific author.
• Thomas Holbrook - Public Opinion and Elections Research, author Do Campaigns Matter?
• Donald Horowitz - Pioneered political science models for assessing ethnic conflict.
• Michael P. Howlett - Canadian political economy.
• Samuel P. Huntington - Author of "Clash of Civilizations" and a noted comparativist.
I
• Kancha Ilaiah - Dalit scholar and social scientist
J
• Robert Jervis - International security specialist.
• Chalmers Johnson - Comparative theorist.
• Loch K. Johnson - United States intelligence expert.
• Bertrand de Jouvenel - French political scientist. Co-founder of Mont Pelerin Society
K
• Peter Katzenstein
• Dennis Kavanagh
• Michael Keating - Specialist in nationalism, European integration and regionalism
• Robert O. Keohane - Interdependence theory author.
• Cornelius Kerwin - President of American University
• V.O. Key, Jr. - Elections, parties and public opinion scholar.
• Kan Kimura - Professor at Kobe University, Specialist in nationalism, East Asian Politics.
• Gary King - Professor at Harvard, political methodologist.
• Henry Kissinger - Former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor to President Richard M. Nixon.
• Herbert Kitschelt - author on new radical right parties
• Stephen D. Krasner - International regimes author, Director of Policy Planning under Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and professor at Stanford University.
• Michael Krassa - Elections, social context, architecture and society. Lobbyist, consultant, political sociologist and Chair of Human Dimensions of Environmental Systems department at University of Illinois at Urbana.
• Oskar Krejčí - Theory of international relations, elections and political psychology, former advisor to two Czechoslovak premieres.
• James Kurth
• Will Kymlicka - Originated the theoretical foundations of multiculturalism.
L
• Guy Laforest - Liberalism (John Locke) scholar and Quebec and Canadian politics specialist
• Jack Layton - Leader of the New Democratic Party of Canada, has a Ph.D in Political Science.
• Richard Ned Lebow - Noted constructivist, Cold War expert, author of "Tragic Vision of Politics".
• Michael Leifer - International Relations, South Asian Studies, London School of Economics
• Arend Lijphart - Originator of consociationalism.
• Dan Lipinski - US House of Representatives (IL-D, 3rd)
• Juan Linz - Democracy specialist
• Seymour Martin Lipset - Renowned political theorist on democracy and development and parties. Taught at Stanford University.
• Ramon Llull - Discoverer of Condorcet Criterion and Borda Count
• Theodore Lowi - Major scholar of American politics at Cornell
• Ian Lustick - State territioriality ethnic conflict and computer modelling in political science; University of Pennsylvania
lombia
M
• Niccolò Machiavelli - considered to be the originator of historically based political science. Author of The Prince
• Harvey C. Mansfield - Political philosophy (Harvard University)
• Donald Manzullo - Congressional Representative of Illinois' 16th District.
• Zeev Maoz - Arab-Israeli Conflict and international relations expert
• Jose M. Maravall - Political economist.
• David Marsh - influential British political scientist
• Pierre Martin - French parties and elections scholar.
• Juraj Marusiak - Slovak expert for Central and Eastern Europe
• David R. Mayhew - US legislative behavior and political parties expert.
• Michael McFaul - Russia specialist, professor and director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University
• John McGarry - Ethnic conflict specialist
• John Mearsheimer - Noted international relations theorist and national security expert.
• Thierry Meyssan - Political theorist of anti-imperialism
• Samuel Merrill III - Voting behavior and party competition.
• George Michael - specialist in right-wing extremism.
• Peter Middlebrook - political economist specialising in transition economies.
• David Miller - Political Philosopher specialized in theories of social justice
• Hans Morgenthau - Noted realist, international relations specialist.
• James Morrow - International relations expert and game theorist.
• Michael Munger - trained as an economist, chair of political science at Duke University, running for governor of North Carolina as a Libertarian
N
• Douglass North - Nobel laureate
• Philip Norton - British politics expert
• Pippa Norris - Harvard comparative political scientist
• Joseph Nye - "Soft power" international security specialist; Kennedy School Dean.
O
• Brendan O'Leary - Ethnic conflict specialist
• Cornelius O'Leary - Irish historian and political scientist
• Mancur Olson - International political economy specialist. Expert on collective action problems. Taught at the University of Maryland, College Park.
• A.F.K. Organski - Developed power transition theory in his 1958 book "World Politics".
P
• Thomas Pangle - Political theorist at University of Texas at Austin
• Michael Parenti - Political Scientist and Author
• Gianfranco Pasquino Italian political scientist. Electoral systems, comparative politics.
• Gleb Pavlovsky - Russian political scientist.
• Nelson W. Polsby - American politics scholar.
• Karl Popper - Theorist who invented the Open Society
• Samuel L. Popkin - Early expert on rational choice theory.
• Sergei M. Plekhanov - Russia relations expert
• Adam Przeworski - Democratic transitions theorist, author of Democracy and Development. Member of the September Group.
• Robert D. Putnam - Social capital theorist, author of Bowling Alone.
R
• Condoleezza Rice - Former National Security Advisor, former Secretary of State. Professor at Stanford University.
• Floyd M. Riddick - Parliamentarian of the United States Senate from 1964 to 1974, and developer of Riddick's Senate procedure.
• William H. Riker - 20th century political scientist who applied game theory to political science.
• David Rohde - Congress scholar
• Stein Rokkan - Expert on political parties and movements, founder of the Institute for Comparative Politics.
• Richard Rose - American political scientist, Professor of Politics at the University of Aberdeen
• Richard Rosecrance - International relations and political economy expert.
• Clinton Rossiter - American government and constitutional history theorist.
• John Ruggie - International relations theorist, social constructivist.
• John Rawls - Political philosopher.
S
• Scott Sagan - Stanford professor and notable critic of deterrence theory.
• Slobodan Samardžić - Research includes political ideas and institutions, federalism, constitutionalism, and European Union.
• David Samuels - Comparativist scholar of Brazilian politics and political institutions.
• Giovanni Sartori - Comparativist, expert on constitutional theory and party systems; author of Parties and Party Systems.
• E.E. Schattschneider - Early political parties expert, author of Party Government and The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America
• Gesine Schwan – Political scientist, president of the Viadrina European University, and nominated twice as a candidate for the federal presidential elections of Germany.
• James C. Scott - political economist, Southeast Asia area specialist
• Hossein Seifzadeh - Iranian Professor of Political Science at University of Tehran and expert on strategic and security issues in the Middle East
• Mitchell A. Seligson - Centennial Professor of Political Science Vanderbilt University and founder of Latin American Public Opinion Project and AmericasBarometer
• Theda Skocpol - Comparative sociologist, former president of American Political Science Association, (Harvard University)
• Stephen Skowronek - Presidency and American political development scholar (Yale University)
• Matthew Soberg Shugart - Scholar of constitutional design and electoral systems.
• Daniel Šmihula - Specialist for international and European law and security studies.
• Jean Edward Smith - political economist, biographer, international relations, constitutional law.
• Rogers Smith - Pulitzer Prize finalist, American politics expert at the University of Pennsylvania
• Steven S. Smith - American politics, congressional politics, Russian politics; Director, Weidenbaum Center
• Herbert Simon - Nobel Prize winning professor at Carnegie Mellon. A founder of artificial intelligence research, he received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago
• Peverill Squire - Americanist
• Michael Steed - British political scientist, developed the concept of "Steed swing" as distinct from "Butler swing"
• Alfred Stepan - Comaparativist, Wallace S. Sayre Professor of Government at Columbia University
• Zeev Sternhell - Theorist, political historian of political ideology.
• John G. Stoessinger - International relations theorist, author of "The Might of Nations: World Politics in our Time".
• Donald Stokes -- Former Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton, expert on elections.
• Herbert Storing - American politics expert.
• Susan Strange - British expert in international relations, taught at the London School of Economics
• Surain Subramaniam - professor and prolific author, realist school of international relations
T
• Rein Taagepera - Comparativist, expert on electoral systems and history of government.
• Dennis Thompson - Political theorist at Harvard University
• Charles Tilly - Professor at Columbia University, his work includes contentious politics and evolution of modern states
• Herbert Tingsten - Professor of political science at Stockholm University
• J. Ann Tickner - Feminist international relations theorist and current president of the International Studies Association(ISA).
• George Tsebelis - Game theorist notable for his general theory of Veto players and for describing the Robinson Crusoe fallacy.
U
V
• Stephen Van Evera - MIT international relations expert, known for proposing Offense-Defense theory
• Sidney Verba
• Eric Voegelin - Major work, "Order and History" in five volumes, he rejected the notion that political science should become a positivistic social science.
W
• Helen Wallace - International relations specialist.
• Stephen Walt - International relations specialist.
• Kenneth N. Waltz - Founder of the neorealist international relations school
• Michael Walzer - International relations, just war theory
• Ken Ward - Constitutional Law, Texas State University
• Alexander Wendt - Social constructivism proponent
• Darrell M. West - Specialist in electronic government, Brookings Institution director of Governance Studies
• John Henry Whyte - Specialist in Northern Irish politics
• Alan Whaites - States/State-building theorist, DFID[1]
• Aaron Wildavsky - Author of "Risk and Culture"
• James Q. Wilson - Former President of the American Political Science Association
• Woodrow Wilson - Former Professor of Politics at Princeton University and former U.S. President
• William Wohlforth - International relations scholar
Y
• Atilla Yayla – Professor of Politics, Political Economy and Political Philosophy at Gazi University in Turkey, and president of the Association for Liberal Thinking.
• Crawford Young - Noted comparativist, Africa scholar.
Z
• Fareed Zakaria - International Relations Expert
• John Zaller - Author of "The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion," at UCLA.
Comparative politics
Comparative politics is a subfield of political science, characterized by an empirical approach based on the comparative method. Arend Lijphart argues that comparative politics does not have a substantive focus in itself, but rather a methodological one: it focuses on "the how but does not specify the what of the analysis."[1] In other words, comparative politics is not defined by the object of its study, but rather by the method it applies to study political phenomena. Peter Mair and Richard Rose advance a slightly different definition, arguing that comparative politics is defined by a combination of a substantive focus on the study of countries' political systems and a method of identifying and explaining similarities and differences between these countries using common concepts.[2][3] Rose states that, on his definition: "The focus is explicitly or implicitly upon more than one country, thus following familiar political science usage in excluding within-nation comparison. Methodologically, comparison is distinguished by its use of concepts that are applicable in more than one country."[3]
When applied to specific fields of study, comparative politics may be referred to by other names, such as for example comparative government (the comparative study of forms of government) or comparative foreign policy (comparing the foreign policies of different States in order to establish general empirical connections between the characteristics of the State and the characteristics of its foreign policy).
Sometimes, especially in the United States, the term "comparative politics" is used to refer to "the politics of foreign countries." This usage of the term, however, is often considered incorrect.[4][5]
Contents
• 1 The comparative method
o 1.1 Comparative strategies
• 2 Some major works in comparative politics
• 3 See also
• 4 References
• 5 External links
The comparative method
The comparative method is - together with the experimental method, the statistical method and the case study approach - one of the four fundamental scientific methods which can be used to test the validity of general empirical propositions,[6] i.e. to establish empirical relationships among two or more variables while all other variables are held constant.[7] In particular, the comparative method is generally used when neither the experimental nor the statistical method can be employed: on the one hand, experiments can only rarely be conducted in political science;[8] on the other hand the statistical method implies the mathematical manipulation of quantitative data about a large number of cases, while sometimes political research must be conducted by analysing the behaviour of qualitative variables in a small number of cases.[9] The case study approach cannot be considered a scientific method according to the above definition, however it can be useful to gain knowledge about single cases, which can then be put to comparison according to the comparative method.[10]
Comparative strategies
Several different strategies can be used in comparative research.[11]
• Most Similar Systems Design/Mill's Method of Difference: it consists in comparing very similar cases which only differ in the dependent variable, on the assumption that this would make it easier to find those independent variables which explain the presence/absence of the dependent variable.
• Most Different Systems Design/Mill's Method of Similarity: it consists in comparing very different cases, all of which however have in common the same dependent variable, so that any other circumstance which is present in all the cases can be regarded as the independent variable.
Some major works in comparative politics
• Aristotle: In his work The Politics, Aristotle compares different "constitutions", by introducing a famous typology based on two criteria: the number of rulers (one, few, many) and the nature of the political regime (good or corrupt). Thus he distinguishes six different kinds of "constitutions": monarchy, aristocracy, and polity (good types), versus tyranny, oligarchy and democracy (corrupt types).
• Montesquieu:
• Alexis de Tocqueville: Democracy in America
• Seymour Martin Lipset: Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics
• Barrington Moore: In Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (1966) Moore compares revolutions in countries like England, Russia and Japan (among others). His thesis is that mass-led revolutions dispossess the landed elite and result in Communism, and that revolutions by the elite result in Fascism. It is thus only revolutions by the bourgeoisie that result in democratic governance. For the outlier case of India, practices of the Mogul Empire, British Imperial rule and the Caste System are cited.
• Samuel P. Huntington: The Third Wave
• Robert A. Dahl: Polyarchy
• Arend Lijphart: Patterns of Democracy (1999), an unrivaled, comprehensive study of democracies around the world.
• Giovanni Sartori: Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structure, Incentives and Outcomes
• Theda Skocpol: In States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China Theda Skocpol compares the major revolutions of France, Russia and China: three basically similar events which took place in three very different contexts. Skopcol's purpose is to find possible similarities which might help explain the phenomenon of political revolution. From this point of view, this work represents a good example of a research conducted according to the Most Different Systems Design.
See also
• Political Science
• Historical sociology
• Comparative government
• Politics of Australia and Canada compared
• Politics of Australia and New Zealand compared
• Canadian and American politics compared
References
1. ^ Lijphart, Arend (1971). "Comparative politics and the comparative method". American Political Science Review 65 (3): 682–693. http://www.jstor.org/pss/1955513.
2. ^ Mair, Peter (1996). "Comparative politics: An overview". in Goodin, Robert E.; Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 309–335. ISBN 0198294719. http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/414665/1998/00000001/00000001/art00016.
3. ^ a b {{cite Comparitive politics is that branch of political science,which deals with the comparitive analysis of politics between countries,in terms of methodical similarities and differences. journal|last=Rose|first=Richard|date=1991|title=Comparing forms of comparative analysis|journal=Political Studies|volume=39|issue=3|pages=446–462|url=http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119347508/abstract|doi=10.1111/j.1467-9248.1991.tb01622.x}}
4. ^ Hopkin, J. [2002 (1995)] "Comparative Methods", in Marsh, D. and G. Stoker (ed.) Theory and Methods in Political Science, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 249-250
5. ^ van Biezen, Ingrid; Caramani, Daniele (2006). "(Non)comparative politics in Britain". Politics 26 (1): 29–37. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9256.2006.00248.x. http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118602277/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0.
6. ^ Lijphart, A. (1971), cit., p. 682
7. ^ Lijphart, A. (1971), cit., p. 683
8. ^ Hopkin, J. [2002 (1995)], cit., p. 250
9. ^ It should be noted however that, as Lijphart points out in the article cited above, the experimental and statistical methods share the same logic as the comparative method: they all imply a comparison between cases which differ on the variable which is being studied, while remaining identical on all the other possible variables.
10. ^ Lijphart, A. (1971), cit., p. 691
11. ^ http://poli.haifa.ac.il/~levi/mlogic.html
Public administration
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Public administration can be broadly described as the development, implementation and study of branches of government policy. The pursuit of the public good by enhancing civil society, ensuring a well-run, fair, and effective public service are some of the goals of the field. Though public administration has been historically referred to as government management, since the 1990s the term is sometimes expanded to encompass non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that also operate with a similar, primary dedication to providing services to the public.
Public administration is carried out by public servants who work in public departments and agencies, at all levels of government, and perform a wide range of tasks. Public administrators collect and analyze data (statistics), monitor budgets,, draft legislation, develop policy, and execute legally mandated government activities. Public administrators serve in many roles: ranging from "front-line" positions serving the public (e.g., parole officers and border guards); administrators (e.g., auditors); analysts (e.g., policy analysts); and managers and executives of government branches and agencies.
Public administration is also an academic field. In comparison with related fields such as political science, public administration is a relatively new, multidisciplinary field which only emerged in the 19th century. It draws on theories and concepts from economics, political science, sociology, administrative law, management, and a range of related fields. The goals of the field of public administration are related to the democratic values of improving equality, justice, security, efficiency, effectiveness of public services; business administration is primarily concerned with profit.
Contents
1 In academia
• 2 History
o 2.1 Antiquity to the early 19th century
o 2.2 Mid-1800s - 1930s
o 2.3 1940s
2.3.1 Post-World War II - 1970s
o 2.4 1980s
o 2.5 1990s
2.5.1 New public management (NPM)
• 3 Organizational theory
o 3.1 Management and government academic work
o 3.2 Early management theory
o 3.3 Early political administration theory
o 3.4 Emergence as a distinct field
o 3.5 A consolidated discipline
o 3.6 Public management
o 3.7 Humanist era
o 3.8 Rethinking power and management
o 3.9 Organizational power
o 3.10 New public management
o 3.11 Feminist interpretations
o 3.12 New public service
• 4 Decision-making models and public administration
o 4.1 Rational choice
o 4.2 Herbert Simon's satisficing
o 4.3 Incrementalism
o 4.4 Game theory
o 4.5 William Niskanen's budget-maximizing
o 4.6 Patrick Dunleavy's bureau shaping
• 5 Public Administration dichotomies
o 5.1 Wilson's Politics-Administration Dichotomy
o 5.2 Fact-Value Dichotomy
o 5.3 Leonard White
o 5.4 Paul Appleby
o 5.5 Luther Gulick
• 6 Ethics: (Denhardt 127-128)
o 6.1 Notable scholars
• 7 References
• 8 See also
o 8.1 Societies for public administration
o 8.2 International public administration
• 9 External links
• 10 Suggested reading
In academia
See also: Master of Public Administration and Doctor of Public Administration
A public administrator can expect to serve in a variety of capacities. In the United States, the academic field draws heavily on political science and law. In Europe, notably England and Germany, the divergence of the field from other disciplines can be traced back to the 1720s continental university curriculum. Formally, official academic distinctions were made in the 1910s and 1890s, respectively. Returning again to the United States, the Federalist Papers referred to the importance of good administration at various times. Further, scholars such as John A. Rohr writes of a long history behind the constitutional legitimacy of government bureaucracy.
One minor tradition that the more specific term "public management" refers to ordinary, routine or typical management concerns, in the context of achieving public good. Others argue that public management as a new, economically driven perspective on the operation of government. We will see that this latter view is often called "new public management" by its advocates. New public management represents a reform attempt, aimed at reemphasizing the professional nature of the field. This will replace the academic, moral or disciplinary emphasis. Some theorists advocate a bright line differentiation of the professional field from related academic disciplines like political science and sociology; it remains interdisciplinary in nature.
As a field, public administration can be compared to business administration, and the master of public administration (MPA) viewed as similar to a master of business administration (MBA) for those wishing to pursue governmental or non-profit careers. An MPA often emphasizes substantially different ethical and sociological criteria that are traditionally secondary to that of profit for business administrators. The MPA is related to similar government studies including public affairs, public policy, and political science. Differences often include program emphases on policy analysis techniques or other topical focuses such as the study of international affairs as opposed to focuses on constitutional issues such as separation of powers, administrative law, problems of governance and power, and participatory democracy.
The Doctor of Public Administration (DPA) is a terminal applied-research doctoral degree in the field of public administration, focusing on practice. The DPA requires a dissertation and significant coursework beyond the masters level. Upon successful completion of the doctoral requirements, the title of "Doctor" is awarded and the post-nominals of D.P.A. are often added.
Public administration theory is the domain in which discussions of the meaning and purpose of government, bureaucracy, budgets, governance, and public affairs takes place. In recent years, public administration theory has periodically connoted a heavy orientation toward critical theory and postmodern philosophical notions of government, governance, and power. However, many public administration scholars support a classic definition of the term emphasizing constitutionality, service, bureaucratic forms of organization, and hierarchical government.
History
Antiquity to the early 19th century
Classic scholars including Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli are the basis of subsequent generations of public administration. Until the birth of a national state, the governors principally emphasized moral and political human nature, as well as the on the organization of the governing bodies. Operations were perceived to secondary to establishing guiding theory. In Machiavelli's The Prince, European princes or governors were offered advice for properly administering their governments. This work represents one of the first Western expressions of the methodology of government. As the centuries moved past, scholars and governors persisted in their various endeavors explaining how one governs.
Though progress varied across the globe, 16th century Western Europe primarily ascribed to the "national-state" model of government and its corresponding administrative structures. Predominantly imperial Asia, tribal Africa, and the tribal/colonial Americas were each feeling the extent of Europe's aggressive, dominant diplomatic strategies whose emphasis was war, profit, and proselytizing. In any event, nation-states required a professional force and structure for carrying out the primary purposes of government: ensuring stability with through law, security with a military, and some measure of equity through taxation. Consequently, the need for expert civil servants whose ability to read and write formed the basis for developing expertise in such necessary activities as legal records, military prowess, and tax administration, and record keeping. As the European imperialist age progressed and the militarily dominant region extended its hold over other continents and people, the need for increasingly conventional administrative expertise grew.
Eighteenth century noble, King Frederick William I of Prussia, created professorates in Cameralism in an effort to service this need. The universities of Frankfurt an der Oder and University of Hallewere Prussian institutions emphasizing economic and social disciplines, with the goal of societal reform. Johann Heinrich Gottlob Justi was the most well-known professor of Cameralism. Thus, from a Western European perspective, classic, medieval, and enlightened scholars formed the foundation of the discipline that has come to be called public administration.
Mid-1800s - 1930s
Lorenz von Stein, an 1855 German professor from Vienna, is considered the founder of the science of public administration in many parts of the world. In the time of Von Stein, public administration was considered a form of administrative law, but Von Stein believed this concept too restrictive.
Von Stein taught:
• Public administration relies on many prestablished disciplines such as sociology, political science, administrative law and public finance. Further, public administration is an integrating science.
• Public administrators need be concerned with both theory and practice. Practical considerations are at the forefront of the field, but theory is the basis of best practices.
• Public administration is a science because knowledge is generated and evaluated according to the scientific method.
In the United States, Woodrow Wilson is considered the father of public administration. He first formally recognized public administration in an 1887 article entitled "The Study of Administration." The future president wrote that "it is the object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can properly and successfully do, and, secondly, how it can do these proper things with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money or of energy."[1] Wilson was more influential to the science of public administration than Von Stein, primarily due to an article Wilson wrote in 1887 in which he advocated four concepts:
• Separation of politics and administration
• Comparative analysis of political and private organizations
• Improving efficiency with business-like practices and attitudes toward daily operations
• Improving the effectiveness of public service through management and by training civil servants, merit-based assessment
The separation of politics and administration has been the subject of lasting debate. The different perspectives regarding this dichotomy contribute to differentiating characteristics of the suggested generations of public administration.
1940s
The separation of politics and administration advocated by Wilson continues to play a significant role in public administration today. However, the dominance of this dichotomy was challenged by second generation scholars, beginning in the 1940s. Luther Gulick's fact-value dichotomy was a key contender for Wilson's allegedly impractical politics-administration dichotomy. In place of Wilson's first generation split, Gulick advocated a "seamless web of discretion and interaction" (Fry 1989, 80).[2]
Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick are two such second generation scholars. Gulick, Urwick, and the new generation of administrators stood on the shoulders of contemporary behavioral, administrative, and organizational "giants" including Henri Fayol, Fredrick W. Taylor, Paul Appleby, Frank Goodnow, and Willam Willoughby. With the help of these specialists and their empirical work on human nature, group behavior, and business organizations, second generation public administration scholars had a necessary advantage over the pre-generation and first generation scholars. That is, the new generation of organizational theories no longer relied upon logical assumptions and generalizations about human nature like classical and enlightened theorists.
Gulick is considered a watershed theorist, a truly unique administrative scholar cr ed with generating a comprehensive, generic theory of organization. During his seven decade career Gulick differentiated his theories from those of his predecessors by emphasizing the scientific method, efficiency, professionalism, structural reform, and executive control. Gulick summarized the duties of administrators with an acronym; POSDCORB, which stands for planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. Finally, Fayol offered a systematic, 14-point, treatment of private management. Second generation theorists drew upon private management practices for administrative sciences. A single, generic management theory bleeding the borders between the private and the public sector, was thought to be possible. With the general theory, the administrative theory could be focused on governmental organizations.
Post-World War II - 1970s
The mid-1940s theorists challenged Wilson and Gulick. The politics-administration dichotomy remained the center of criticism in the third generation. In addition to this area of criticism, government itself came under fire as ineffective, inefficient, and largely a wasted effort. The sometimes deceptive, and expensive American intervention in Vietnam along with domestic scandals including Watergate are two examples of self-destructive government behavior during the third generation. There was a call by citizens for efficient administration to replace ineffective, wasteful bureaucracy. Public administration would have to distance itself from politics to answer this call and remain effective.
Elected officials supported such reform. The Hoover Commission, chaired by University of Chicago professor Louis Brownlow, to examine reorganization of government. Dr. Brownlow subsequently he founded the public administration service on the university, 1313 E. 60th Street. The organization PAS provided consulting services to governments at all levels of government until the 1970s.
1980s
In the late 1980s, yet another generation of public administration theorists began to displace the last. What was called New Public Management was proposed by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler [3] . The new model advocated the use of private sector innovation, resources, and organizational ideas to improve the public sector. During the Clinton Administration (1992-2000), Vice President Al Gore adopted and reformed federal agencies accordingly. New public management there by became prevalent throughout the US bureaucracy.
Some critics argue that the New Public Management concept of Americans as "customers" rather than "citizens" is an unacceptable abuse. That is, customers are a means to an end, profit, rather than part of the policy making process. Citizens are in fact the proprietors of government (the owners), opposed to merely the customers of a business (the patrons). In New Public Management, people are viewed as economic units not democratic participants. Nevertheless, the model is still widely accepted at all levels of government.
1990s
In the late 1990s, Janet and Robert Denhardt proposed a new public service model [4]. This model's chief contribution is a focus on Americans as "citizens" rather than "customers". Accordingly, the citizen is expected to participate in government and take an active role throughout the policy process. No longer are the proprietors considered an end to a mean. Whilse this remains feasible at the federal, state & local levels, where the concept of citizenship is commonly wedded, the emergence of 'transnational administration' with the growing number of international organizations and 'transnational executive networks' complicates the prospects for citizen engagement.[5]
One example of this is openforum.com.au, an Australian non-for-profit eDemocracy project which invites politicians, senior public servants, academics, business people and other key stakeholders to engage in high-level policy debate.
New public management (NPM)
The critics of NPM claim that a successor to NPM is digital era governance, focusing on themes of reintegrating government responsibilities, needs-based holism (executing duties in cursive ways), and digitalization (exploiting the transformational capabilities of modern IT and digital storage).
Organizational theory
The thematic evolution of organizational theory is yet another way one might capture the development of the field. Modern public sector organizational theory can be thought of as the product of two fields of study: management and government. Each of these disciplines stand upon a foundation built by the theories of Karl Marx, Max Weber, Sigmund Freud, Abraham Maslow, and Robert Golembiewsky.
Foundational scholars do not precede the entire discipline and have emerged by contributing to transformations of the field. The discipline has undergone at least two major transformations: from classic, rational managers and political scientists to a humanistic model of management and increasingly distinct public administration scholars. Indeed, some argue that the third and possibly fourth thematic developments are currently under way. That is, new public management that was popular with the Clinton Administration (1992-2000) may soon yield to new public service. While a thematic discussion of the field involves much of the same chronological narrative, a thematic discussion permits meaningful insights that might otherwise be overlooked. We will begin with foundations of organizational theory before discussing modern trends.
Management and government academic work
In much the same way “pre-generation” scholars provide a foundation for future governors and administrators, many seemingly unrelated scholars are important to the developing organizational theory. Though their respective connections with and relevance to organizational theory vary, Marx, Weber, Freud, Maslow, and Golembiewsky (Denhardt 104-108)[6] form the foundation for much of what has become public sector organizational theory.
• Karl Marx-”The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.” (The Communist Manifesto 1848, 10)
• Max Weber-Government merely monopolizes the legitimate use of force in a given area. Weber’s most famous work was The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930).
• Sigmund Freud-Subconscious needs and desires are manifest in everyday human activities; The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).
• Abraham Maslow theorized that there is a hierarchy of human needs, each level of which must be fulfilled before one can effectively ascend to the next level. Toward a Psychology of Being (1968).
o The five categories of needs are, in hierarchical order: physiological needs, safety, love and belonging, self esteem, and self actualization needs.
• Robert Golembiewsky- Golembiewsky wrote two books of particular relevance to public administration: Men Management and Morality (1967 in Denhardt 2001, 104) and Renewing Organizations (1972 in Denhardt 2001, 106). In the first, he argues for what has come to be known as moral management, a “moral sensitivity…associated with satisfactory output and employee satisfaction” (Denhardt 104). In the second, Golembiewsky takes a “laboratory approach to organizational change” (Denhardt 106). The author identifies five metavalues that guide this approach to organizational change
1. “acceptance of inquiry based on mutual accessibility and open communication
2. expanded consciousness and recognition of choice, especially the willingness to experiment with new behaviors and choose those that seem most effective
3. a collaborative concept of authority, emphasizing cooperation and responsibility for others
4. authenticity in interpersonal relationships“ (Denhardt 106-107).
Golembiewsky’s moral management and meta values are highly compatible with subsequently discussed Theory Y management, Type-Z Organizations, and a humanist approach to workplace organization.
Given its interdisciplinary nature, one might visualize public sector organization theory as a helix of management and government scholars. Management theory began as a strictly rational, positivist dogma through a humanist revolution, and includes a modern reinterpretations and explorations. Similarly, government scholars in the United States first delineated a border between politics and administration that has been re-evaluated and re-interpreted throughout the history of the discipline. Today, public sector management incorporates developments in private management theory with a renegotiation of the policy analyst’s role in the political process.
Early management theory
Due in part to the historic context in which the field of public administration emerged, early management and government scholars attempted to be comprehensive rationalists. This required that they also ascribe to a positivist reality. That is, scholars seek a factual basis for drawing conclusions based upon observations and logical deduction. Positivists believe these methods yield factual, solid, unwavering truths, similar to the laboratory sciences. The early theorists sometimes lost sight of the unpredictable nature of social science.
Early management theorists were almost exclusively private sector scholars. The concept of an employee as a manipulable tool was another feature of early theorists. By creating the proper conditions, management could better shape employees to fit the needs of the organization; the company was primary in early management theory. Though somewhat naive from a modern perspective, early management scholars set a precedent for systematic, unbiased decision-making. Fredrick W. Taylor and Henri Fayol were two of the many seminal management theorists of particular importance to public sector management. Fredrick W. Taylor is probably most remembered for "scientific management." This is commonly described as the method by which the "one best way" to complete a task is discovered. In a 1915 address, Taylor outlined the mutual advantages of labor saving technology and processes, implicitly touting the significance of his model. Taylor argued that objective empirical observation would eventually yield an optimally efficient process by which a labor task could be completed. (Taylor in Shafritz and Ott 2001, 61)[7]
Much like Taylor, Henri Fayol was originally a private sector theorist. In General and Industrial Management (1916), Fayol outlined what he called the “General Principles of Management.” The author acknowledges, from a positivist perspective, the flexibility of management studies. However, his fourteen principles use in much the same matter-of-fact tone as Taylor’s. Fayol’s 14 principles included the division of work, authority and responsibility, discipline, unity of command, unity of direction, subordination of individual interest to the general interest, re-numeration of personnel, centralization, scalar chain, order, equity, stability of tenure of personnel, initiative, and espirit de corps.
His elaboration upon each principle can be summarized as an argument for a logically structured organization with an efficient (non-duplicative) management chain. The author highlighted tension between individual and organizational interests, a theme that would be taken up again by subsequent humanists. Finally, his principles advocated a management style and structure intended to foster a healthy, spirited workforce, with a sense of loyalty to the company. Taylor and Fayol represent early, private sector, management scholars whose work would be succeeded by humanist managers from both the public and private sectors.
Early political administration theory
Government or political science scholars dominated what would become the public side of organizational theory. Woodrow Wilson, PhD. and 28th president, is remembered as one such political scientist who first distinguished public administrators from politicians. In an 1887 article, “The Study of Administration” Wilson called a professional workforce of public sector employees. He further argued for efficiency and responsibility to the public as key criteria by which this workforce would operate. His work marks the beginning of an era, at least in the United States, during which public administration has been thought of as a distinct field of study and practice. Since Wilson, public administration has been a discipline separate from politics, worthy of academic study and independent discussion. The idea that business-like administrators should separate themselves from politics in daily operations remains Wilson’s chief, most enduring contribution.
Subsequent interpretations and the eventual development of rival dichotomies are perhaps a tribute to the importance of Wilson’s first distinction. The politics administration survived the mid-twentieth century in the works of Leonard White, Frank Goodnow, and W.F. Willoughby, but these scholars did not leave the original dichotomy as they had found it. Leonard White authored The Study of Public Administration (1948), a standard in the field for years (Denhardt 2000, 44). In it, the author argued that “the study of public administration…needs to be related to the broad generalizations of political theory concerned with such matters as justice, liberty, obedience, and the role of the state in human affairs “ (cited in Denhardt 2000, 44). The desire to restore a degree of reliability, merit, and workability to modernizing democracy was a major impetus for the continued division of politics and administration.
In a related work, Frank Goodnow, Policy and Administration (1900), takes a local government perspective to comment on the separation of powers in government. He argues that the strict interpretation of the separation of powers in the constitution has been violated many times for good reason (Denhardt 2000, 46). “Therefore, it is appropriate to rethink the formal theory of separation of powers so that our theory might more closely match our practice” (46). The unique perspective offers valuable insight into other trade-offs, including that between legislative versus administrative centralization at the state level (Denhardt 47).
W.F. Willoughby, ‘The Government of Modern States (1936), also contributed to the dialogue. Early in his career, Wolloughby argued for a somewhat strict separation of government powers. The executive branch was to enforce laws as they were created by the legislature and interpreted by the courts (Denhardt 47). However, he later recognized difficulties in this hard-line position. Consequently, Willoughby suggested there are five classes of governmental powers: legislative, judicial, executive, electorate, and administrative. These classes existed in addition to the three traditional branches of government. The theories of White, Goodnow, and Willougby represent nuanced elaborations of a dichotomy much like that of Wilson. However, this dichotomy would be more directly challenged with suggested alternatives by the next generation of public administration scholars.
Emergence as a distinct field
Luther Gulick and Paul Appleby were among those who argued for dichotomies that were wholly different from Wilson's. Gulick has been called a strong personification of public administration in the United States (Fry 1989, 73). Gulick ascribes to many of Wilson’s themes, including a “science of administration,” increased efficiency, structural reform of the bureaucracy, and augmented executive authority. The chief executive coordinates the otherwise disaggregate activities of a large, complex organization such as a government. However, Gulick challenged Wilson’s strict dichotomy by suggesting every action of a public administrator represents a “seamless web of discretion and interaction.” “The administrator’s role is to understand and coordinate public policy and interpret policy directives to the operating services, but with unquestioned loyalty to the decision of elected officials” (Fry 1989, 81).
Paul Appleby argued against the increasingly dominant theory that administrators were somehow neutral policy actors. He argued that “administrators are significant policy actors who influence the policy-making process in several different ways” (Denhadt 49). Administrators are charged with the execution of public programs, the analysis of data for decision recommendations, and interpreting the law as it is carried out on a regular basis. Consequently, administrators influence and even produce policy on a daily basis. Despite their break with Wilson on the issue of completely separating administration from politics, these divergent scholars agreed that a professional workforce remain educated, skilled, and exist in meritous competition for public sector employment. Thus, Gulick and Appleby are major theorists whose theories truly break with Wilson's original public administration theories.
A consolidated discipline
In addition to Gulick and Appleby, Herbert Simon, Chester Barnard, and Charles Lindblom are among the first of those recognized as early American public administrators. These men ushered in an era during which the field gained recognition as independent and unique, despite its multidisciplinary nature. In Simon’s Administrative Behavior (1948), the argument is made that decision-making is the essence of management. The premises with which decisions are made are therefore integral to management. Simon also contributed a fact-value dichotomy, a theoretical separation to discern management, decisions based upon fact versus those made based on values. Since one cannot make completely responsible decisions with public resources based solely on personal values, one must attempt to upon objectively determined facts.
Simon developed other relevant theories as well. Similar to Lindblom’s subsequently discussed critique of comprehensive rationality, Simon also taught that a strictly economic man, one who maximizes returns or values by making decisions based upon complete information in unlimited time, is unrealistic. Instead, most public administrators use a sufficient amount of information to make a satisfactory decision:, they “satisfice.”
Charles Lindblom also expressed disaffection with the comprehensive rational model in a 1959 article, “The Science of Muddling Through.” He argued for “successive limited comparison" (81). [8]” Though the result of this process was not as rational or ultimately as reliable as decisions truly rational methods, incremental decision-making is undoubtedly preferable to making a decision “off-the-cuff” or those that consume extensive resources. Incrementalism's value lies in the realistic expectation that practitioners will be able to use it.
Chester Barnard was also one of the watershed scholars. That is, his theories would bridge what would become a gap between managers like F.W. Taylor and Henri Fayol with subsequent humanists: Mary Follett, Elton Mayo, and Chris Argyris. Barnard published “The Economy of Incentives” (1938), in an attempt to explain individual participation in an organization. Barnard explained organizations as systems of exchange. Low-level employees must have more incentive to remain with the organization for which they exchange their labor and loyalty. The organization (and higher level employees) must derive sufficient benefit from its employees to keep them. The net pull of the organization is determined by material rewards, environmental conditions, and other intangibles like recognition.
Scholars including Gulick, Appleby, Simon, Lindblom, and Barnard are among the early, independent public administrators. We will see, however, that many of their ideas and justifications for a positive, pro-active government are indebted, in fact, to the contributions of numerous female philanthropists (Acker 1992; [9] Stivers 2002[10]).
Public management
Several theorists bridged the gap between strictly private and public sector management. Luther Gulick negotiated a generic theory of organization. Max Weber exploring sociologist, explored the ideal bureaucracy in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism(Denhardt 2000, 27). He claimed that bureaucracies are organizations that manage resources for citizens (Weber in Shafritz and Ott, 2001, 73). The "physical" characteristics the organization and the position of public officials were essential to its structure. Weber held that graduated authority and equitable, formalized procedures guard against the subjective abuse of power by bureaucrats.
Weber admired bureaucracy for its trustworthiness. The bureaucracy was constituted by a group of professional, ethical public officials. These servants dedicate themselves to the public in return for security of job tenure among the many advantages of public employment. By rationalizing the organization of individuals and recognizing the professional nature of the field, Weber implicitly supports Wilson's politics-administration dichotomy.
Humanist era
Humanists embrace a dynamic concept of an employee and management techniques. This requires a theoretical shift away from the idea that an employee is a cog in the industrial machine. Rather, employees are unique individuals with goals, needs, desires, etc. Mary Parker Follett, Elton Mayo, Chris Agyris are among the most prominent humanists. Mary Parker Follett claims that conflict is neither good nor bad, it is simply inevitable (Fry 1989, 98).[11] Elton teaches that humans are social beings whose individualism is defined in part by participation in the group.
Chris Agyris, a writer commonly associated with business management authored Personality and Organization in 1957. He argues that “formal organizational structures and traditional management practices tend to be at odds with certain basic trends toward individual growth and development”[12]. Argyris continues,Executives must therefore fuse basic human tendencies for growth and development with demands of the organization’s task.
Rethinking power and management
The humanist era ushered in other possible interpretations of such topics as power and management. One of the most significant was Douglas McGregor’s “Theory X and Theory Y.” McGregor's work provided a basis for a management framework, a structure upon whose rungs the classic and new-aged management might be hung (Denhardt 99-100). First, commonly held by early management theorists, Theory X begins with the assumption that humans possess an inherent aversion to work. Employees must therefore be coerced and controlled if management expects to see results. Further, lazy humans prefer direction bordering micromanagement whenever possible (Denhardt 99).
Theory Y is much more compatible with the humanist tradition. This begins with the assumption that work is as natural for humans as rest or play. Further, employees will direct and control themselves as they complete objectives. Humans learn naturally and seek responsibility (Denhardt 100). Consequently, managers need only to steer employees in a cooperative manner toward goals that serve the organization. There is room for many to create and share power.
The Z-Organization can be thought of as a complimentary third element to McGregor's dichotomy. Z-organizations are a Japanese organizational model.[13] Similar to Theory-Y management, Z organizations place a large degree of responsibility upon the employees. Further, relatively low-level employees are entrusted with the freedom to be creative, “wander around the organization” and become truly unique, company-specific employees. However, employees achieve only after “agreeing on a central set of objectives and ways of doing business” (Oichi 435).
In Z Organizations, decision-making (Simon’s ostensible basis of management) is democratic and participatory. Despite the many advantages of this organizational model, there are several draw-backs. These include the depredation of a large professional distance--de-personalization is impossible in Z-organizations. A high level of self-discipline is also necessary. Z-organizations tend to be homogeneous. In Japan where this organizational form is popular, management is dominated by males and foreigners are a rarity.
Organizational power
An organization has an array of options for delegating power to its lower level employees. Bown and Lawlwer (2006)identify a spectrum of empowerment possible for service workers in private sector employment.[14] Low-level workers can either be thought of as belonging to a production line and given little individual decision-making freedom (power). These workers can be thought of as individual actors, given discretion to interpret a situation as it arises, and make reasonably independent decisions themselves. Most organizations allow their employees to operate somewhere between these extremes depending on several criteria the organization has as a whole.
Henry Mintzburg contributes to the power discussion with his article, “The Power Game and its Players.[15]" He writes that organizations consist of many individuals, each drawing a source of power from their position within the organization, knowledge skills and abilities, and relative role in that organization. Each also works to increase or maximize his or her power.
Moss Kanter published “Power Failure in Management Circuits” to address symptoms of unhealthy organizational power struggles. The reader learns that many symptoms of dysfunctional organizations can, in fact, be traced to power problems. The three sources of power: position/authority, knowledge/expertise, and technical/vocational ability combined with the way individuals within an organization use this power are often the root of dysfunctional symptoms. By addressing power issues and the ways in which individuals use power with and over one another, participants within an organization can better work together and increase power with one another.
New public management
New public administration theories have emerged over the latter half of the twentieth century. New frameworks increasingly acknowledge that government is seen by citizens through administrators, front line, service deliverers. These are the employees that execute decisions by elected officials. One such theory, new public management, gained popularity in the early nineties (Denhardt 144-153). Programs were implemented and reformed accordingly the Clinton Administration (1992-2000). Vice President Al Gore's efforts and leadership during the National Performance Review spearheaded the effort. Gore and the NPR operated with government effectiveness, efficiency, and reduced cost their main criteria. A private sector mentality pervaded. David Osborne and Ted Gebler (1992) Reinventing Government , describe ten new features of government emphasized in new public management.
1. "Catalytic Government: Steering Rather Than Rowing
2. Community-Owned Government: Empowering Rather than Serving
3. Competitive Government: Injecting Competition into Service
4. Mission-Driven Government: Transforming Rule-Driven Organizations
5. Results-Oriented Government: Funding Outcomes, Not Inputs
6. Customer-Driven Government: Meeting the Needs of the Customer, Not the Bureaucracy
7. Enterprising Government: Earning Rather Than Spending
8. Anticipatory Government: Prevention Rather than Cure
9. Decentralized Government: From Hierarchy to Participation and Teamwork
10. Market-Oriented Government: Leveraging Change Through the Market" (Osborn and Gaebler 1992 cited in Denhardt 145-146).
There has been a rigorous critique and emphasis upon implicit problems with new public management. First, a reliance upon competition and market forces assumes that individual self interest will effectively bring about an equitable social and economic reality for citizens. Henry Mintzberg’s protests,“I am not a mere customer of my government, thank you.” (cited by Dendhardt 2001, 77). “I expect something more than arm’s length trading and something less than the encouragement to consume.” (Denhardt 152 citing Mintzberg 1992, 77). “Do we really want our governments…hawking products?” While greater government efficiency, an individual emphasis, and lower cost operations of new public management may be initially attractive, Mintzberg and Denhardt highlight many incompatibilities of such values with justice, equity, security, and other important government values.
Further, encouraging an entrepreneurial spirit in administrators carries the benefits of innovation and productivity. These benefits are balanced by necessary costs. An entrepreneurial attitude tends to be accompanied by a willingness to bend the rules, reduced level of accountability, and a motivation to take risk with public resources are potentially costly (Denhardt 152-153). Despite what might appear to be a destructive criticism of a new model for public service delivery, Denhardt advocates new public service, one that carefully navigates the intricate differences between public and private organizations.
Feminist interpretations
The simple phrase, "feminist interpretation" carries relevant concepts, often stimulating an emotional response. However, if one can move past prejudice or negativity popularly attributed to the word, one might find important challenges to the implicit assumptions upon which many modern institutions and disciplines are built. Specifically, feminists uncover and challenge the assumption that a heritage of male-dominated public administration has yielded anything other than a "masculine interpretation" of the field. The simple adjective, feminist, asks the public administrator to evaluate his or her premises in a search for masculine interpretations, buried beneath a century of academic dialogue and practice (Stivers, 2002).
Many of the responsibilities public employees currently carry are rooted in nineteenth and twentieth century female philanthropists. Women volunteered their time to contribute to the communal welfare, innovating the rationale and justifications subsequently borrowed by paid male advocates of positive government. Government employees that advocated a public responsibility to assist the poor and underprivileged with material aid and necessary services. Due in part to women's role as pioneers, such activities were (and in actuality still are) perceived to be feminine. Further, the written language describing these efforts was actively "cleaned" of feminine attributes. Once predominantly male, professional administrators began advocating and defending public medical assistance for such groups as the elderly and low income, services including retirement aid and youth activity, and arguments had to be “re-couch” in explicitly masculine terms.
This and other traditional features are used to make the argument that males have a persistent advantage in professional organizations. Subtle, gendered processes perpetuate the advantage, vehemently denied by men and women alike.(Acker 1992). These may be overt, sexual jokes or discrimination in promotion, or covert, organizational processes and decisions apparently independent of gender considerations on their face.
Processes fall into four categories:
1. Production of gender divisions-hierarchies are gendered
2. Creating "symbols, images, and forms of consciousness that explicate, justify, and, more rarely, oppose gender divisions” (Shafritz and Ott, 393).
3. Interactions between individuals that “enact dominance and subordination and create alliances and exclusions.”
4. “Internal mental work of individuals as they consciously construct their understandings of the organization’s gendered structure”
Comparable Worth is another, related topic [16]. Difficult, unpopular questions, like whether women are paid less because they ware women, are explored by contributing scholars. Women might be victims of discrimination because of societal expectations of their biological and psychological state of mind. That is, women bear children and are most often the primary care-taker of children. If a young, newly-wed women is pitted against a similarly qualified, young, newly-wed male for a promotion or position, do expectations of gender roles influence management decisions? Further, to what degree do women possess sufficient power of self-determination?
While feminists are often attacked as radical an unfounded in their claims, the group provides valuable food for thought. That is, questioning premises and assumptions that have led administrators to truths is important for judging the value of these truths.
New public service
Among the many new trends in government administration, the “government scholar” is being rapidly replaced by the “policy analyst.” The change in specialty reflects a shift in focus toward policy outputs and outcomes. Government rhetoric would be expected to yield to measurable impacts of public action. Government professionals are shifting from a focus upon government actors to observation and quantification at all steps of the policy process. For example, domestic social programming and support like senior center activities, welfare, Medicare, and youth groups have measurable inputs and outputs that can be quantified and examined. Effectiveness and efficiency can be estimated with dollars, opinion surveys, confidence indexes, and the like, to quantify the output, impact, and value of such programming.
New concepts of administrative roles challenge both the politics-administration and fact-value dichotomies. In the former case,administrators serving as policy analysts inevitably influence the information they generate, thereby impacting policy. In the case of the former, a newly constructed bureaucracy, representative of the populace it serves, personal values of administrators my reflect the values of the citizenry. In such a case, the necessity of a distinction between fact and value is compromised. A degree of subjectivity, interjection of personal values into factual decision-making may be preferred by the population. In place of alternate theoretical dichotomies, policy analysts and workplace diversity essentially compromise the value of the dichotomy mentality.
In the new public service, citizens are expected to develop a sense of community in addition to personal interests, pushing the threshold past simple self-interest of the new public management. Further, public employees draw heavily upon the variety of humanist management theories that have developed in the private and public sectors. John Gardner writes that healthy communities consisting of good community members “deal with each other humanely, respect individual differences and value the integrity of each person” (cited by Denhardt 2000, 183). Similarly, Robert Bellah, The Good Society , argues that the relationships, the space between these communities and the government, ought to then be relevant.
Smaller, intermediary institutions like churches, families, work groups, and civic associations, are also participants in the negotiation of the newly recognized space for public activity. Such commitment carries tangible benefits. Robert Putnam empirically demonstrates that communities whose citizens are civically engaged live in communities of reduced poverty, crime, better health and improved educational systems. Organization thereby represents a form of “social capital.” Capital being the aspects of social life, like the aforementioned networks, that “facilitate the coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Denhardt 185 citing Putnam 1995, 67).
In Orange County, Florida The “Citizens First!” exemplifies a campaign in favor of new public service. The group advocates for citizens to demonstrate a concern for the wider community of which they are a part. Further, the group teaches that governments must be prepared to listen to citizen groups as they reach out, becoming active. Further, the group recognizes that a citizen is much more than a customer. “ultimately government must be more concerned and more responsive to the needs and interests of citizens” than a business is of its customers (Denhard 187).
The changing nature of leadership, a proactive leadership, is particularly important to new public service (Denhardt 2001). That is, a “catalytic leadership” (Luke 1998) “involves elevating the issue to the public and policy agendas, engaging a diverse set of people on an issue, stimulating multiple strategies and options for action, and sustaining action” (Denhardt 188). New public service administrators have a much more active role to play and cannot differ to citizen apathy to justify ineffectiveness. Where the new public management emphasizes self-interest, new public service asks that citizens become active and develop a sense, an appreciation of the public interest. Further, public employees are expected to engage with the citizens they serve. This is no longer a job; the new public service is a way of life.
Jane Vinzant, Street–Level Leadership (1998) and Terry Cooper, An Ethic of Citizenship for Public Administration (1991) each highlight an important implications of the new public service. Vinzant’s study of administrators physically on the street, including police officers and case workers, brings the reality of increased administrator discretion in daily operations to life. Cooper discusses a relationship between leaders, public employees and citizens (Denhardt 188). The new public service, with a focus on community-mindedness, makes this analysis possible and facilitates a new understanding of public administrators as “citizen-administrators.” Public servants who, by definition, engage citizens as peers. These ideas, combined with modern management practices in the Pursuit of Significance (Denhardt 1993) exemplify best administrative and management practices (Dehardt 2001, 189).
Denhardt’s proposed new public service represents a necessary reconciliation of the new public management and the American-democratic principles. Further, his description of new public service is the culmination of the converging generic management theory and public administration. In Wilson and Taylor’s era, politics and the administration of mandated government activities was very much the same thing. Management was restricted to Theory-X interpretations and assumptions. American “public administration” was thus a nepotistic, spoiled system in which managers governed from high.
After Wilson’s initial distinction between a professional workforce and elected officials, nuanced variations maintained his theoretical trajectory. Taylor and Fayol, Theory-X managers, initially dominated the management circuit until humanists like Mayo, Follett, and Argyris hung new concepts of organization and management on McGregor’s Theory-X/Theory-Y framework. During this time, truly independent administrators including Gulick, Simon, Barnard, and Lindblom forged a significant new field.
A fact-value dichotomy challenged Wilson’s politics-administration dichotomy for dominance, management science was defocused on a revolutionary new unit of analysis: decision premises. Organizations, viewed as systems of exchange, had to recognize employees, even low-level line workers, as partners brokering for adequate compensation and fulfillment. Even the comprehensive rational model, the most scientific of all possible decision-making methods, was challenged as highly impractical. If managers instead make “successive limited comparisons,” they can make informed decisions in a timely, affordable manner.
This dynamic evolution, indeed a changing system of intellectual exchange, continues today as the popular new public management dominates the field. Public administration should arguably be a field dedicated to service of its owners, not mere customers. Indeed, citizens ought to take an active role in their government as an owner would in a business. A government that is administered by a meritocracy, professionals with powerful analytic and literary abilities. Managers might soon find themselves operating with an ethical commitment to values, serve the public, an empowerment attitude with a concept of shared power, pragmatic incrementalism, and a dedication to the public. “Unlike the new public management, which is built on economic concepts such as the maximization of self-interest, the new public service is built on the idea of the public interest, the idea of public administrators serving citizens and indeed becoming fully engaged with those they serve. (Denhardt 2001, 190).
Decision-making models and public administration
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Given the array of duties public administrators find themselves performing, the professional administrator might refer to a theoretical framework from which he or she might work. Indeed, many public and private administrative scholars have devised and modified decision-making models.
Rational choice
Herbert Simon's satisficing
Incrementalism
Game theory
William Niskanen's budget-maximizing
An relatively recent rational choice variation, proposed by William Niskanen in a 1971 article 'budget-maximizing' model, argued that rational bureaucrats will universally seek to increase their budgets, thereby contributing to state growth, measured by expenditure. Niskanen served on President Reagan's Council of Economic Advisors; his model underpinned what has been touted as curtailed public spending and increased privatization. However, budgeted expenditures and the growing deficit during the Reagan administration is evidence of a different reality. A range of pluralist authors have critiqued Niskanen's universalist approach. These scholars have argued that officials tend also to be motivated by considerations of the public interest.
Patrick Dunleavy's bureau shaping
The bureau-shaping model, a modification of Niskanen, holds that rational bureaucrats only maximize the part of their budget that they spend on their own agency's operations or give to contractors and interest groups. Groups that are able to organize a "flowback" of benefits to senior officials would, according to this theory, receive increased budgetary attention. For instance, rational officials will get no benefit from paying out larger welfare checks to millions of low-income citizens because this does not serve a bureaucrats' goals. Accordingly, one might should instead expect a jurisdiction to seek budget increases for defense and security purposes in place of domestic social programming. If we refer back to Reagan once again, Dunleavy's bureau shaping model accounts for the alleged decrease in the "size" of government while spending did not, in fact, decrease. Domestic entitlement programming was financially de-emphasized for military research and personnel.
Public Administration dichotomies
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Wilson's Politics-Administration Dichotomy
Fact-Value Dichotomy
Leonard White
Paul Appleby
Luther Gulick
Ethics: (Denhardt 127-128)
Denhardt identifies two approaches to ethics in public sector work: a more rigorous, philosophical studies in ethics that can be applied to the field.
• Alternately, administrators might simply assume “an ethical obligation to support ‘regime values.” Essentially, public employees should refer to the constitution and Supreme Court decisions for specifics on equity and justice.
• John Rohr, Ethics for Bureaucrats (1978)
• Terry Cooper The Responsible Administrator (1990)
• John Burke-Bureaucratic Responsibility (1986).
• Kathryn G. Denhardt-The Ethics of Public Service (1988)
Notable scholars
Notable scholars of public administration have come from a range of fields. In the period before public administration existed as its own independent discipline, scholars contributing to the field came from economics, sociology, management, political science, law, and, other related fields. More recently, scholars from public administration and public policy have contributed important studies and theories.
For a longer list of academics and theorists, see the List of notable public administration scholars article.
References
1. ^ Wilson, Woodrow, "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly 2 (June 1887)
2. ^ Fry, Brian R. 1989. Mastering Public Administration; from Max Weber to Dwight Waldo. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
3. ^ Public Administration Review, Vol. 56, No. 3 (May – Jun., 1996), pp. 247–255
4. ^ Denhardt , Robert B. and Janet Vinzant Denhardt (2000). "The New Public Service: Serving Rather than Steering." Public Administration Review 60(6)
5. ^ Diane Stone, (2008) 'Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities and their Networks,' Journal of Policy Sciences.
6. ^ Denhard, Robert B. 2000. Theories of Public Organizations. Orlando Florida: Harcourt Brace & Co.
7. ^ Shafritz, Jay M. and J. Steven Ott. 2001. The Classics of Organization Theory. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
8. ^ Lindblom, Charles 1959. “The Science of Muddling Through.” Public Administration Review. Spring 19.
9. ^ Acker, Joan. 1992. "Gendering Organizational Theory." in The Classics of Organization Theory. Jay M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott eds. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 391-399
10. ^ Stivers, Camilla.1992 From the Ground(s) Up: Women Reformers and the Rise of the Administrative State”in Gender Images in Public Administration. Camilla Stivers ed. Sage.
11. ^ Fry, Brian R. 1989. Mastering Public Administration; from Max Weber to Dwight Waldo. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc.
12. ^ cited in Denhardt 2001, 100-101
13. ^ William Ouichi. 1981. “The Z Organization." in Classics of Organization Theory. Shafritz and Ott eds. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
14. ^ Bowen, David and Edward Lawler. 2006. “The Empowerment of service Workers; What, Why, How and When.” in Managing Innovation and Change David Mayle. Sage.
15. ^ Mintzburg, Henry. 2001. "The Power Game and its Players." in The Classics of Organization Theory. Jay M. Shafritz and J. Steven Ott Eds. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 353-360.
16. ^ Acker, Joan. 1989. Doing Comparable Worth: Gender, Class and Pay Equity . Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
See also
• Accountability
• Administration (government)
• Administrative law
• British civil service
• Budgeting
• Budget theory
• Bureaucracy
• Civil society
o Community Development
o Governance
o Nonprofit organizations
o Non-governmental organization
o Separation of church and state
o Social innovation
• Doctor of Public Administration
• Docket
• Municipal government
• Politics
• Professional administration
• Public management — focusing on the efficiency and effectiveness of a government
• Public administration theory
• Public policy
• Public policy schools
• Record
• Theories of administration
o Max Weber
o Dwight Waldo
Societies for public administration
• American Society for Public Administration
• Chinese Public Administration Society
• Dutch Association for Public Administration
• Royal Institute for Public Administration
International public administration
There are several organizations that are active. The oldest is the International Association of Schools and Institutes of Administration (IASIA). Based in Brussels, Belgium, IASIA is an association of organizations and individuals whose activities and interests focus on public administration and management. The activities of its members include education and training of administrators and managers. It is the only worldwide scholarly association in the field of public management. Visit their Web site at www.iiasiisa.be/schools/aeacc.htm.
Also the International Committee of the US-based National Association of School of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA) has developed a number of relationships around the world. They include sub regional and National forums like CLAD, INPAE and NISPAcee, APSA, ASPA. For general information about these regional networks, visit www.GlobalMPA.net.
The Center for Latin American Administration for Development (CLAD), based in Caracas, Venezuela, this regional network of schools of public administration set up by the governments in Latin America is the oldest in the region. Information about CLAD is accessible at www.clad.org.ve.
The Institute is a founding member and played a central role in organizing the Inter-American Network of Public Administration Education (INPAE). Created in 2000, this regional network of schools is unique in that it is the only organization to be composed of institutions from North and Latin America and the Caribbean working in public administration and policy analysis. It has more than 49 members from top research schools in various countries throughout the hemisphere, www.ebape.fgv.br/inpae.
NISPAcee is a network of experts, scholars and practitioners who work in the field of public administration in Central and Eastern Europe, including the Russian Federation and the Caucasus and Central Asia. Their English Web site is located at www.nispa.sk/_portal/homepage.php.
The US public administration and political science associations like NASPA, APSA and ASPA. These organizations have helped to create the fundamental establishment of modern public administration. For more information visit the Web sites of American Political Science Association, www.apsanet.org, and the American Society of Public Administration www.aspanet.org.
External links
Australia
• Australia's Open Forum
Austria
• KDZ — Centre for Public Administration Research
Brazil
• The Brazilian National School of Public Administration
• The Brazilian School of Public and Business Administration
Canada
• The Institute of Public Administration of Canada
• Commonwealth Association for Public Administration and Management
People's Republic of China
• Hong Kong Public Administration Association
Europe
• National Institute of Public Administration — Europe/Portugal
• EAPAA European Association for Public Administration Accr ation
• EGPA European Group of Public Administration
• NISPAcee Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe
• EUPAN European Public Administration Network
• EPSA European Public Service Award
Finland
• University of Helsinki, Faculty of Social Sciences (In English-Suomeksi-På svenska)
Germany
• Hertie School of Governance Berlin
Greece
• National Centre for Public Administration and Local Government (In Greek)
Philippines
• University of the Philippine's National College of Public Administration and Governance
Russia
• повышение эффективности работы руководителей государственных и муниципальных органов (По русски)
Holland/The Netherlands
• Dutch Association for Public Administration (In Dutch)
• Public Administration starting page (In Dutch)
• Page about the Dutch association of Public Administration (In English)
India
• Indian Institute of Public Administration
Philippines
• University of the Philippines — National College of Public Administration and Governance
Poland
• National School of Public Administration, Warsaw, Poland
Turkey
• Ankara University Faculty of Political Science — Public Administration (In Turkish)
• İstanbul University Faculty of Political Science — Public Administration (In Turkish)
United Kingdom
• Royal Institute of Public Administration
• How to be a civil servant under the British or Westminster system
United States
• Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management
• American Society for Public Administration
• National Academy of Public Administration
• National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration
Suggested reading
• Smith, Kevin B. and Licari, Michael J. Public Administration — Power and Politics in the Fourth Branch of Government, ISBN 1-933220-04-X
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_administration"
Public policy
Public policy can be generally defined as the course of action or inaction taken by governmental entities with regard to a particular issue or set of issues.[1] Other scholars define it as a system of "courses of action, regulatory measures, laws, and funding priorities concerning a given topic promulgated by a governmental entity or its representatives."[2] Public policy is commonly embodied "in constitutions, legislative acts, and judicial decisions." [3]
In the United States, this concept refers not only to the end result of policies, but more broadly to the decision-making and analysis of governmental decisions. Public policy is also considered an academic discipline, as it is studied by professors and students at public policy schools of major universities throughout the country. The professional association of public policy practitioners, researchers, scholars, and students is the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.
Contents
• 1 Government action
• 2 As an academic discipline
• 3 References
• 4 See also
• 5 External links
Government action
Shaping public policy is a complex and multifaceted process that involves the interplay of numerous individuals and interest groups competing and collaborating to influence policymakers to act in a particular way. These individuals and groups use a variety of tactics and tools to advance their aims, including advocating their positions publicly, attempting to educate supporters and opponents, and mobilizing allies on a particular issue.[4]
In this context, advocacy can be defined as attempting to influence public policy through education, lobbying, or political pressure. Advocacy groups "often attempt to educate the general public as well as public policy makers about the nature of problems, what legislation is needed to address problems, and the funding required to provide services or conduct research. Although advocacy is viewed as unseemly by some in the professional and research community, it is clear that public policy priorities are influenced by advocacy. Sound research data can be used to educate the public as well as policy makers, thereby improving the public policy process."[5]
As an academic discipline
Main article: Public policy school
As an academic discipline, public policy brings in elements of many social science fields and concepts, including economics, sociology, political economy, program evaluation, policy analysis, and public management, all as applied to problems of governmental administration, management, and operations. At the same time, the study of public policy is distinct from political science or economics, in its focus on the application of theory to practice. While the majority of public policy degrees are master's and doctoral degrees, several universities also offer undergraduate education in public policy.
Examples of institutions offering degrees in public policy are the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University, the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley, the School of Policy, Planning and Development at the University of Southern California, the Gerald Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, the Graduate Center for Social and Public Policy at Duquesne University, the Harry S Truman School of Public Affairs at the University of Missouri, the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, Northwestern University School of Continuing Studies and the Berlin-based Hertie School of Governance.
References
1. ^ Wolf, Robert, "Definitions of Policy Analysis"
2. ^ Kilpatrick, Dean, "Definitions of Public Policy and Law"
3. ^ Schuster II, W. Michael, "For the Greater Good: The Use of Public Policy Considerations in Confirming Chapter 11 Plans of Reorganization"
4. ^ Kilpatrick.
5. ^ Kilpatrick
See also
• List of public administration schools
• Category:Public administration schools
External links
• Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management
• National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_policy"
Separation of powers
The separation of powers, also known as trias politica, is a model for the governance of democratic states. The model was first developed in ancient Greece and came into widespread use by the Roman Republic as part of the uncodified Constitution of the Roman Republic. Under this model, the state is divided into branches or estates, each with separate and independent powers and areas of responsibility. The normal division of estates is into an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary.
Parliamentary democracies do not have distinct separation of powers. The executive, which often consists of a prime minister and cabinet ("government"), is drawn from the legislature (parliament). This is the principle of responsible government. However, although the legislative and executive branches are connected, in parliamentary systems there is usually an independent judiciary and the government's role in the parliament does not give them unlimited legislative influence.
Contents
• 1 Origins
o 1.1 Constitution of the Roman Republic
o 1.2 Montesquieu's tripartite system
• 2 Comparison with fusion of powers
• 3 Other branches
o 3.1 Auditory
o 3.2 Civil examination
o 3.3 Data Protection
o 3.4 Electoral
o 3.5 The people
o 3.6 Independent executive agencies
o 3.7 Press
o 3.7.1 Around the world
• 4 Various models
o 4.1 Australia: three branches
o 4.2 People's Republic of China
o 4.3 Costa Rica: five branches
o 4.4 European Union
o 4.5 France
o 4.6 Germany: three branches and six bodies
o 4.7 Taiwan: five branches
o 4.8 United Kingdom
o 4.9 United States: three branches
4.9.1 Checks and balances
4.9.2 Maintaining balance
4.9.3 State and local governments
o 4.10 Venezuela: five branches
• 5 Criticisms
• 6 Related restraint-of-power concepts
• 7 See also
• 8 References
• 9 External links
Origins
Constitution of the Roman Republic
The government of the Roman Republic divided power into three independent branches: the senate, the legislative branch, and the executive branch. The Senate made military and foreign policy, and directed domestic policy. It also issued orders to executive branch officials, which were usually obeyed. The Senate was not a legislative body and it did not pass laws. The legislative branch had two primary functions. First, it elected all executive officials. Election to such office usually meant automatic membership in the senate (senate terms were for life). The second major function of the legislative branch was to pass domestic laws. These legislative assemblies were not bodies of elected representatives. Rather, they were bodies of citizens, participating in a direct-democracy legislative system. The laws (Latin: lex) passed by these assemblies were called plebiscites, the modern equivalent of popular referendums. Members of the executive branch commanded the military, enforced the laws, and acted as high judges. A network of checks and balances existed between the three branches. This system of checks and balances was designed to prevent the accumulation of too much power into the hands of a single person.
Montesquieu's tripartite system
This section may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards.
The term is ascribed to French Enlightenment political philosopher Baron de Montesquieu.[1][2] Montesquieu described division of political power among an executive, a legislature, and a judiciary. He based this model on the British constitutional system, in which he perceived a separation of powers among the monarch, Parliament, and the courts of law. Subsequent writers have noted that this was misleading, because Great Britain had a very closely connected legislature and executive, with further links to the judiciary (though combined with judicial independence).
Montesquieu did specify that "the independence of the judiciary has to be real, and not apparent merely".[3] "The judiciary was generally seen as the most important of powers, independent and unchecked", and also considered the least dangerous.[3] Some politicians decry judicial action against them as a "criminalization" of their behavior, but such "criminalization" may be seen as a response to corruption, collusion, or abuse of power by these politicians.[4]
Comparison with fusion of powers
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In democratic systems of governance, a continuum exists between "Presidential government" and "Parliamentary government". "Separation of powers" is a feature more inherent to presidential systems, whereas "fusion of powers" is characteristic of parliamentary ones. "Mixed systems" fall somewhere in between, usually near the midpoint; the most notable example of a mixed system is France's (current) Fifth Republic.
In fusion of powers, one government (invariably the elected legislature) is supreme, and the other estates are subservient to it. In separation of powers, each estate is largely (although not necessarily entirely) independent of the others. Independent in this context means either that selection of each estate happens independently of the other estates or at least that each estate is not beholden to any of the others for its continued existence.
Accordingly, in a fusion of powers system such as that of the United Kingdom, first described as such by Walter Bagehot, the people elect the legislature, which in turn "creates" the executive. As Professor Cheryl Saunders writes, "...the intermixture of institutions [in the UK] is such that it is almost impossible to describe it as a separation of powers."[5] In a separation of powers, the national legislature does not select the person or persons[6] of the executive; instead, the executive is chosen by other means (direct popular election, electoral college selection, etc.) In a parliamentary system, when the term of the legislature ends, so too may the tenure of the executive selected by that legislature. Although in a presidential system the executive's term may or may not coincide with the legislature's, their selection is technically independent of the legislature. However, when the executive's party controls the legislature, the executive often reaps the benefits of what is, in effect, a "fusion of powers". Such situations may thwart the constitutional goal or normal popular perception that the legislature is the more democratic branch or the one "closer to the people", reducing it to a virtual "consultative assembly", politically or procedurally unable—or unwilling—to hold the executive accountable in the event of blatant, even boldly admitted, "high crimes and misdemeanors."
Other branches
Auditory
With the title Comptroller General, Auditor General or Comptroller and Auditor General, the European Union's Court of Auditors and Taiwan's Control Yuan are individual or bodies of independent ombudsmen. They are often independent of the other branches of government.
Their purpose is to audit government expenditure and general activity. Also non as checks and balance
Civil examination
Sun Yat Sen proposed a branch of government based on the Imperial examination system used in China. The "Examination Yuan" (Traditional Chinese: 考試院; pinyin: Kǎoshì Yuàn), as it is called in Taiwan, is in charge of validating the qualification of civil servants. This structure has been implemented in the Republic of China.
Data Protection
In Germany, as in the rest of the EU, there is a notion of data protection. In Germany it is represented by its own commissioners. Additionally there is the BStU dealing with the Stasi archives and the German Federal Archives, each providing access to data only in accordance with special laws.
Electoral
Costa Rica's Supreme Elections Tribunal is a branch of government that manages elections. Similar independent institutions exist in many other democratic countries, however they are not seen as a branch of government. In many countries, these are known as Electoral Commissions.
The people
Many philosophers and political scientists[specify] believe that democratic governments are created and constitutions exist to serve the people. The people have their own system of checks and balances by electing the legislative and executive branches. The government also draws its power directly from the people. Without the people, there is no government, just as without the legislative branch, there can be no judicial branch.
In the Constitution of Venezuela, the "citizen's power" is a formal branch of government, though it acts like auditors' branches in other jurisdictions.
See also:
• Direct democracy
• Initiative
• Referendum
• Recall election
Independent executive agencies
The federal executive of the United States is a very large bureaucracy, and due to civil service rules, most middle- and low-level government workers do not change when a new President is elected. (New high-level officials are usually appointed and must be confirmed by the United States Senate.) Moreover, semi-independent agencies (such as the Federal Reserve or the Federal Communications Commission) may be created within the executive by the legislature. These agencies exercise legally defined regulatory powers. High-level regulators are appointed by the President and confirmed by the legislature; they must follow the law and certain lawful executive orders. But they often sit for long, fixed terms and enjoy reasonable independence from other policy makers. Because of its importance to modern governance, the regulatory bureaucracy of the executive is sometimes referred to as a "fourth" branch of government.
This separation is even more pronounced in the United Kingdom. The separation was a prominent element of the Yes Minister comedy television series.
Press
The press has been described as a "fourth power" because of its considerable influence over public opinion (which in turn affects the outcome of elections), as well as its indirect influence in the branches of government by, for example, its support or criticism of pending legislation or policy changes. It has rarely, however, been a formal branch of democratic government; nor have political philosophers suggested that it become one.
The press is also sometimes referred to as the Fourth Estate, a term of French origin, which is not related to the modern three-branch system of government.
Originally, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution explicitly guaranteed freedom of the press only against interference by the federal government. Later this right was extended by the United States Supreme Court in the Incorporation Cases to cover state and local governments.
Traditionally, the press has been the "voice of the people", keeping government somewhat in check. Examples of this were the Watergate scandal, where two Washington Post reporters exposed corruption and coverup at the highest levels of government, or the Adscam (Sponsorship scandal) which was uncovered by the press in Canada. This exposure caused the resignation, firing, or prosecution of many officials.
There exist situations where the press can affect public opinion in ways that are contrary to the spirit of separation of powers. One of the most compelling of these situations is when the state controls the content and distribution of the information disseminated by the press. However, even if the press is immune to censorship and compulsion from the government, the controlling entity of a press association or media outlet must almost always , and may orialize, providing opportunities to affect public opinion in ways that may contradict public interest. In all cases, the "voice of the people" (as perceived by some) is modified by the opinions of those producing the stories.
Around the world
Main articles: Freedom of the press and public broadcasting
The freedom of the reporting media is generally considered to be essential for the perpetuation of democratic governments, and it is found in all strong democracies, regardless of the organizational principle of the "branches" of government.
Many governments financially support public broadcasting in some way, but in strong democracies these media outlets can enjoy wide orial latitude.
An independent press acts as a powerful check on all forms of government by providing information about governmental activities to the public. There are weighty arguments to suggest that the press is the external 4th branch which continuously scrutinizes a government's operations, with David Blunkett's two resignations as both Home Secretary(2004) and Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (2005) as particular examples.
Various models
Constitutions with a high degree of separation of powers are found worldwide. The UK system is distinguished by a particular entwining of powers. India's democratic system also offers a clear separation of power under Lok Sabha (lower house of parliament), Rajya Sabha (upper house of Parliament), and the President of India, who overlooks independent governing branches such as the Election commission and the Judiciary. Under the Indian constitution, just as in the British system, the Prime Minister is a head of the governing party and functions through a selected group of ministers. In Italy the powers are completely separated, even if Council of Ministers need the vote of confidence from both chambers of Parliament, that's however formed by a wide number of members (almost 1,000).
Countries with little separation of power include New Zealand and Canada. Canada makes limited use of separation of powers in practice, although in theory it distinguishes between branches of government.
Complete separation-of-powers systems are almost always presidential, although theoretically this need not be the case. There are a few historical exceptions, such as the Directoire system of revolutionary France. Switzerland offers an example of non-Presidential separation of powers today: It is run by a seven-member executive branch, the Federal Council. However, some might argue that Switzerland does not have a strong separation of powers system, as the Federal Council is appointed by parliament (but not dependent on parliament), and the judiciary has no power of review.
Australia: three branches
Main article: Separation of powers in Australia
This section requires expansion.
People's Republic of China
Main article: Government of the People's Republic of China
This section requires expansion.
Costa Rica: five branches
After eight years of social conflict, the question of who would lead Costa Rica and which transformational model the State would use was decided by who killed the president. A constituent assembly followed and drew up a new constitution, approved in 1949. This document was an of the constitution of 1871, as the constituent assembly rejected more radical corporatist ideas proposed by the ruling junta. Nonetheless, the new constitution increased centralization of power at the expense of municipalities and eliminated provincial government altogether.
It established the three supreme powers as the legislature, executive, and judicial branches, but also created two other autonomous state organs that have equivalent power but not equivalent rank. The first is the Supreme Elections Tribunal (electoral branch) which controls elections and makes unique, unappealable decisions on their outcomes.
The second is the office of the Comptroller General (auditory branch), an autonomous and independent organ nominally subordinate to the unicameral legislative assembly. All budgets of ministries and municipalities must pass through this agency, including the execution of budget items such as contracting for routine operations. The Comptroller also provides financial vigilance over government offices and office holders, and routinely brings actions to remove mayors for malfeasance, firmly establishing this organization as the fifth branch of the Republic.
European Union
The branches of the European Union are slightly mixed due to the complex nature of the EU's design. There are five institutions of the European Union. The functioning of the EU is split into intergovernmental and supranational spheres (see three pillars of the European Union). In intergovernmental matters, most power is concentrated in the Council of the European Union - giving it the characteristics of a normal international organization. Here, all power at EU level is in one branch. In the latter there are four main actors. The European Commission acts as an independent executive which is appointed by the Council in conjunction with the European Parliament. The European Parliament is one half of the legislative branch and is directly elected. The Council itself acts both as the second half of the legislative branch and also holds some executive functions (some of which are exercised by the related European Council in practice). The European Court of Justice acts as the independent judicial branch, interpreting EU law and treaties. The remaining institution, the European Court of Auditors, is an independent auditory authority (due to the sensitive nature of fraud in the EU).
• European Commission - executive
• European Parliament - legislative
• Council of the European Union - legislative and executive
• European Court of Justice - judicial
• European Court of Auditors - auditory
France
Main article: Government of France
This section requires expansion.
Germany: three branches and six bodies
The six main bodies enshrined in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany are:
• Federal President (Bundespräsident) - executive
• Federal Cabinet (Bundesregierung) - executive
• Federal Diet (Bundestag) & Federal Council (Bundesrat) - legislative
• Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung) - presidential electoral college
• Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) - judiciary
The Bundesversammlung is primiraliy constituted of members of the Bundestag and Bundesrat.
Besides the constitutional court the judicial branch at the federal level is made up of five supreme courts - one for civil and criminal cases (Bundesgerichtshof), and one each for administrative, tax, labour, and social security issues. There are also state (Länder / Bundesländer) based courts beneath them, and a rarely used senate of the supreme courts.
Taiwan: five branches
Some countries take the doctrine further than the three-branch system. The politics of the Republic of China, for example, has five branches: the Executive Yuan, Legislative Yuan, Judicial Yuan, Control Yuan, and Examination Yuan.
Due in part to the Republic's youth, the relationship between its executive and legislative branches are poorly defined. An example of the problems this causes is the near complete political paralysis that results when the president, who has neither the power to veto nor the ability to dissolve the legislature and call new elections, cannot negotiate with the legislature when his party is in the minority.[7]
United Kingdom
Although the principle of separation of power plays a role in the United Kingdom's constitutional doctrine, the UK constitution is often described as having "a weak separation of powers"[citation needed], despite its constitution being the one to which Montesquieu originally referred. For example, in the United Kingdom, the executive forms a subset of the legislature, as does—to a lesser extent—the judiciary. The Prime Minister, the chief executive, must by convention be a Member of the House of Commons and can effectively be removed from office by a simple majority vote. Furthermore, while the courts in Britain are undoubtedly amongst the most independent in the world, the Law Lords, who are the final arbiters of judicial disputes in the UK, sit simultaneously in the House of Lords, the upper house of the legislature, although this arrangement will cease in 2009 when the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom comes into existence. Furthermore, because of the existence of Parliamentary sovereignty, while the theory of separation of powers may be studied in Britain, a system such as that of the UK is more accurately described as a "fusion of powers".[citation needed]
The development of the British constitution, which is not written down in one document, is based on this fusion in the person of the Monarch, who has a formal role to play in the legislature (Parliament, which is where legal and political sovereignty lies, is the Crown-in-Parliament, and is summoned and dissolved by the Queen who must give her Royal Assent to all Bills so that they become Acts), the executive (the Queen appoints all ministers of Her Majesty's Government, who govern in the name of the Crown) and the judiciary (the Queen, as the fount of justice, appoints all senior judges, and all public prosecutions are brought in her name).
The British legal system is based on common law traditions which require:
• Police or regulators cannot initiate complaints under criminal law but can only investigate (prosecution is mostly reserved for the Crown Prosecution Service), which prevents selective enforcement, e.g. the 'fishing exp ion' which is often specifically forbidden.
• Prosecutors cannot withhold evidence from attorneys for the defendant; to do so results in mistrial or dismissal. Accordingly, their relation to police is no advantage.
• Defendants convicted can appeal, but no new evidence can usually be introduced, restricting the power of the court of appeal to the process of law applied.
United States: three branches
Main article: Separation of powers under the United States Constitution
In the United States Constitution, Article I Section I gives Congress only those "legislative powers herein granted" and proceeds to list those permissible actions in Article I Section 8, while Section 9 lists actions that are prohibited for Congress. The vesting clause in Article II places no limits on the Executive branch, simply stating that, "The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."[8] The Supreme Court holds "The judicial Power" according to Article III, and it established the implication of Judicial review in Marbury vs Madison.[9] The federal government refers to the branches as "branches of government", while some systems use "government" to describe the executive. The Executive branch has attempted to usurp power from Congress arguing for Separation of powers to include being the Commander in Chief of a standing army since the Civil war, executive orders, emergency powers and security classifications since WWII, national security, signing statements, and now the concept of a unitary executive.
Checks and balances
To prevent one branch from becoming supreme, and to induce the branches to cooperate, governance systems that employ a separation of powers need a way to balance each of the branches. Typically this was accomplished through a system of "checks and balances", the origin of which, like separation of powers itself, is specifically cr ed to Montesquieu. Checks and balances allows for a system based regulation that allows one branch to limit another, such as the power of Congress to alter the composition and jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Legislative
Executive
Judicial
• Also known as Congress
• Makes all laws.
• Controls all the money; taxes, borrows, and sets the budget (with exception of unappropriated spending by central bank).
• Has sole power to declare war.
• Oversees, investigates, and makes the rules for the government and its officers.
• Appoints the heads of the executive branch.
• Confirms federal judicial appointments.
• Ratifies treaties.
• Originates cases of impeachment. • Preserves, protects and defends the Constitution
• Faithfully executes the laws of the United States
• Executes the instructions of Congress
• May veto laws but the veto may be overridden by Congress by a 2/3 majority.
• Executes the spending authorized by Congress
• Executes the instructions of Congress when it declares war or makes rules for the military
• Declares states of emergency and publishes regulations and executive orders
• Appoints judges with the advice and consent of the Senate
• President and Vice-President can be impeached and removed from office by Congress
• Has the power to grant pardons for crimes against the United States • Determines which jurisdiction any given case falls under
• Judges when a law is unconstitutional
• Has the responsibility to administer Constitutional law and to apply it to constitutional disputes
• Determines the disposition of prisoners
• May legally compel testimony and the production of evidence as the law provides.
• Judges and competently administers uniform policies via the appeals process, but gives discretion in individual cases to low-level judges. (The amount of discretion depends upon the standard of review, determined by the type of case in question.)
• Oversees and administers members of the judiciary
• Is subject to impeachment by Congress
Maintaining balance
The theoretical independence of the executive and legislative branches is partly maintained by the fact that they are separately elected and are held directly accountable to the public. There are also judicial prohibitions against certain types of interference in each others' affairs. (See "separation of powers" cases in the List of United States Supreme Court cases.) Judicial independence is maintained by life appointments of judges, with voluntary retirement, and a high threshold for removal by the legislature. In recent years, there have been accusations that the power to interpret the law is being misused (judicial activism) by some judges in the US. In the checks and balances system, the judicial branch has the right to say that something is unconstitutional, like a law or a bill (Cr ed to an opinion piece by Chief Justice John Marshall presiding over the case of Marbury v. Madison (1803)).
The legal mechanisms constraining the powers of the three branches depend a great deal on the sentiment of the people. A common perception is that popular support establishes legitimacy and makes possible the actual implementation of legal authority. National crises (such as the Civil War, the Great Depression, pre-Pearl Harbor World War II, the Vietnam War) have been the times at which the principle of separation of powers has been most endangered, either through official "misbehavior" or through the willingness of the public to sacrifice such principles if more pressing problems are solved. The system of checks and balances is also self-reinforcing. Potential abuse of power may be deterred, and the legitimacy and sustainability of any power grab is hindered by the ability of the other two branches to take corrective action; though they still must actually do so, therefore accountability is not automatic. This is intended to reduce opportunities for tyranny sometimes.
However, as James Madison wrote in Federalist No. 51 regarding the ability of each branch to defend itself from actions by the others, "But it is not possible to give to each department an equal power of self-defense. In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates." Bicameralism was, in part, intended to reduce the relative power of the legislature by turning it against itself, by having "different modes of election and different principles of action." (This is one of the arguments against the popular election of Senators, which was instituted by the Seventeenth Amendment.) But when the legislature is unified, it can obtain dominance over the other branches.
State and local governments
The American states mirror the executive/legislative/judicial division of the federal government. Major cities tend to do so as well, but the arrangements of local and regional governments vary widely. Because the judicial branch is often a part of a state or county government, the geographic jurisdiction of local judges is often not coterminous with municipal boundaries.
In many American states and local governments, executive authority and law enforcement authority are separated by allowing citizens to directly elect public prosecutors (district attorneys and state attorneys-general). In some states, judges are also directly elected.
Many localities also separate special powers from their executive and legislative branches through the direct election of sheriffs, school boards, transit agency boards, park commissioners, etc.
Juries (groups of randomly selected citizens) also have an important role in the checks-and-balances system. They have the sole authority to not only determine the facts in most criminal and civil cases, but to judge the law, acting as a powerful buffer against arbitrary enforcement by the executive and judicial branches. In many jurisdictions they are also used to determine whether or not a trial is warranted, and in some places Grand Juries have independent investigative powers with regard to government operations.
Venezuela: five branches
Main article: Constitution of Venezuela
This section requires expansion.
The constitution establish that the government of Venezuela has five branches: the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, an electoral branch, and a citizen's branch that acts as an auditor.
Criticisms
This article contains weasel words, vague phrasing that often accompanies biased or unverifiable information. Such statements should be clarified or removed. (December 2007)
It can be argued that there is no natural distinction between executive and legislative forms of government: legislation that is passed must always be executed, and much executive action requires new laws. This argument might be compared to the arrangement between Architect, Contractor and Owner, where the architect designs a plan, the contractor executes it, and the owner pays. Not all plans are built as designed, but where there are change orders its the architect who writes them, where there are requisitions for payment its the architect who approves them, and where there are disputes its the architect who decides them.
As such, while the division can be said to be an artificial one, the roles defined by the division have different degrees of power and responsibility.In the United States the Legislative branch has all the power, the Executive branch has the responsibility to preserve, protect and defend the constitution and the laws of the United States and the Judicial branch decides.
There is currently no constitutional system which has a complete separation of powers where there is a distribution of functions among three independent organs with no overlapping or cross-coordination except for the United States as described above. Some of the early American States and the French Constitution of 1791 tried to enforce this doctrine strictly, but they failed. Instead, most constitutions give slightly overlapping powers to each branch, such as the US president's ability to veto legislation, or the power of judicial appointment.
Some observers believe that no obvious case exists in which such instability was prevented by the separation of powers. In parliamentary systems such as the United Kingdom the three "powers" are not separated (although the judiciary is independent). However, this has not threatened British stability, because the strong tradition of parliamentary sovereignty serves the purpose of limiting executive power.
In contrast, many countries which have adopted separation of powers (especially in Latin America) have suffered from instability (coups d'état, military dictatorships, civil war and unrest, etc). If the separated executive is granted strong powers, it may well encourage instability, because it is less consensus-oriented than a parliamentary system, and because it inures the population and political elite to the influence of a dominant leader. In times of instability, competing political groups can become obsessed with controlling the executive office, and it is often the loss of a presidential election which triggers greater instability. In a presidential system, there can only be one winning party, and all others fail entirely to gain power. In contrast, a parliamentary system can allow all political groups to have some share in control of the executive by participating in a coalition.
Some are concerned that where the executive branch is granted few powers, there is the danger of political gridlock. When the executive cannot operate without waiting for the legislature to deliberate, then government action to solve problems can be delayed. Others are concerned that where there is deciciveness without deliberation the consequences can be grave.
Some political scientists have wondered whether there is a tendency for separation-of-power systems, especially those with strong executives, to develop into two-party systems[citation needed]. As the executive is as a "winner-take-all" position, voters and lobby groups might tend to adopt a strategy of supporting their preferred choice from the two leading candidates, the perception being that a vote or donation to a third-party candidate is a waste. As the executive is usually considered the most important position in government, members of the legislature will coalesce into groups supporting the two dominant executive candidates. Recently we have seen an alternative to this partisan schism may be offered when there is a competent and cooperative relationship established between branches respecting their established roles.
The categories of the functions and corresponding powers of government are inclined to become blurred when it is attempted to apply them to the details of a particular constitution. Some hold that the true distinction lies not in the nature of the powers themselves, but rather in the procedure by which they are exercised.
Sometimes systems with clearly defined separation of powers are complex and difficult for any person to understand, resulting in a nebulous political process and leading to a lack of engagement. Proponents of parliamentary systems and the legislative process claim that they make it easier to understand how "politics is done" by providing a clearer view of who does what, who is responsible for what, and who is to blame. This is important when it comes to engaging the people in political debate and increasing citizens' interest and participation in politics. However, for a parliamentary system to work effectively, institutional arrangements such as fair electoral laws, freedom of the press, independent courts, due process, and the independence of the Houses of Parliament must be so designed as to prevent executive supremacy over the legislative and judicial branches while also encouraging a culture of public debate, open government, accountable office holders, and policy contest-ability and compromise, rather than a culture of "winner takes all" political domination.
Related restraint-of-power concepts
• Federalism, also known as vertical separation of powers — Prevents abuse by dividing governing powers, usually by separating municipal, provincial, and national governments. See also subsidiarity.
• Rule of law - Prevents arbitrary exercise of the executive power, preserves general and minority rights, and promotes stability and predictability.
• Democracy and civil society - Attempts to constrain elected branches of government to act in the public interest, not in self-interest.
• Separation of church and state or Laïcité - Ensures freedom of religion by preventing government interference in its practice. Also constrains the power of government by maintaining freedom of conscience and belief.
• Civilian control of the military - Helps prevent dictatorship that otherwise might occur through military rule.
• In some systems, an independent central bank.
• Separation of duties in organizations.
• Independent Civil Service.
• Negarchy - The self-interests of separate powers canceling one another via indirect yet interdependent means.
• Multicameralism - The division of legislature into separate autonomous chambers.
See also
• Constitution of the Roman Republic
• Absolute power
• Balance of power
• Corruption Perceptions Index - Parliamentary systems are, in general, perceived as less corrupt than other systems
• Judicial activism
• List of democracy and elections-related topics
• Signing statement
• Unitary executive theory
• Fifth power
References
1. ^ "Baron de Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)". Plato.stanford.edu. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/montesquieu/#4. Retrieved on 2008-10-29.
2. ^ "K-Zone law - Separation of Powers: the reality". Kevinboone.com. http://www.kevinboone.com/separation.html. Retrieved on 2008-10-29.
3. ^ a b Przeworski 2003, p.26, p.13, p.223-4
4. ^ Przeworski 2003, p.14 [1]
5. ^ Cheryl Saunders. "Separation of Powers and the Judicial Branch" (doc). http://www.adminlaw.org.uk/docs/Professor%20Cheryl%20Saunders%20-%20July%202006.doc.
6. ^ Two examples of executives of more than one person are a triumvirate (three rulers) and a constitutional monarchy (two rulers).
7. ^ "E-Notes: Why Taiwan's Political Paralysis Persists - FPRI". Fpri.org. http://www.fpri.org/enotes/asia.20020418.rigger.taiwanpoliticalparalysis.html. Retrieved on 2008-10-29.
8. ^ Constitution of the United States. [2]
9. ^ Madison, James. (8 February 1788) "The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments" The Federalist Papers No. 51
• Alec Stone Sweet, Governing With Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe 2000 Oxford University Press ISBN 978-0-19-829730-7
• Adam Przeworski, JM Maravall, I NetLibrary Democracy and the Rule of Law (2003)
• The Invention of the Modern Republic (March 2007) ISBN 978-0-521-03376-3
• Manin, Bernard Principles of Representative Government (English version 1997)
• MJC Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1998) Second ion.
External links
• Polybius and the Founding Fathers: the separation of powers
• Arbitrary Government Described and the Government of the Massachusetts Vindicated from that Aspersion (1644)
Sovereignty
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The frontispiece of Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, depicting the Sovereign as a massive body wielding a sword and crozier and composed of many individual people.
Sovereignty is the right to exercise, within a territory, the functions of a state, exclusive of any other state, or Kingdom and subject to no other authority.[1] A sovereign is a supreme lawmaking authority.
Contents
• 1 History
o 1.1 Classical
o 1.2 Medieval
o 1.3 Reformation
o 1.4 Age of Enlightenment
• 2 Definition and types
o 2.1 Absoluteness
o 2.2 De jure and de facto
o 2.3 Internal
o 2.4 External
• 3 Views on
• 4 In federations
• 5 Sovereign as a title
• 6 Shared
• 7 Of nation-states
• 8 See also
• 9 References
o 9.1 Notes
o 9.2 Bibliography
• 10 External links
History
Classical
Ideas about sovereignty have changed over time. The Roman jurist Ulpian observed that:
• The imperium of the people is transferred to the Emperor,
• The Emperor is not bound by the law,
• The Emperor's word is law.
Ulpian was expressing — although he did not use the term — the idea that the Emperor exercised a rather absolute form of sovereignty. Ulpian's statements were known in medieval Europe but sovereignty was not an important concept in medieval times. Medieval monarchs were not sovereign, at least not strongly so, because they were constrained by, and shared power with, their feudal aristocracy. Furthermore, both were strongly constrained by custom.
[ ] Medieval
During the medieval period, sovereignty existed as the de jure rights of nobility and royalty, and in the de facto right and capability of an individual to make their own choices in life.
Around c. 1380-1400, the issue of feminine sovereignty was addressed in Geoffrey Chaucer's Middle English collection of Canterbury Tales, specifically in The Wife of Bath's Tale.[2]
A later English Arthurian romance, The Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnell (c. 1450)[3], uses much of the same elements of the Wife of Bath's tale, yet changes the setting to the court of King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table. The story revolves around the knight Sir Gawain granting to Dame Ragnell, his new bride, what is purported to be wanted most by women: sovereignty.
We desire most from men,
From men both rich and poor,
To have sovereignty without lies.
For where we have sovereignty, all is ours,
Though a knight be ever so fierce,
And ever win mastery.
It is our desire to have master
Over such a sir.
Such is our purpose.
—The Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnell (c. 1450), [3]
Reformation
Sovereignty reemerged as a concept in the late 1500s, a time when civil wars had created a craving for stronger central authority, when monarchs had begun to gather power into their own hands at the expense of the nobility, and the modern nation state was emerging. Jean Bodin, partly in reaction to the chaos of the French wars of religion; and Thomas Hobbes, partly in reaction to the English Civil War, both presented theories of sovereignty calling for strong central authority in the form of absolute monarchy. In his 1576 treatise Six livres de la république ("Six Books of the Republic") Bodin argued that it is inherent in the nature of the state that sovereignty must be:
• Absolute: On this point he said that the sovereign must not be hedged in with obligations and conditions, must be able to legislate without his (or its) subjects' consent, must not be bound by the laws of his predecessors, and could not, because it is illogical, be bound by his own laws.
• Perpetual: Not temporarily delegated as to a strong leader in an emergency or to a state employee such as a magistrate. He held that sovereignty must be perpetual because anyone with the power to enforce a time limit on the governing power must be above the governing power: impossible if the governing power is absolute.
Bodin rejected the notion of transference of sovereignty from people to sovereign ; natural law and divine law confer upon the sovereign the right to rule. And the sovereign is not above divine law or natural law. He is above (ie. not bound by) only positive law, that is, laws made by humans. The fact that the sovereign must obey divine and natural law imposes ethical constraints on him. Bodin also held that the lois royales, the fundamental laws of the French monarchy which regulated matters such as succession, are natural laws and are binding on the French sovereign. How divine and natural law could in practice be enforced on the sovereign is a problematic feature of Bodin's philosophy: any person capable of enforcing them on him would be above him.
Despite his commitment to absolutism, Bodin held some moderate opinions an how government should in practice be carried out. He held that although the sovereign is not obliged to, it is advisable for him, as a practical expedient, to convene a senate from whom he can obtain advice, to delegate some power to magistrates for the practical administration of the law, and to use the Estates as a means of communicating with the people.
With his doctrine that sovereignty is conferred by divine law, Bodin predefined the scope of the divine right of kings.
Age of Enlightenment
Hobbes, in Leviathan (1651) introduced an early version of the social contract (or contractarian) theory, arguing that to overcome the "nasty, brutish and short" quality of life without the cooperation of other human beings, people must join in a "commonwealth" and submit to a "Soveraigne Power [sic]" that is able to compel them to act in the common good. This expediency argument attracted many of the early proponents of sovereignty. Hobbes deduced from the definition of sovereignty that it must be:
• Absolute: because conditions could only be imposed on a sovereign if there were some outside arbitrator to determine when he had violated them, in which case the sovereign would not be the final authority.
• Indivisible: The sovereign is the only final authority in his territory; he does not share final authority with any other entity. Hobbes held this to be true because otherwise there would be no way of resolving a disagreement between the multiple authorities.
Hobbes' hypothesis that the ruler's sovereignty is contracted to him by the people in return for his maintaining their safety, led him to conclude that if the ruler fails to do this, the people are released from their obligation to obey him.
Bodin's and Hobbes's theories would decisively shape the concept of sovereignty, which we can find again in the social contract theories, for example, in Rousseau's (1712-1778) definition of popular sovereignty (with early antecedents in Francisco Suárez's theory of the origin of power), which only differs in that he considers the people to be the legitimate sovereign. Likewise, it is inalienable – Rousseau condemned the distinction between the origin and the exercise of sovereignty, a distinction upon which constitutional monarchy or representative democracy are founded. Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Montesquieu are also key figures in the unfolding of the concept of sovereignty.
The second book of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Du Contrat Social, ou Principes du droit politique (1762) deals with sovereignty and its rights. Sovereignty, or the general will, is inalienable, for the will cannot be transmitted; it is indivisible, since it is essentially general; it is infallible and always right, determined and limited in its power by the common interest; it acts through laws. Law is the decision of the general will in regard to some object of common interest, but though the general will is always right and desires only good, its judgment is not always enlightened, and consequently does not always see wherein the common good lies; hence the necessity of the legislator. But the legislator has, of himself, no authority; he is only a guide who drafts and proposes laws, but the people alone (that is, the sovereign or general will) has authority to make and impose them.
Rousseau, in his 1763 treatise Of the Social Contract[4] argued, "the growth of the State giving the trustees of public authority more and means to abuse their power, the more the Government has to have force to contain the people, the more force the Sovereign should have in turn in order to contain the Government," with the understanding that the Sovereign is "a collective being of wonder" (Book II, Chapter I) resulting from "the general will" of the people, and that "what any man, whoever he may be, orders on his own, is not a law" (Book II, Chapter VI) – and furthermore predicated on the assumption that the people have an unbiased means by which to ascertain the general will. Thus the legal maxim, "there is no law without a sovereign."
The 1789 French Revolution shifted the possession of sovereignty from the sovereign ruler to the nation and its people.
Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) defined sovereignty as "the power to decide the state of exception", in an attempt, argues Giorgio Agamben, to counter Walter Benjamin's theory of violence as radically disjoint from law. Georges Bataille's heterodox conception of sovereignty, which may be said to be an "anti-sovereignty", also inspired many thinkers, such as Jacques Derrida, Agamben or Jean-Luc Nancy.
Definition and types
“ There exists perhaps no conception the meaning of which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon. ”
— Lassa Oppenheim[5], an authority on international law
Absoluteness
An important attribute of sovereignty is its degree of absoluteness. A sovereign power has absolute sovereignty if it has the unlimited right to control everything and every kind of activity in its territory. This means that it is not restricted by a constitution, by the laws of its predecessors, or by custom, and no areas of law or behavior are reserved as being outside its control; for example, parents are not guaranteed the right to decide some matters in the upbringing of their children independently of the sovereign power, municipalities are not guaranteed freedom from its interference in some local matters, etc. Theorists have diverged over the necessity or desirability of absoluteness. Historically, it is doubtful whether a sovereign power has ever claimed complete absoluteness, let alone had the power to actually enforce it.[citation needed]
De jure and de facto
De jure, or legal, sovereignty is the theoretical right to exercise exclusive control over one's subjects.
De facto, or actual, sovereignty is concerned with whether control in fact exists. It can be approached in two ways:
1. Does the governing power have sufficient strength (police, etc.) to compel its subjects to obey it? (If so, a type of de facto sovereignty called coercive sovereignty exists.)
2. Are the subjects of the governing power in the habit of obeying it?
Internal
Internal sovereignty is the relationship between a sovereign power and its own subjects. A central concern is legitimacy: by what right does a political body (or individual) exercise authority over its subjects? Possible answers include: by the divine right of kings or by social contract (popular sovereignty).
External
External sovereignty concerns the relationship between a sovereign power and other states. The central question is, under what conditions do other states recognise a political entity as having sovereignty over some territory? The following criteria, used by Britain in regarding other powers, are typical:
“ "Sovereignty." A government which exercises de facto administrative control over a country and is not subordinate to any other government in that country is a foreign sovereign state. ”
— (The Arantzazu Mendi, [1939] A.C. 256), Strouds Judicial Dictionary
External sovereignty is connected with questions of international law, such as: when, if ever, is intervention by one country onto another's territory permissible?
Following the Thirty Years' War, a European religious conflict that embroiled much of the continent, the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 established the notion of territorial sovereignty as a doctrine of noninterference in the affairs of other nations, so-called Westphalian sovereignty. This resulted as a natural extension of the principle of cuius regio, eius religio (Whose realm, his religion), leaving the Roman Catholic Church with little ability to interfere with the internal affairs of many European states.
In international law, sovereignty means that a government possesses full control over its own affairs within a territorial or geographical area or limit. Determining whether a specific entity is sovereign is not an exact science, but often a matter of diplomatic dispute. There is usually an expectation that de jure and de facto sovereignty exist at the place and time of concern, and rest in the same organization. Foreign governments recognize the sovereignty of a state over a territory, or refuse to do so.
For instance, in theory, both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China considered themselves sovereign governments over the whole territory of mainland China and Taiwan. Though some foreign governments recognize the Republic of China as the valid state, most now recognize the People's Republic of China. However, de facto, the People's Republic of China has jurisdiction only over mainland China but not Taiwan, while the Republic of China has jurisdiction only over Taiwan and some outlying islands but not mainland China. Since ambassadors are only exchanged between sovereign high parties, the countries recognizing the People's Republic often entertain de facto but not de jure diplomatic relationships with the Republic by maintaining "offices of representation", such as the American Institute in Taiwan, rather than embassies there.
Sovereignty may be recognized even when the sovereign body possesses no territory or its territory is under partial or total occupation by another power. The Holy See was in this position between the annexation in 1870 of the Papal States by Italy and the signing of the Lateran Treaties in 1929, when it was recognised as sovereign by many (mostly Roman Catholic) states despite possessing no territory – a situation resolved when the Lateran Treaties granted the Holy See sovereignty over the Vatican City. Another case, sui generis, though often contested, is the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, the third sovereign mini-state based in an enclave in the Italian capital (since in 1869 the Palazzo di Malta and the Villa Malta receive extraterritorial rights, in this way becoming the only "sovereign" territorial possessions of the modern Order), which is the last existing heir to one of several once militarily significant, crusader states of sovereign military orders. In 1607 its Grand masters were also made Reichsfürst (princes of the Holy Roman Empire) by the Holy Roman Emperor, granting them seats in the Reichstag, at the time the closest permanent equivalent to a UN-type general assembly; confirmed 1620). These sovereign rights never deposed, only the territories were lost. 100 modern states still maintain full diplomatic relations with the order[citation needed] (now de facto "the most prestigious service club"), and the UN awarded it observer status.
Similarly, the governments-in-exile of many European states (for instance, Norway, Netherlands or Czechoslovakia) during the Second World War were regarded as sovereign despite their territories being under foreign occupation; their governance resumed as soon as the occupation had ended. The government of Kuwait was in a similar situation vis-à-vis the Iraqi occupation of its country during 1990-1991.
Views on
This section overlaps with other sections too much. It should be combined with the rest of the article.
Please improve this article if you can.
There exist vastly differing views on the moral bases of sovereignty. These views translate into various bases for legal systems:
A fundamental polarity is between theories that assert that sovereignty is vested directly in the sovereign by divine right or natural right ; and theories that assert it is vested in the people. In the latter case there is a further division into those that assert that the people transfer their sovereignty to the sovereign (Hobbes), and those that assert that the people retain their sovereignty (Rousseau).
The European theorists of the 1500-1750 period generally insisted that sovereignty must be absolute, perpetual, and indivisible (or exclusive). Their definitions of absoluteness, however are not always the most stringent possible. Later theorists have often held that absoluteness may be considerably limited, for example by a constitution. The above points are treated more fully in the History section of this article.
Related articles: Divine right of kings, Absolute monarchy.
• Democracy is based on the concept of popular sovereignty. Representative democracies permit (against Rousseau's thought) a transfer of the exercise of sovereignty from the people to the parliament or the government. Parliamentary sovereignty refers to a representative democracy where the Parliament is, ultimately, the source of sovereignty, and not the executive power.
• Anarchists and some libertarians deny the sovereignty of states and governments. Anarchists often argue for a specific individual kind of sovereignty, such as the Anarch as a sovereign individual. Salvador Dalí, for instance, talked of "anarcho-monarchist" (as usual for him, tongue in cheek); Antonin Artaud of Heliogabalus: Or, The Crowned Anarchist; Max Stirner of The Ego and Its Own; Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida of a kind of "antisovereignty". Therefore, anarchists join a classical conception of the individual as sovereign of himself, which forms the basis of political consciousness. The unified consciousness is sovereignty over one's own body, as Nietzsche demonstrated (see also Pierre Klossowski's book on Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle). See also self-ownership and Sovereignty of the individual.
• The republican form of government acknowledges that the sovereign power is founded in the people, individually, not in the collective or whole body of free citizens, as in a democratic form. Thus no majority can deprive a minority of their sovereign rights and powers.
• Imperialists hold a view of sovereignty where power rightfully exists with those states that hold the greatest ability to impose the will of said state, by force or threat of force, over the populace or other states with weaker military or political will. They effectively deny the sovereignty of the individual in deference to either the 'good' of the whole, or to divine right.
The key element of sovereignty in the legalistic sense is that of exclusivity of jurisdiction. Specifically, when a decision is made by a sovereign entity, it cannot generally be overruled by a higher authority.
It is generally held that sovereignty requires not only the legal right to exercise power, but the actual exercise of such power. ("No de jure sovereignty without de facto sovereignty.") In other words, neither claiming/being proclaimed Sovereign, nor merely exercising the power of a Sovereign is sufficient; sovereignty requires both elements.
In constitutional law, sovereignty may pertain in some contexts to various organs possessing legal jurisdiction in their own chief, rather than by mandate or under supervision
Another topic is whether the law is held to be sovereign, that is, whether it is above political or other interference. Sovereign law constitutes a true state of law, meaning the letter of the law (if constitutionally correct) is applicable and enforceable, even when against the political will of the nation, as long as not formally changed following the constitutional procedure. Strictly speaking, any deviation from this principle constitutes a revolution or a coup d'état, regardless of the intentions.
In federations
This section requires expansion.
In federal systems of government, sovereignty also refers to powers which a state government possesses independently of the national government. Whether state sovereignty is superior to the sovereignty of the national government or vice versa determines whether the country is considered a federation (such as the United States) or a confederation (such as the Iroquois Confederacy). The fact that both state and national governments can simultaneously be sovereign is often explained by reasoning that sovereignty ultimately flows from the people in both cases. Controversy over states' rights ultimately contributed to the start of the American Civil War.
Sovereign as a title
In some cases, the title sovereign is not just a generic term, but an actual (part of the) formal style of a Head of state.
Thus from 22 June 1934, to 29 May 1953, (the title "Emperor of India" was dropped as of 15 August 1947, by retroactive proclamation dated 22 June 1948), the King of South Africa was styled in the Dominion of South Africa: "By the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India and Sovereign in and over the Union of South Africa." Upon the accession of Elizabeth II to the Throne of South Africa in 1952, the title was changed to Queen of South Africa and Her other Realms and Territories, Head of the Commonwealth, parallel to the style used in almost all the other Commonwealth realms. The pope holds ex officio the title "Sovereign of the Vatican City State" in respect to Vatican City.
The adjective form can also be used in a Monarch's full style, as in pre-imperial Russia, 16 January 1547 – 22 November 1721: Bozhiyeyu Milostiyu Velikiy/Velikaya Gosudar'/Gosudarynya Tsar'/Tsaritsa i Velikiy/Velikaya Knyaz'/Knyaginya N.N. vseya Rossiy Samodyerzhets "By the Grace of God Great Sovereign Tsar/Tsarina and Grand Prince/Princess, N.N., of All Russia, Autocrat"
Shared
Just like the office of Head of state (whether sovereignty is vested in it or not) can be vested jointly in several persons within a state, the sovereign jurisdiction over a single political territory can be shared jointly by two or more consenting powers, notably in the forms of a condominium or of (as still in Andorra) a co-principality
Of nation-states
Nations, claiming the right of self-determination, often establish sovereign states for themselves, thus creating nation-states.
See also
• Basileus
• Constitutive theory of statehood
• Declarative theory of statehood
• Montevideo Convention
• Neo-medievalism
• Plenary authority
• Souverainism
• Sovereigntist
• Suzerainty
• Tribal sovereignty
References
Notes
1. ^ Boczek, Boleslaw Adam (2005). International Law: A Dictionary. Scarecrow Press. pp. 117-118. ISBN 9780810850781.. Online, Google Books entry
2. ^ "Chaucer's tale of the Wife of Bath.". http://www.dhushara.com/book/renewal/bath.htm. Retrieved on 2009-01-10.
3. ^ a b "The Wedding of Sir Gawain and Dame Ragnell". http://www.lone-star.net/mall/literature/gawain.htm. Retrieved on 2009-01-10.
4. ^ Of the Social Contract, Book II, Chapter III.
5. ^ 1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 66 (Sir Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed. 1928)
Bibliography
• This article incorporates text from the public-domain Catholic Encyclopedia of 1913.
• The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and International Relations by Winston P. Nagan and Craig Hammer of the Levine College of Law, University of Florida
• Etymology OnLine
• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry
• The Extinction of Nation-States
• Protection of national sovereign rights under international law
• WorldStatesmen
• Catalan bid for 'sovereignty', BBC NEWS
• The Jacobs Elements of Sovereignty
• Sourcebooks
External links
Philosophy portal
• A Brief Primer on International Law
• Official United Nations website
• Official UN website on International Law
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sovereignty"
Theories of political behavior
For closely related theories in sociology, see collective behavior.
Theories of political behavior, as an aspect of political science, attempt to quantify and explain the influences that define a person's political views, ideology, and levels of political participation. Theorists who have had an influence on this field include Karl Deutsch and Theodor Adorno.
Contents
• 1 Long-term influences on political orientation
• 2 Short-term influences on political orientation
• 3 The influence of social groups on political outcomes
• 4 References
• 5 See also
Long-term influences on political orientation
There are three main sources of influence that shapes political orientation which create long-term effects. Generally, the primary influence originates from family. As stated previously, children will often adopt their parents' ideological values. Some theorists have argued that family tends to be the strongest, most influential force which exists over the lifetime; one essay has cr ed the majority of the student activism of the 1930s to the influence of parents.[1]
Secondly, teachers and other educational authority figures have a significant impact on political orientation. From as early as age 4 up until 18, children spend about 25 percent of their time involved in educational processes.[citation needed] Post-secondary education significantly raises the impact of political awareness and orientation; an October 2004 study of 1,202 college undergraduates across the United States showed that 87% of college students were registered to vote, compared to a national average of 64% of American adults.[2] A study at Santa Clara University also showed that 84% of students there were registered to vote.[2] Also consider that childhood and adolescent stages of personal growth have the highest level of impressionability.
Thirdly, peers also affect political orientation. Friends often, but not necessarily, have the advantage of being part of the same generation, which collectively develops a unique set of societal issues; Eric L. Bey has argued that "socialisation is the process through which individuals acquire knowledge, habits, and value orientations that will be useful in the future."[3] The ability to relate on this common level is where the means to shape ideological growth.
Short-term influences on political orientation
Short-term factors also affect voting behavior; the media and the impact of individual election issues are among these factors. These factors differ from the long-term factors as they are often short lived. However, they can be just as crucial in modifying political orientation. The ways in which these two sources are interpreted often relies on the individuals specific political ideology formed by the long term factors.
Most political scientists agree that the mass media have a profound impact on voting behavior. One author asserts that "few would argue with the notion that the institutions of the mass media are important to contemporary politics...in the transition to liberal democratic politics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe the media was a key battleground."
Second, there are election issues. These include campaign issues, debates and commercials. Election years and political campaigns can shift certain political behaviors based on the candidates involved, which have different degrees of effectiveness in influencing voters.
The influence of social groups on political outcomes
Recently, some political scientists have been interested in many studies which aimed to analyse the relation between the behaviour of social groups and the political outcomes. Some of the social groups included in their studies have been age demographics, gender, and ethnic groups.
For example, in U.S. politics, the effect of ethnic groups and gender has a great influence on the political outcomes.
Latin Americans have a profound social impact on the political outcome of their vote and are emerging as a strong up-and-coming political force. The most noticeable increase in Latin American voting was in the 2000 presidential election, although the votes did not share a socially common political view at that time. In the 2006 election, the Latin American vote aided tremendously in the election of Florida Senator Mel Martinez, although in the 2004 presidential election, about 44% of Latin Americans voted for Republican President George W. Bush. Latin Americans have been seen to be showing an increasing trend in the issues on which they vote for, causing them to become more united when faced with political views. Currently illegal immigration has been claiming most attention and Latin Americans, although not completely unanimous, are concerned with the education, employment and deportation of illegal immigrants in the United States.
Over seven decades ago, women earned the right to vote and since then they have been making a difference in the outcomes of political election. Given that the right to be politically active has granted them the opportunity to expand their knowledge and influence in current affairs, they are now considered one of the main components in the country’s decision making in both politics and economy. According to The American Political Science Association, over the pass 2004 presidential election, the women vote may have well decided the outcome of the race. Susan Carroll, the author of Women Voters and the Gender Gap, states that the increase of women influence on political behaviors due to four main categories: women outnumber men among voters; significant efforts are underway to increase registration and turnout among women; a gender gap is evident in the 2004 election as it has been in every presidential election since 1980; and women constitute a disproportionately large share of the undecided voters who will make their decision late in the campaign.
References
1. ^ Activist Impulses: Campus Radicalism in the 1930s (Cohen)
2. ^ a b Ethics and Political Behavior: A Portrait of the Voting Decisions of Santa Clara Students
3. ^ Dey, Eric L., Undergraduate Political Attitudes: Peer Influence in Changing Social Contexts, Journal of Higher Education, Vol. 68, 1997
See also
• Political parties
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theories_of_political_behavior"
Sovereign state
This article is about sovereign independent states. For subnational entities called states, see State (administrative division). For other uses, see State (disambiguation) and government.
A sovereign state is a political association with effective sovereignty over a geographic area and representing a population. A state usually includes the set of institutions that claim the authority to make the rules that govern the people of the society in that territory, though its status as a state often depends in part on being recognized by a number of other states as having internal and external sovereignty over it.
In sociology, the state is normally identified with these institutions: in Max Weber's influential definition, it is that organization that "(successfully) claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory," which may include the armed forces, civil service or state bureaucracy, courts, and police.
Contents
• 1 Definition
• 2 Modern criteria
o 2.1 Constitutive theory of statehood
o 2.2 Montevideo Convention
• 3 Etymology
• 4 Empirical and juridical senses of the word state
• 5 States, government types, and political systems
• 6 The historical development of the state
o 6.1 The state in classical antiquity
o 6.2 From the feudal state to the modern state in the West
o 6.3 The modern state
• 7 State and civil society
• 8 The state and the international system
o 8.1 The state and supranationalism
o 8.2 The state and international law
• 9 Contemporary approaches to the study of the state
o 9.1 Pluralism
o 9.2 Marxism
o 9.3 Anarchism
o 9.4 Institutionalism
• 10 The state in modern political thought
• 11 See also
• 12 References
Definition
Although the term often includes broadly all institutions of government or rule—ancient and modern—the modern state system bears a number of characteristics that were first consolidated beginning in earnest in the 15th century, when the term "state" also acquired its current meaning. Thus the word is often used in a strict sense to refer only to modern political systems.
In casual usage, the terms "country", "nation", and "state" are often used as if they were synonymous; but in a more strict usage they can be distinguished:
• Nation denotes a people who are believed to or deemed to share common customs, origins, and history. However, the adjectives national and international also refer to matters pertaining to what are strictly states, as in national capital, international law.
• State refers to the set of governing and supportive institutions that have sovereignty over a definite territory and population.
Modern criteria
Constitutive theory of statehood
Main article: Constitutive theory of statehood
In 1815 at the Congress of Vienna the Final Act only recognised 39 sovereign states in the European diplomatic system, and as a result it was firmly that in future new states would have to be recognised by other states, and that meant in practice recognition by one or more of the great powers.[1]
The constitutive theory was developed in the 19th century to define what is and is not a state. With this theory, the obligation to obey international law depends on a entity's recognition by other countries. Because of this, new states could not immediately become part of the international community or be bound by international law, and recognized nations did not have to respect international law in their dealings with them.[2]
One of the major criticisms of this law is the confusion caused when some states recognize a new entity, but other states do not, a situation the theory does not deal with. Hersch Lauterpacht, one of the theory's main proponents, suggested that it is a state's duty to grant recognition as a possible solution. However, a state may use any criteria when judging if they should give recognition and they have no obligation to use such criteria. Many countries may only recognize a state if it is to their advantage.[2]
Montevideo Convention
Main article: Montevideo Convention
One of the criteria most commonly cited by micronations with regard to difficulty getting international recognition is the Montevideo Convention. The Montevideo Convention was signed on December 26 1933 by the United States, Honduras, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, Guatemala, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Colombia, Chile, Peru and Cuba but it never received international consensus.[3] The Montevideo Convention has four conditions that an entity must meet to become a country:
• a permanent population
• defined territory
• Government
• capacity to enter into relations with other states
Because of these easy to meet criteria, the Montevideo Convention was never accepted by the international community and most countries instead use the constitutive theory of statehood as a benchmark.[4]
Etymology
The word state and its cognates in other European languages (stato in Italian, état in French, Staat in German, stát in Czech and Estado in Spanish and Portuguese) ultimately derive from the Latin status, literally "standing" but meaning "condition" or "status".[5] With the revival of the Roman law in the 14th century in Europe, this Latin term was used to refer to the legal standing of persons (such as the various "estates of the realm" - noble, common, and clerical), and in particular the special status of the king. The word was also associated with Roman ideas (dating back to Cicero) about the status rei publicae, the "condition of the republic." In time, the word lost its reference to particular social groups and became associated with the legal order of the entire society and the apparatus of its enforcement.[6]
Empirical and juridical senses of the word state
The word state has both an empirical and a juridical sense; that is, entities can be states either de facto or de jure or both.[7]
Empirically (or de facto), an entity is a state if, as in Max Weber's influential definition, it is that organization that has a 'monopoly on legitimate violence' over a specific territory.[8] Such an entity imposes its own legal order over a territory, even if it is not legally recognized as a state by other states (e.g., the Somali region of Somaliland).
Juridically (or de jure), an entity is a state in international law if it is recognized as such by other states, even if it does not actually have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force over a territory. Only an entity juridically recognized as a state can enter into many kinds of international agreements and be represented in a variety of legal forums, such as the United Nations.
States, government types, and political systems
The concept of the state can be distinguished from two related concepts with which it is sometimes confused: the concept of a form of government or regime, such as democracy or dictatorship, and the concept of a political system. The form of government identifies only one aspect of the state, namely, the way in which the highest political offices are filled and their relationship to each other and to society. It does not include other aspects of the state that may be very important in its everyday functioning, such as the quality of its bureaucracy. For example, two democratic states may be quite different if one has a capable, well-trained bureaucracy or civil service while the other does not. Thus generally speaking the term "state" refers to the instruments of political power, while the terms regime or form of government refers more to the way in which such instruments can be accessed and employed.[9]
Some scholars have suggested that the term "state" is too imprecise and loaded to be used productively in sociology and political science, and ought to be replaced by the more comprehensive term "political system." The "political system" refers to the ensemble of all social structures that function to produce collectively binding decisions in a society. In modern times, these would include the political regime, political parties, and various sorts of organizations. The term "political system" thus denotes a broader concept than the state.[10]
The historical development of the state
The examples and perspective in this section may not represent a worldwide view of the subject. Please improve this article or discuss the issue on the talk page.
The earliest forms of the state emerged whenever it became possible to centralize power in a durable way. Agriculture and writing are almost everywhere associated with this process. Agriculture allowed for the production and storing of a surplus. This in turn allowed and encouraged the emergence of a class of people who controlled and protected the agricultural stores and thus did not have to spend most of their time providing for their own subsistence. In addition, writing (or the equivalent of writing, like Inca quipus) because it made possible the centralization of vital information.[11]
Some political philosophers believe the origins of the state lie ultimately in the tribal culture which developed with human sentience, the template for which was the alleged primal "alpha-male" microsocieties of our earlier ancestors, which were based on the coercion of the weak by the strong.[citation needed] However anthropologists point out that extant band- and tribe-level societies are notable for their lack of centralized authority, and that highly stratified societies--i.e., states--constitute a relatively recent break with the course of human history.[12]
The state in classical antiquity
The history of the state in the West usually begins with classical antiquity. During that period, the state took a variety of forms, none of them very much like the modern state. There were monarchies whose power (like that of the Egyptian Pharaoh) was based on the religious function of the king and his control of a centralized army. There were also large, quasi-bureaucratized empires, like the Roman empire, which depended less on the religious function of the ruler and more on effective military and legal organizations and the cohesion of an aristocracy.
Perhaps the most important political innovations of classical antiquity came from the Greek city-states and the Roman Republic. The Greek city-states before the 4th century granted citizenship rights to their free population, and in Athens these rights were combined with a directly democratic form of government that was to have a long afterlife in political thought and history.
In contrast, Rome developed from a monarchy into a republic, governed by a senate dominated by the Roman aristocracy. The Roman political system contributed to the development of law, constitutionalism and to the distinction between the private and the public spheres.
From the feudal state to the modern state in the West
The story of the development of the specifically modern state in the West typically begins with the dissolution of the western Roman empire. This led to the fragmentation of the imperial state into the hands of private and decentralized lords whose political, judicial, and military roles corresponded to the organization of economic production. In these conditions, according to Marxists, the economic unit of society corresponded exactly to the state on the local level.
The state-system of feudal Europe was an unstable configuration of suzerains and anointed kings. A monarch, formally at the head of a hierarchy of sovereigns, was not an absolute power who could rule at will; instead, relations between lords and monarchs were mediated by varying degrees of mutual dependence, which was ensured by the absence of a centralized system of taxation. This reality ensured that each ruler needed to obtain the 'consent' of each estate in the realm. This was not quite a 'state' in the Weberian sense of the term, since the king did not monopolize either the power of lawmaking (which was shared with the church) or the means of violence (which were shared with the nobles).
The formalization of the struggles over taxation between the monarch and other elements of society (especially the nobility and the cities) gave rise to what is now called the Standestaat, or the state of Estates, characterized by parliaments in which key social groups negotiated with the king about legal and economic matters. These estates of the realm sometimes evolved in the direction of fully-fledged parliaments, but sometimes lost out in their struggles with the monarch, leading to greater centralization of lawmaking and coercive (chiefly military) power in his hands. Beginning in the 15th century, this centralizing process gave rise to the absolutist state.[13]
The modern state
The state's (government's) position in the economy.
The rise of the "modern state" as a public power constituting the supreme political authority within a defined territory is associated with western Europe's gradual institutional development beginning in earnest in the late 15th century, culminating in the rise of absolutism and capitalism.
As Europe's dynastic states—England under the Tudors, Spain under the Habsburgs, and France under the Bourbons—embarked on a variety of programs designed to increase centralized political and economic control, they increasingly exhibited many of the institutional features that characterize the "modern state". This centralization of power involved the delineation of political boundaries, as European monarchs gradually defeated or co-opted other sources of power, such as the Church and lesser nobility. In place of the fragmented system of feudal rule, with its often indistinct territorial claims, large, unitary states with extensive control over definite territories emerged. This process gave rise to the highly centralized and increasingly bureaucratic forms of absolute monarchical rule of the 17th and 18th centuries, when the principal features of the contemporary state system took form, including the introduction of a standing army, a central taxation system, diplomatic relations with permanent embassies, and the development of state economic policy—mercantilism.
Cultural and national homogenization figured prominently in the rise of the modern state system. Since the absolutist period, states have largely been organized on a national basis. The concept of a national state, however, is not synonymous with nation-state. Even in the most ethnically homogeneous societies there is not always a complete correspondence between state and nation, hence the active role often taken by the state to promote nationalism through emphasis on shared symbols and national identity.[14]
It is in this period that the term "the state" is first introduced into political discourse in more or less its current meaning. Although Niccolò Machiavelli is often cr ed with first using the term to refer to a territorial sovereign government in the modern sense in The Prince, published in 1532, it is not until the time of the British thinkers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke and the French thinker Jean Bodin that the concept in its current meaning is fully developed.[6]
Today, most Western states more or less fit the influential definition of the state in Max Weber's Politics as a Vocation.[8] According to Weber, the modern state monopolizes the means of legitimate physical violence over a well-defined territory. Moreover, the legitimacy of this monopoly itself is of a very special kind, "rational-legal" legitimacy, based on impersonal rules that constrain the power of state elites.
However, in some other parts of the world states do not fit Weber's definition as well.[7] They may not have a complete monopoly over the means of legitimate physical violence over a definite territory, or their legitimacy may not be adequately described as rational-legal. But they are still recognizably distinct from feudal and [absolutist states in the extent of their bureaucratization and their reliance on nationalism as a principle of legitimation.
Since Weber, an extensive literature on the processes by which the "modern state" emerged from the feudal state has been generated. Marxist scholars, for example, assert that the formation of modern states can be explained primarily in terms of the interests and struggles of social classes.[15]
Scholars working in the broad Weberian tradition, by contrast, have often emphasized the institution-building effects of war. For example, Charles Tilly has argued that the revenue-gathering imperatives forced on nascent states by geopolitical competition and constant warfare were mostly responsible for the development of the centralized, territorial bureaucracies that characterize modern states in Europe. States that were able to develop centralized tax-gathering bureaucracies and to field mass armies survived into the modern era; states that were not able to do so did not.[16]
State and civil society
The modern state is both separate from and connected to civil society. The nature of this connection has been the subject of considerable attention in both analyses of state development and normative theories of the state. Classical thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes, J. J. Rousseau, Immanuel Kant emphasized the identity of the state and society, while modern thinkers, by contrast, beginning with G. W. F. Hegel and Alexis de Tocqueville, started to emphasize the relations between them as independent entities[17]. Following Karl Marx, Jürgen Habermas, has argued that civil society may form an economic base for a public sphere, as a placed in political superstructure domain of extra-institutional engagement with matters of public interest trying to influence the state and yet necessarily connected with it.
Some Marxist theorists, such as Antonio Gramsci, have questioned the distinction between the state and civil society altogether, arguing that the former is integrated into many parts of the latter. Others, such as Louis Althusser, maintain that civil organizations such as churches, schools, and even trade unions are part of an 'ideological state apparatus.' In this sense, the state can fund a number of groups within society that, while autonomous in principle, are dependent on state support.
Given the role that many social groups have in the development of public policy and the extensive connections between state bureaucracies and other institutions, it has become increasingly difficult to identify the boundaries of the state. Privatization, nationalization, and the creation of new regulatory bodies also change the boundaries of the state in relation to society. Often the nature of quasi-autonomous organizations is unclear, generating debate among political scientists on whether they are part of the state or civil society. Some political scientists thus prefer to speak of policy networks and decentralized governance in modern societies rather than of state bureaucracies and direct state control over policy.[18] Alfred Stepan also introduced the idea of `political society' those organisations that move periodically between the state and non-state sectors (such as Political Parties). Whaites has argued that in developing countries there are dangers inherent in promoting strong civil society where states are weak, risks that should be considered and mitigated by those funding civil society or advocating its role as an alternative source of service provision[19].
The state and the international system
Since the late 19th century the entirety of the world's inhabitable land has been parceled up into states with more or less definite borders claimed by various states. Earlier, quite large land areas had been either unclaimed or uninhabited, or inhabited by nomadic peoples who were not organized as states. Currently more than 200 states comprise the international community, with the vast majority of them represented in the United Nations.
These states form what International relations theorists call a system, where each state takes into account the behavior of other states when making their own calculations. From this point of view, states embedded in an international system face internal and external security and legitimation dilemmas. Recently the notion of an "international community" has been developed to refer to a group of states who have established rules, procedures, and institutions for the conduct of their relations. In this way the foundation has been laid for international law, diplomacy, formal regimes, and organizations.
The state and supranationalism
In the late 20th century, the globalization of the world economy, the mobility of people and capital, and the rise of many international institutions all combined to circumscribe the freedom of action of states. These constraints on the state's freedom of action are accompanied in some areas, notably Western Europe, with projects for interstate integration such as the European Union. However, the state remains the basic political unit of the world, as it has been since the 16th century. The state is therefore considered the most central concept in the study of politics, and its definition is the subject of intense scholarly debate.
The state and international law
By modern practice and the law of international relations, a state's sovereignty is conditional upon the diplomatic recognition of the state's claim to statehood. Degrees of recognition and sovereignty may vary. However, any degree of recognition, even recognition by a majority of the states in the international system, is not binding on third-party states.
The legal criteria for statehood are not obvious. Often, the laws are surpassed by political circumstances. However, one of the documents often quoted on the matter is the Montevideo Convention from 1933, the first article of which states:
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
Contemporary approaches to the study of the state
There are three main traditions within political science and sociology that shape 'theories of the state': the pluralist, the Marxist, and the institutionalist. In addition, anarchists present a tradition which is similar to, but different from, the Marxian one.
Each of these theories has been employed to gain understanding on the state, while recognizing its complexity. Several issues underlie this complexity. First, the boundaries of the state sector are not clearly defined, while they change constantly. Second, the state is not only the site of conflict between different organizations, but also internal conflict and conflict within organizations. Some scholars speak of the 'state's interest,' but there are often various interests within different parts of the state that are neither solely state-centered nor solely society-centered, but develop between different groups in civil society and different state actors.
Pluralism
Pluralism has been very popular in the United States. In fact, it might be seen as the dominant vision of politics in that country.
Within this tradition, Robert Dahl sees the state as either (1) a neutral arena for settling disputes among contending interests or (2) a collection of agencies which themselves act as simply another set of interest groups. With power diffused across society among many competing groups, state policy is a product of recurrent bargaining. Although pluralism recognizes the existence of inequality, it asserts that all groups have an opportunity to pressure the state. The pluralist approach suggests that the modern democratic state's actions are the result of pressures applied by a variety of organized interests. Dahl called this kind of state a polyarchy.[20]
In some ways, the development of the pluralist school is a response to the "power elite" theory presented in 1956 by the sociologist C. Wright Mills concerning the U.S. and furthered by research by G. William Domhoff, among others. In that theory, the most powerful elements of the political, military, and economic parts of U.S. society are united at the top of the political system, acting to serve their common interests. The "masses" were left out of the political process. In context, it might said that Mills saw the U.S. elite as in part being very similar to that of the Soviet Union, then the major geopolitical rival of the U.S. One response was the sociologist Arnold M. Rose's publication of The Power Structure: Political Process in American Society in 1967. He argued that the distribution of power in the U.S. was more diffuse and pluralistic in nature.
The importance of democratic elections of political leaders in the U.S. (and not the Soviet Union) provides evidence in favor of the pluralist perspective for that country. We might reconcile power elite theory with pluralism in terms of Joseph Schumpeter's theory of democracy. To him, "democracy" involved the (non-elite) masses choosing which elite would have the power.
The absence of democratic elections do not rule out pluralism, however. The old Soviet Union is sometimes described as being ruled by an elite, which ran society via a bureaucracy which united the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the military, and Gosplan, the economic planning apparatus. However, bureaucratic rule from above is never perfect. This meant that, so to some extent, Soviet policies reflected a pluralistic competition of interest groups within the Party, the military, and Gosplan, including factory managers.
Marxism
Marxist theories of the state were relatively influential in continental Europe in the 1960s and 1970s. But it is hard to summarize the theory developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. After all, the effort by Hal Draper to distill their political thinking in his Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution (Monthly Review Press) took several thick volumes. But many have tried.
For Marxist theorists, the role of modern states is determined or related to their role in capitalist societies. They would agree with Weber on the crucial role of coercion in defining the state. (In fact, Weber himself starts his analysis with a quotation from Leon Trotsky, a Bolshevik leader.) But Marxists reject the mainstream liberal view that the state is an institution established in the collective interest of society as a whole (perhaps by a social contract) to reconcile competing interests in the name of the common good. Contrary to the pluralist vision, the state is not a mere "neutral arena for settling disputes among contending interests" because it leans heavily to support one interest group (the capitalists) alone. Nor does the state usually act as merely a "collection of agencies which themselves act as simply another set of interest groups," again because of the state's systematic bias toward serving capitalist interests.
In contrast to liberal or pluralist views, the American economist Paul Sweezy and other Marxian thinkers have pointed out that the main job of the state is to protect capitalist property rights in the means of production. At first, this seems hardly controversial. After all, many economics and politics textbooks refer to the state's crucial role in defending property rights and in enforcing contracts. But the capitalists own a share of the means of production that is far out of proportion to the capitalists' role in the total population. More importantly, in Marxian theory, ownership of the means of production gives that minority social power over those who do not own the means of production (the workers). Because of that power, i.e., the power to exploit and dominate the working class, the state's defense of them is nothing but the use of coercion to defend capitalism as a class society.[21] Instead of serving the interests of society as a whole, in this view the state serves those of a small minority of the population.
Among Marxists, as with other topics, there are many debates about the nature and role of the capitalist state. One division is between the "instrumentalists" and the "structuralists."
On the first, some contemporary Marxists apply a literal interpretation of the comment by Marx and Frederich Engels in The Communist Manifesto that "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie." In this tradition, Ralph Miliband argued that the ruling class uses the state as its instrument (tool) to dominate society in a straightforward way. For Miliband, the state is dominated by an elite that comes from the same background as the capitalist class and therefore shares many of the same goals. State officials therefore share the same interests as owners of capital and are linked to them through a wide array of interpersonal and political ties.[22] In many ways, this theory is similar to the "power elite" theory of C. Wright Mills.
Miliband's research is specific to the United Kingdom, where the class system has traditionally been integrated strongly into the educational system (Eton, Oxbridge, etc.) and social networks. In the United States, the educational system and social networks are more heterogeneous and seem less class-dominated to many. But a social connection between state managers and the capitalist class can be seen in the dependence of the major politicians and their parties on campaign contributions from the rich, on approval from the capitalist-owned media, on advice from corporate-endowed "think tanks," and the like.
In the second view, other Marxist theorists argue that the exact names, biographies, and social roles of those who control the state are irrelevant. Instead, they emphasize the structural role of the state's activities. Heavily influenced by the French philosopher Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, a Greek neo-Marxist theorist argued that capitalist states do not always act on behalf of the ruling class, and when they do, it is not necessarily the case because state officials consciously strive to do so, but because the structural position of the state is configured in such a way to ensure that the interests of capital are always dominant.
Poulantzas' main contribution to the Marxian literature on the state was the concept of relative autonomy of the state: state policies do not correspond exactly to the collective or long-term interests of the capitalist class, but help maintain and preserve capitalism over the long haul. The "power elite," if one exists, may act in ways that go against the wishes of capitalists. While Poulantzas' work on 'state autonomy' has served to sharpen and specify a great deal of Marxist literature on the state, his own framework came under criticism for its "structural functionalism."
But this kind of criticism can be answered by considering what happens if state managers do not work to favor the operations of capitalism as a class society.[23] They find that the economy are punished by a capital strike or capital flight, encouraging higher unemployment, a decline in tax receipts, and international financial problems. The decline in tax revenues makes it more necessary to borrow from the bourgeoisie. Because the latter will charge high interest rates (especially to a government seen as hostile), the state's financial problems deepen. Such events might be seen in Chile in 1973, under Salvador Allende's Unidad Popular government. Added to the relatively "automatic" workings of the economy (under the spur of profit-seeking businesses) are the ways in which an anti-capitalist government provokes anti-government conspiracies, including those by the Central Intelligence Agency and local political forces, as actually happened in 1973.
Unless they are ready to actually mobilize the working population to revolutionize society and move beyond capitalism, "sober" state managers will pull back from anti-capitalist policies. In any event, they would likely never go so far as to "rock the boat" because of their acceptance of the dominant ideology encouraged by the prevailing educational system.
Despite the debates among Marxist theorists of the state, there are also many agreements. It is possible that both "instrumental" and "structural" forces encourage political unity of the state managers with the capitalist class. That is, both the personal influence of capitalists and the societal constraints on state activity play a role.
Of course, no matter how strong this link, the Marx-Engels dictum that "The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" does not say that the executive will always do a good job in such management. (As Poulantzas pointed out, the state maintains some autonomy.) First, there is the problem of reconciling the particular interests of individual capitalist organizations with each other. For example, different parts of the media may disagree on the nature of needed government regulations. Further, it is often unclear what the long-run class interests of capitalists are, beyond the simple defense of capitalist property rights. It may be impossible to discover class interests until after the fact, i.e., after a policy has been implemented. Third, state managers may use their administrative power to serve their own interests and even to facilitate their entrance into the capitalist class.
Finally, pressure from working-class organizations (labor unions, social-democratic parties, etc.) or other non-capitalist forces (environmentalists, etc.) may push the state from toeing the capitalist "line" exactly. In the end, these problems imply that the state will always have some autonomy from obeying the exact wishes of the capitalist class.
In this view, the Marxian theory of the state does not really contradict the pluralist vision of the state as an arena for the contention of many interest groups, including those based in the state itself. Rather, the Marxian proposition is that this multi-sided competition and its results are strongly biased in the direction of reproducing the capitalist system over time.
It should be emphasized that all of the Marxist theories of the state discussed above refer only to the capitalist state in normal times (without civil war and the like). During a period of economic and social crisis, the absolute need to maintain order may raise the power of the military -- and military goals -- in governmental affairs, sometimes even leading to the violation of capitalist property rights.
In a non-capitalist system such as feudalism, Marxian historians have said that the state did not really exist in the sense that it does today (using Weber's definition). That is, the central state did not monopolize force in a specific geographic area. The feudal king typically had to depend on the military power of his "lieges." This meant that the country was more of an alliance than a unified whole. Further, the difference between the state and civil society was weak: the feudal lords were not simply involved in "economic" activity (production, sale, etc.) but also "political" activity: they used force against their serfs (to extract rents), while acting as judge, jury, and police.
Getting further beyond capitalism, Marxist theory says that since the state is central to protecting class inequality, it will "wither away" once class inequality of power is abolished. In practice, no self-styled Marxist leader or government has ever made attempts to move toward a society without a state. Of course, that is to be expected. After all, no society has ever completely abolished classes. In addition, no self-described "socialist" country has been able to do without a military defense against capitalist invasion or destabilization. Third, in Marxian theory, impetus for the abolition of the state would not come from the leaders or the government themselves as much as from the working people that they are supposed to represent.
Anarchism
This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources (ideally, using inline citations). Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (August 2008)
The anarchists share many of the Marxian propositions about the state. But in contrast, anarchists argue that a country's collective interests can be served without having a centralized organization. The maintenance of law and order does not require that there be a sector of society that monopolizes the legitimate use of force. It is possible for society to prosper without a state, even without a long period of classes "withering away." In fact, anarchists see the state as a parasite that can and should be abolished.
Thus, they oppose the state as a matter of principle and reject the Marxian view that it may be needed temporarily as part of a transition to socialism or communism. They propose different strategies for the elimination of the state. There is a dichotomy of views regarding its replacement. Anarcho-capitalists envision a free market guided by the invisible hand offering critical or valuable functions traditionally provided by to replace the state; other anarchists (such as Bakunin and Kropotkin in the 19th century) tend to put less emphasis on markets, arguing for a form of socialism without the state. Such socialism would require worker self-management of the means of production and the federation of worker organizations in communes which will then federate into larger units.
Anarchists consider the state to be the institutionalization of domination and privilege. According to key theorists[citation needed], the state emerged to ratify and deepen the dominance of the victors of history. Unlike Marxists, anarchists believe that the state, while reflecting social interests, is not a mere executive committee of the ruling class. In itself, without class rule, it is a position of power over the whole society that can dominate and exploit society. Naturally enough, many fractions of the ruling classes and even the oppressed classes strive to control the state, forming different and ever-changing alliances.[citation needed] They also reject the need for a state to serve the collective needs of the people. Hence, they reject not only the current state, but the Marxian idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat). Instead, they see the state as an inherently oppressive force which takes away the ability of people to make decisions about the things that affect their lives.
Institutionalism
Both the Marxist and pluralist approaches view the state as reacting to the activities of groups within society, such as classes or interest groups. In this sense, they have both come under criticism for their 'society-centered' understanding of the state by scholars who emphasize the autonomy of the state with respect to social forces.
In particular, the "new institutionalism," an approach to politics that holds that behavior is fundamentally molded by the institutions in which it is embedded, asserts that the state is not an 'instrument' or an 'arena' and does not 'function' in the interests of a single class. Scholars working within this approach stress the importance of interposing civil society between the economy and the state to explain variation in state forms.
"New institutionalist" writings on the state, such as the works of Theda Skocpol, suggest that state actors are to an important degree autonomous. In other words, state personnel have interests of their own, which they can and do pursue independently (at times in conflict with) actors in society. Since the state controls the means of coercion, and given the dependence of many groups in civil society on the state for achieving any goals they may espouse, state personnel can to some extent impose their own preferences on civil society.[24]
'New institutionalist' writers, claiming allegiance to Weber, often utilize the distinction between 'strong states' and 'weak states,' claiming that the degree of 'relative autonomy' of the state from pressures in society determines the power of the state—a position that has found favor in the field of international political economy.
The state in modern political thought
The rise of the modern state system was closely related to changes in political thought, especially concerning the changing understanding of legitimate state power. Early modern defenders of absolutism such as Thomas Hobbes and Jean Bodin undermined the doctrine of the divine right of kings by arguing that the power of kings should be justified by reference to the people. Hobbes in particular went further and argued that political power should be justified with reference to the individual, not just to the people understood collectively. Both Hobbes and Bodin thought they were defending the power of kings, not advocating democracy, but their arguments about the nature of sovereignty were fiercely resisted by more traditional defenders of the power of kings, like Sir Robert Filmer in England, who thought that such defenses ultimately opened the way to more democratic claims.
These and other early thinkers introduced two important concepts in order to justify sovereign power: the idea of a state of nature and the idea of a social contract. The first concept describes an imagined situation in which the state - understood as a centralized, coercive power - does not exist, and human beings have all their natural rights and powers; the second describes the conditions under which a voluntary agreement could take human beings out of the state of nature and into a state of civil society. Depending on what they understood human nature to be and the natural rights they thought human beings had in that state, various writers were able to justify more or less extensive forms of the state as a remedy for the problems of the state of nature. Thus, for example, Hobbes, who described the state of nature as a "war of every man, against every man,"[25] argued that sovereign power should be almost absolute since almost all sovereign power would be better than such a war, whereas John Locke, who understood the state of nature in more positive terms, thought that state power should be strictly limited.[26] Both of them nevertheless understood the powers of the state to be limited by what rational individuals would agree to in a hypothetical or actual social contract.
The idea of the social contract lent itself to more democratic interpretations than Hobbes or Locke would have wanted. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, for example, argued that the only valid social contract would be one were individuals would be subject to laws that only themselves had made and assented to, as in a small direct democracy. Today the tradition of social contract reasoning is alive in the work of John Rawls and his intellectual heirs, though in a very abstract form. Rawls argued that rational individuals would only agree to social institutions specifying a set of inviolable basic liberties and a certain amount of redistribution to alleviate inequalities for the benefit of the worst off. Lockean state of nature reasoning, by contrast, is more common in the libertarian tradition of political thought represented by the work of Robert Nozick. Nozick argued that given the natural rights that human beings would have in a state of nature, the only state that could be justified would be a minimal state whose sole functions would be to provide protection and enforce agreements.
Some contemporary thinkers, such as Michel Foucault, have argued that political theory needs to get away from the notion of the state: "We need to cut off the king's head. In political theory that has still to be done."[27] By this he meant that power in the modern world is much more decentralized and uses different instruments than power in the early modern era, so that the notion of a sovereign, centralized state is increasingly out of date.
Others have advocated the consideration of the state within the context of complex underlying elite relationships, themselves shaped by factors that include outside pressures. This work has been prominent in the thinking of State-building theorists such as Alan Whaites, who focuses on dynamics shaping the nature and capability of states. Whaites' model of state-building offers a conceptualization of why some states work well and others become characterized by patronage, corruption and conflict.[28]
See also
• Country
• Elite theory
• Failed state
• International relations
• List of sovereign states (by formation date)
• Montevideo Convention
• Nation
• Nation-building
• Police state
• Political power
• Political settlement
• Province
• Regional state
• Social contract
• State-building
• State country
• Statism
• Justification for the state
• Unitary state
• U.S. state
References
1. ^ Kalevi Jaakko Holsti Taming the Sovereigns p. 128
2. ^ a b Hillier, Tim (1998). Sourcebook on Public International Law. Routledge. pp. 201–2. ISBN 1859410502. http://books.google.com/books?id=Kr0sOuIx8q8C.
3. ^ "Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American); December 26, 1933". The Avalon Project. Yale University. 2008-11-17. Archived from the original on 2008-02-15. http://web.archive.org/web/20080215090153/http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/intdip/interam/intam03.htm. Retrieved on 2008-11-20.
4. ^ Ryan, John; George Dunford, Simon Sellar (2006) (HTML). Micronations: The Lonely Planet Guide to Home-Made Nations. Lonely Planet. pp. 9. ISBN 1741047307. http://books.google.com.au/books?id=5ZRrwrlIPSYC. Retrieved on 2008-11-13.
5. ^ "state." Online Etymology Dictionary. Douglas Harper, Historian. 26 February 2007. [Dictionary.com http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/state].
6. ^ a b Skinner, Quentin. 1989. The State. In Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, ed by T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521359783
7. ^ a b Jackson, Robert H., and Carl G. Rosberg. 1982. Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and The Juridical in Statehood. World Politics 35 (1):1-24.[1]
8. ^ a b Weber, Max. 1994. The Profession and Vocation of Politics. In Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521397197.
9. ^ Bobbio, Norberto. 1989. Democracy and Dictatorship: The Nature and Limits of State Power. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 0816618135.
10. ^ Easton, David. 1990. The Analysis of Political Structure. New York: Routledge.
11. ^ Giddens, Anthony. 1987. Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism. 3 vols. Vol. II: The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity Press. ISBN 0520060393. See chapter 2.
12. ^ Boehm, Christopher. 1999. in the Forest. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 0674006917.
13. ^ Poggi, G. 1978. The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
14. ^ Breuilly, John. 1993. Nationalism and the State. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 0719038006.
15. ^ Anderson, Perry. 1979. Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: Verso. ISBN 086091710X.
16. ^ Tilly, Charles. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992. Cambridge, Massachusetts: B. Blackwell. ISBN 1557863687.
17. ^ Zaleski, Pawel (2008). "Tocqueville on Civilian Society. A Romantic Vision of the Dichotomic Structure of Social Reality". Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte (Felix Meiner Verlag) 50.
18. ^ Kjaer, Anne Mette. 2004. Governance. London: Verso. ISBN 0745629792
19. ^ Alan Whaites. 1998. Viewpoint NGOs, civil society and the state: avoiding theoretical extremes in real world issues Development in Practice
20. ^ Robert Dahl. 1973. Modern Political Analysis. Prentice Hall. ISBN 0135969816
21. ^ Sweezy, Paul. 1942. The Theory of Capitalist Development. New York: Monthly Review, ch. 13.
22. ^ Miliband, Ralph. 1983. Class power and state power. London: Verso.
23. ^ Fred Block. 1977 "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule." Socialist Revolution May-June.
24. ^ Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Theda Skocpol, and Peter B. Evans, eds. 1985. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.ISBN 0521313139.
25. ^ Hobbes, Thomas. 1651. Leviathan. Part I, chapter 13.
26. ^ Locke, John. 1689. Two Treatises of Government. Second Treatise, chapter 2.
27. ^ Foucault, Michel. 2000 [1976]. Truth and Power. In Power, ed by J. D. Fearon. New York: The New Press, p. 123. ISBN 1565847091
28. ^ Whaites, Alan, States in Development: Understanding State-building, [2]
International relations theory
International relations theory attempts to provide a conceptual model upon which international relations can be analyzed. Each theory is reductive and essentialist to different degrees, relying on different sets of assumptions respectively. As Ole Holsti describes them, international relations theories act as a pair of coloured sunglasses, allowing the wearer to see only the salient events relevant to the theory. An adherent of realism may completely disregard an event that a constructivist might pounce upon as crucial, and vice versa.
The number and character of the assumptions made by an international relations theory also determine its usefulness. Realism, a parsimonious and very essentialist theory, is useful in accounting for historical actions (for instance why did X invade Y) but limited in both explaining systemic change (such as the end of the Cold War) and predicting future events. Liberalism, which examines a very wide number of conditions, is less useful in making predictions, but can be very insightful in analyzing past events. Traditional theories may have little to say about the behavior of former colonies, but post-colonial theory may have greater insight into that specific area, where it fails in other situations.
• International relations theories can be divided into "positivist/rationalist" theories which focus on a principally state-level analysis, and "post-positivist/reflectivist" ones which incorporate expanded meanings of security, ranging from class, to gender, to postcolonial security. Many often conflicting ways of thinking exist in IR theory, including Cons1 Realism
• 2 Liberalism
o 2.1 Democratic peace theory
• 3 Institutionalism
• 4 English School
• 5 Critical theories
o 5.1 Marxist theory
o 5.2 Constructivism
• 6 Functionalism
• 7 Further reading
• 8 See also
• 9 External links
10 Notes tructivism, Institutionalism, Marxism, Neo-Gramscianism, and others. However, two positivist schools of thought are most prevalent: Realism and Liberalism; though increasingly, Constructivism is becoming mainstream[1] and postpositivist theories are increasingly popular, particularly outside the United States.
Contents
Realism
Main article: Realism in international relations
Realism makes several key assumptions. It assumes that nation-states are unitary, geographically-based actors in an anarchic international system with no authority above capable of regulating interactions between states as no true authoritative world government exists. Secondly, it assumes that sovereign states, rather than IGOs, NGOs or MNCs, are the primary actors in international affairs. Thus, states, as the highest order, are in competition with one another. As such, a state acts as a rational autonomous actor in pursuit of its own self-interest with a primary goal to maintain and ensure its own security—and thus its sovereignty and survival. Realism holds that in pursuit of their interests, states will attempt to amass resources, and that relations between states are determined by their relative levels of power. That level of power is in turn determined by the state's military and economic capabilities.
Some realists (offensive realists) believe that states are inherently aggressive, that territorial expansion is constrained only by opposing powers, while others (defensive realists) believe that states are obsessed with the security and continuation of the state's existence. The defensive view can lead to a security dilemma where increasing one's own security can bring along greater instability as the opponent(s) builds up its own arms, making security a zero-sum game where only relative gains can be made.
Liberalism
The precursor to liberal IR theory was "idealism"; however, this term was applied in a critical manner by those who saw themselves as 'realists', for instance E. H. Carr. Idealism in international relations usually refers to the school of thought personified in American diplomatic history by Woodrow Wilson, such that it is sometimes referred to as "Wilsonianism." Idealism holds that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. For example, an idealist might believe that ending poverty at home should be coupled with tackling poverty abroad. Wilson's idealism was a precursor to liberal international relations theory, which would arise amongst the "institution-builders" after World War II.
Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behavior. Unlike realism where the state is seen as a unitary actor, liberalism allows for plurality in state actions. Thus, preferences will vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government type. Liberalism also holds that interaction between states is not limited to the political/security ("high politics"), but also economic/cultural ("low politics") whether through commercial firms, organizations or individuals. Thus, instead of an anarchic international system, there are plenty of opportunities for cooperation and broader notions of power, such as cultural capital (for example, the influence of films leading to the popularity of the country's culture and creating a market for its exports worldwide). Another assumption is that absolute gains can be made through co-operation and interdependence - thus peace can be achieved.
Democratic peace theory
Main article: Democratic peace theory
The democratic peace theory argues that liberal democracies have never (or almost never) made war on one another and have few lesser conflicts between each other. This is seen as contradicting especially the realist theories and this empirical claim is now one of the great disputes in political science. Numerous explanations have been proposed for the democratic peace. It has also been argued, as in the book Never at War, that democracies conduct diplomacy in general very differently from nondemocracies. (Neo)realists disagree with Liberals over the theory, often citing structural reasons for the peace, as opposed to the state's government.
Institutionalism
Main article: Institutionalism in international relations
Institutionalism in international relations holds that the international system is not—in practice—anarchic, but that it has an implicit or explicit structure which determines how states will act within the system.
Institutions are rules that determine the decision-making process. In the international arena, institution has been used interchangeably with 'regime', which has been defined by Krasner as a set of explicit or implicit "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given issue-area."
Institutionalist scholars hold a wide array of beliefs stemming from the central proposition that institutions "matter" in answering the question, what explains a particular outcome? There are four reasons for this:
They structure choices, they provide incentives, they distribute power and they define identities and roles.
English School
Main article: English school of international relations theory
The 'English School' of international relations theory, also known as International Society, Liberal Realism, Rationalism or the British institutionalists, maintains that there is a 'society of states' at the international level, despite the condition of 'anarchy' (literally the lack of a ruler or world state).
A great deal of the work of the English School concerns the examination of traditions of past international theory, casting it, as Martin Wight did in his 1950s-era lectures at the London School of Economics, into three divisions: 1. Realist or Hobbesian (after Thomas Hobbes), 2. Rationalist (or Grotian, after Hugo Grotius), 3. Revolutionist (or Kantian, after Immanuel Kant).
In broad terms, the English School itself has supported the rationalist or Grotian tradition, seeking a middle way (or via media) between the 'power politics' of realism and the 'utopianism' of revolutionism.
Critical theories
Main article: Critical international relations theory
Many schools of thought in international relations have criticized the status-quo - both from other positivist positions as well as postpositivist positions. The former include Marxist and Neo-Marxist approaches and Neo-Gramscianism. The latter include postmodernist, postcolonial and feminist approaches, which differ from both realism and liberalism in their epistemological and ontological premise.
Marxist theory
Main article: Marxist international relations theory
Marxist and Neo-Marxist international relations theories are positivist paradigms which reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation; instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. It makes the assumption that the economic concerns transcend others; allowing for the elevation of class as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation.
Constructivism
Main article: Constructivism in international relations
Whereas realism deals mainly with security and material power, and liberalism looks primarily at economic interdependence and domestic-level factors, constructivism most concerns itself with the role of ideas in shaping the international system (Indeed it is possible there is some overlap between constructivism and realism or liberalism, but they remain separate schools of thought). By "ideas" constructivists refer to the goals, threats, fears, identities, and other elements of perceived reality that influence states and non-state actors within the international system. Constructivists believe that these ideational factors can often have far-reaching effects, and that they can trump materialistic power concerns. For example, constructivists note that an increase in the size of the US military is likely to be viewed with much greater concern in Cuba, a traditional antagonist of the US, than in Canada, a close US ally. Therefore, there must be perceptions at work in shaping international outcomes. As such, constructivists do not see anarchy as the invariable foundation of the international system, but rather argue, in the words of Alexander Wendt, that "anarchy is what states make of it." Constructivists also believe that social norms shape and change foreign policy over time rather than security which realists cite.
Functionalism
Main article: Functionalism in international relations
Functionalism is a theory of international relations that arose principally from the experience of European integration. Rather than the self-interest that realists see as a motivating factor, functionalists focus on common interests shared by states. Integration develops its own internal dynamic: as states integrate in limited functional or technical areas, they increasingly find that momentum for further rounds of integration in related areas. This "invisible hand" of integration phenomenon is termed "spill-over." Although integration can be resisted, it becomes harder to stop integration's reach as it progresses. This usage, and the usage in functionalist in international relations, is the less commonly used meaning of the term functionalism.
More commonly, however, functionalism is a term used to describe an argument which explains phenomena as functions of a system rather than an actor or actors. Immanuel Wallerstein employed a functionalist theory when he argued that the Westphalian international political system arose to secure and protect the developing international capitalist system. His theory is called "functionalist" because it says that an event was a function of the preferences of a system and not the preferences of an agent. Functionalism is different from structural or realist arguments in that while both look to broader, structural causes, realists (and structuralists more broadly) say that the structure gives incentives to agents, while functionalists attribute causal power to the system itself, bypassing agents entirely.
Further reading
• Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory. A Critical Introduction, 2nd ion, Taylor & Francis 2004, ISBN 0415342082
• Scott Burchill and others, eds. Theories of International Relations, 3rd ion, Palgrave 2005, ISBN 1403948666
See also
• List of scholarly journals in international relations
• Human security
• Foreign interventionism
External links
• Articles by IR Theorists
• Interviews with cutting-edge IR Theorists
• The Martin Institute
• A Discussion and Overview of IR Theory and its Historical Roots at American University
Notes
1. ^ Reus-Smit, Christian. "Constructivism." Theories of International Relations, ed. Scott Burchill ... [et al], page 209, 216. Palgrave, 2005.
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_relations_theory"
Idealism (international relations)
See also Idealism (disambiguation).
This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources (ideally, using inline citations). Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (May 2008)
In the American study of international relations, Idealism usually refers to the school of thought personified in American diplomatic history by Woodrow Wilson, such that it is sometimes referred to as Wilsonianism, or Wilsonian Idealism. Idealism holds that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. For example, an idealist might believe that ending poverty at home should be coupled with tackling poverty abroad. Wilson's idealism was a precursor to liberal international relations theory, which would arise amongst the "institution-builders" after World War II. It particularly emphasized the ideal of American Exceptionalism.
More generally, the Anglo-Australian scholar of international relations Hedley Bull wrote:[1]
" By the 'idealists' we have in mind writers such as Sir Alfred Zimmern, S. H. Bailey, Philip Noel-Baker, and David Mitrany in the United Kingdom, and James T. Shotwell, Pitman Potter, and Parker T. Moon in the United States. ... The distinctive characteristic of these writers was their belief in progress: the belief, in particular, that the system of international relations that had given rise to the First World War was capable of being transformed into a fundamentally more peaceful and just world order; that under the impact of the awakening of democracy, the growth of 'the international mind', the development of the League of Nations, the good works of men of peace or the enlightenment spread by their own teaching, it was in fact being transformed; and that their responsibility as students of international relations was to assist this march of progress to overcome the ignorance, the prejudices, the ill-will, and the sinister interests that stood in its way."
Since the 1980s, there has been growing study of the major writers of this idealist tradition of thought in international relations, including Sir Alfred Zimmern[2], Norman Angell, John Maynard Keynes[3], John A. Hobson, Leonard Woolf, Gilbert Murray, Florence Stawell (known as Melian Stawell), Philip Henry Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian, Arnold J. Toynbee, Lester Pearson and David Davies.
Much of this writing has contrasted these idealist writers with 'realists' in the tradition of E.H. Carr, whose The Twenty Years' Crisis (1939) both coined the term 'idealist' and was a fierce and effective assault on the inter-war idealists.
Idealism is also marked by the prominent role played by international law and international organizations in its conception of policy formation. One of the most well-known tenets of modern idealist thinking is democratic peace theory, which holds that states with similar modes of democratic governance do not fight one another. Wilson's idealistic thought was embodied in his Fourteen points speech, and in the creation of the League of Nations.
Idealism transcends the left-right political spectrum. Idealists can include both human rights campaigners (traditionally, but not always, associated with the left) and American neoconservatism which is usually associated with the right.
Idealism may find itself in opposition to Realism, a worldview which argues that a nation's national interest is more important than ethical or moral considerations; however, there need be no conflict between the two (see Neoconservatism for an example of a confluence of the two). Realist thinkers include Hans Morgenthau, Niccolò Machiavelli, Otto von Bismarck, George F. Kennan and others.
Contents
• 1 Descendant theories
o 1.1 Liberalism
o 1.2 Neoconservatism
• 2 See also
• 3 References
Descendant theories
Idealism proper was a relatively short-lived school of thought, and suffered a crisis of confidence following the failure of the League of Nations and the outbreak of World War II. However, subsequent theories of international relations would draw elements from Wilsonian Idealism when constructing their world views.
Liberalism
Main article: Liberal international relations theory
Liberalism manifested a tempered version of Wilson's idealism in the wake of World War I. Cognizant of the failures of Idealism to prevent renewed isolationism following World War I, and its inability to manage the balance of power in Europe to prevent the outbreak of a new war, liberal thinkers devised a set of international institutions based on rule of law and regularized interaction. These international organizations, such as the United Nations and the NATO, or even international regimes such as the Bretton Woods system, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), were calculated both to maintain a balance of power as well as regularize cooperation between nations.
Neoconservatism
Main article: Neoconservatism
Neoconservatism drew from Liberalism its intense focus on the promotion of "universal values", in this case democracy, human rights, free trade, women's rights and minority protections. However, it differs in that it is less wedded to the importance of preserving international institutions and treaties while pursuing assertive or aggressive stances which it deems morally worthy, and is willing to use force or the threat of force, unilaterally if necessary, to push for its goals.
See also
• Idealism
• Human Rights
• Realism (international relations)
• United Nations
• International relations theory
• "New world order"
• Liberal internationalism
• Norman Angell
• E.H. Carr
• John A. Hobson
• John Maynard Keynes
• Philip Henry Kerr, 11th Marquess of Lothian
• Donald Markwell
• Gilbert Murray
• Philip Noel-Baker
• Florence Stawell (known as Melian Stawell)
• Arnold J. Toynbee
• Woodrow Wilson
• Sir Alfred Zimmern
• Lester Pearson
References
1. ^ Quoted from Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace, Oxford University Press, 2006, page 3.
2. ^ Donald Markwell (1986), 'Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited: Fifty Years On', Review of International Studies. Donald Markwell, 'Sir Alfred Eckhard Zimmern', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004.
3. ^ E.g. Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace, Oxford University Press,2006.
• Martin Ceadel, Semi-detached Idealists: the British peace movement and international relations, 1854-1945, 2000.
• Tim Dunne, Michael Cox, Ken Booth (eds), The Eighty Years' Crisis: International Relations 1919-1999, Cambridge University Press, 1999.
• F. H. (Sir Harry) Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Cambridge University Press, 1967.
• David Long, Towards a New Liberal Internationalism: The International Theory of J.A. Hobson, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
• David Long and Peter Wilson (eds), Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed, Oxford University Press, 1995.
• Donald Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace, Oxford University Press, 2006.
• Donald Markwell (1986), 'Sir Alfred Zimmern Revisited: Fifty Years On', Review of International Studies.
• Donald Markwell, 'Sir Alfred Eckhard Zimmern', Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2004.
• J. D. B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind, London, Macmillan, 1986.
• Peter Wilson, The International Thought of Leonard Woolf: A Study in Twentieth Century Idealism, 2003.
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism_(international_relations)"
Liberal international relations theory
Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behavior. Unlike realism where the state is seen as a unitary actor, liberalism allows for plurality in state actions. Thus, preferences will vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government type. Liberalism also holds that interaction between states is not limited to the political (high politics), but also economic (low politics) whether through commercial firms, organizations or individuals. Thus, instead of an anarchic international system, there are plenty of opportunities for cooperation and broader notions of power, such as cultural capital (for example, the influence of American films leading to the popularity of American culture and creating a market for American exports worldwide). Another assumption is that absolute gains can be made through co-operation and interdependence - thus peace can be achieved.
Many different strands of liberalism have emerged; some include commercial liberalism, liberal institutionalism, idealism, and regime theory. Two forms of liberalism predominate, liberal institutionalism and idealism:
The former suggests that with the right factors, the international system provides opportunities for cooperation and interaction. Examples include the successful integration of Europe through the European Union or regional blocs and economic agreements such as ASEAN or the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Ramifications of this view are that if states cannot cooperate, they ought to be curbed, whether through economic sanctions or military action. For example, before the invasion of Iraq by the United States and United Kingdom in 2003, the governments' claims that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction could be seen as claims that Iraq is a bad state that needs to be curbed rather than an outright danger to American or European security. Thus, the invasion could be seen as curbing a bad state under liberal institutionalism. A variant is Neo-liberal institutionalism (USA) which shifts back to a state-centric approach, but allows for pluralism through identifying and recognizing different actors, processes and structures.
Neo-liberal institutionalism holds a view to promote a more peaceful world order through international organizations or IGOs; for example, through the United Nations (UN).
Neo-liberalism
Main article: Neoliberalism in international relations
See also
• International relations theory
• Liberal internationalism
Neoliberalism in international relations
In the study of international relations, neoliberalism refers to a school of thought which believes that nation-states are, or at least should be, concerned first and foremost with absolute gains rather than relative gains to other nation-states. The notion is often connected with neoliberal economic theory.
Contents
• 1 Activities of the International System
• 2 Development
• 3 Contentions
o 3.1 Keohane and Nye
o 3.2 Lebow
o 3.3 Mearsheimer
• 4 References
• 5 See also
Activities of the International System
Neoliberal international relations thinkers often employ game theory to explain why states do or do not cooperate;[1] since their approach tends to emphasize the possibility of mutual wins, they are interested in institutions which can arrange jointly profitable arrangements and compromises.
Neoliberalism is a response to Neorealism; while not denying the anarchic nature of the international system, neoliberals argue that its importance and effect has been exaggerated. The neoliberal argument is focused on the neorealists' underestimation of "the varieties of cooperative behavior possible within... a decentralized system."[2] Both theories, however, consider the state and its interests as the central subject of analysis; Neoliberalism may have a wider conception of what those interests are.
Neoliberalism argues that even in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, cooperation can emerge through the building of norms, regimes and institutions.
In terms of the scope of international relations theory and foreign interventionism, the debate between Neoliberalism and Neorealism is an intra paradigm one, as both theories are positivist and focus mainly on the state system as the primary unit of analysis.
Development
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are considered the founders of the neoliberal school of thought; Keohane's book After Hegemony is a classic of the genre. Another major influence is the hegemonic stability theory of Stephen Krasner, Charles P. Kindleberger, and others.
Contentions
Keohane and Nye
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in response to neorealism, develop an opposing theory they dub "Complex interdependence." Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain, “…complex interdependence sometime comes closer to reality than does realism.”[3] In explaining this, Keohane and Nye cover the three assumptions in realist thought: First, states are coherent units and are the dominant actors in international relations; second, force is a usable and effective instrument of policy; and finally, the assumption that there is a hierarchy in international politics.[4]
The heart of Keohane and Nye’s argument is that in international politics there are, in fact, multiple channels that connect societies exceeding the conventional Westphalian system of states. This manifests itself in many forms ranging from informal governmental ties to multinational corporations and organizations. Here they define their terminology; interstate relations are those channels assumed by realists; transgovernmental relations occur when one relaxes the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational applies when one removes the assumption that states act coherently. It is through these channels that political exchange occurs, not through the limited interstate channel as championed by realists.
Secondly, Keohane and Nye argue that there is not, in fact, a hierarchy among issues, meaning that not only is the martial arm of foreign policy not the supreme tool by which to carry out a states agenda, but that there are a multitude of different agendas that come to the forefront. The line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred in this case, as realistically there is no clear agenda in interstate relations.
Finally, the use of military force is not exercised when complex interdependence prevails. The idea is developed that between countries in which a complex interdependence exists, the role of the military in resolving disputes is negated. However, Keohane and Nye go on to state that the role of the military is in fact important to that "alliance’s political and military relations with a rival bloc."
Lebow
Richard Ned Lebow states that the failure of neorealism lies in its “institutionalist” ontology, whereas the neorealist thinker Kenneth Waltz states, “the creators [of the system] become the creatures of the market that their activity gave rise to.” This critical failure, according to Lebow, is due to the realists’ inability “to escape from the predicament of anarchy.” Or rather, the assumption that states do not adapt and will respond similarly to similar constraints and opportunities.[5]
Mearsheimer
Norman Angell, a classical London School of Economics liberal, had held: "We cannot ensure the stability of the present system by the political or military preponderance of our nation or alliance by imposing its will on a rival."[6]
Keohane and Lisa L. Martin expound upon these ideas in the mid 1990s as a response to John J. Mearsheimer’s “The False Promise of International Institutions,” where Mearsheimer purports that, “institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers.”[7] In fact Mearsheimer’s article is a direct response to the liberal-institutionalist movement created in response to neo-realism. The central idea in Keohane and Martin’s idea is that neo-realism insists that, “institutions have only marginal effects…[which] leaves it [neo-realism] without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations.”[8] This idea is in keeping with the notion of complex interdependence. Moreover, Keohane and Martin argue that the fact that international institutions are created in response to state interests, that the real empirical question is “knowing how to distinguish the effects of underlying conditions from those of the institutions themselves.”[9]
Mearsheimer, however, is concerned with ‘inner-directed’ institutions, which he states, “seek to cause peace by influencing the behavior of the member states.” In doing so he dismisses Keohane and Martin’s NATO argument in favor of the example of the European Community (EC) and the International Energy Agency. According to Mearsheimer, the NATO argument is an alliance and is interested in “an outside state, or coalition of states, which the alliance aims to deter, coerce, or defeat in war.” Mearsheimer reasons that since NATO is an alliance it has special concerns and concedes this point to Keohane and Martin.[10]
Mearsheimer attacks Martin’s research on the EC, particularly her argument on Argentine sanctions by Britain during the Falklands war, which were affected by Britain’s linking of issues in context of the EC. Mearsheimer purports that the United States was not a member of the EC and yet the US and Britain managed to cooperate on sanctions, effectively creating an ad hoc alliance which effected change in its member states.
References
1. ^ KEOHANE, Robert O. - After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, 1984
2. ^ Evans, Graham. The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations. London: Penguin Books.
3. ^ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977): 23.
4. ^ Ibid., 23-24.
5. ^ Waltz, 90; quoted in Richard Ned Lebow, “The long peace, the end of the cold war, and the failure of realism,” International Organization, 48, 2 (Spring 1994), 273
6. ^ Norman Angell, The Great Illusion, (1909) cited from 1933 ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons),p. 137.
7. ^ John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 82.
8. ^ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), 47.
9. ^ Ibid.
10. ^ Mearsheimer, 83-87.
See also
• Liberal international relations theory
• Institutionalism in international relations
• Neorealism
• Globalization and Health
• Foreign interventionism
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neoliberalism_in_international_relations"
Political realism
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Realism, also known as political realism, in the context of international relations, encompasses a variety of theories and approaches, all of which share a belief that states are primarily motivated by the desire for military and economic power or security, rather than ideals or ethics. This term is often synonymous with power politics.
The term realism can, instead of referring to the broad family of realist theories, refer specifically to "classical realism", the common ancestor and original form of realism.
Contents
• 1 Common assumptions
• 2 History and branches
o 2.1 Historic antecedents
o 2.2 Classical realism
o 2.3 Liberal realism or the English school or rationalism
o 2.4 Neorealism or structural realism
o 2.5 Neoclassical realism
• 3 Realism in statecraft
• 4 Criticisms
o 4.1 Democratic peace
o 4.2 Federalism
• 5 See also
• 6 References
• 7 External links
Common assumptions
Realist theories share the following key assumptions:
• The international system is anarchic. There is no authority above states capable of regulating their interactions; states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than it being dictated to them by some higher controlling entity.
• Sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system. International institutions, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, individuals and other sub-state or trans-state actors are viewed as having little independent influence.
• States are rational unitary actors each moving towards their own national interest. There is a general distrust of long-term cooperation or alliance.
• The overriding 'national interest' of each state is its national security and survival.
• In pursuit of national security, states strive to amass resources.
• Relations between states are determined by their comparative level of power derived primarily from their military and economic capabilities.
• There are no universal principles which all states can use to guide their actions. Instead, a state must be ever aware of the actions of the states around it and must use a pragmatic approach to resolve the problems that arise.
In summary, realists believe that mankind is not inherently benevolent but rather self-centered and competitive. This Hobbesian perspective, which views human nature as selfish and conflictual unless given appropriate conditions under which to cooperate, contrasts with the approach of liberalism to international relations. Further, they believe that states are inherently aggressive (offensive realism) and/or obsessed with security (defensive realism); and that territorial expansion is only constrained by opposing power(s). This aggressive build-up, however, leads to a security dilemma where increasing one's security can bring along greater instability as the opponent(s) builds up its own arms in response. Thus, security is a zero-sum game where only relative gains can be made.
History and branches
Historic antecedents
While Realism as a formal discipline in international relations did not arrive until World War II, its primary assumptions have been expressed in earlier writings[1][2]:
• Sun Tzu (or Sunzi), an ancient Chinese military strategist who wrote the Art of War.
• Thucydides, an ancient Greek historian who wrote the History of the Peloponnesian War and is also cited as an intellectual forebearer of realpolitik.
• Chanakya (or Kautilya) early Indian statesman, and writer on the Arthashastra.
• Han Feizi, Chinese scholar who theorised Legalism (or Legism) and who served in the court of the King of Qin - later unifier of China ending the Warring States Period. His writings include The Two Handles (about punishments and rewards as tools of governance). He theorised about a neutral, manipulative ruler who would act as Head of State while secretly controlling the executive through his ministers - the ones to take real responsibility for any policy.
• Niccolò Machiavelli, a Florentine political philosopher, who wrote Il Principe (The Prince) in which he held that the sole aim of a prince (politician) was to seek power, regardless of religious or ethical considerations.
• Cardinal Richelieu, French statesman who destroyed domestic factionalism and guided France to a position of dominance in foreign affairs.
• Thomas Hobbes, an English philosopher who wrote Leviathan in which he stated the State of Nature was prone to a "war of all against all".
• Frederick the Great, Prussian monarch who transformed Prussia from a second-rate power to a great European power through warfare and dubious diplomacy.
• Charles Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, French diplomat who guided France and Europe through a variety of political systems.
• Prince Klemens Wenzel von Metternich, Koblenz-born Austrian statesman opposed to political revolution.
• Otto von Bismarck, a Prussian statesman coined the term balance of power. Balancing power meant keeping the peace and careful realpolitik practitioners tried to avoid arms races.
• Carl von Clausewitz was a 19th century Prussian general and military theorist who wrote On War (Vom Kriege).
• 20th century proponents of realism include Henry Kissinger, the National Security Adviser and Secretary of State to President Richard Nixon, French General and President Charles de Gaulle, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin.
Classical realism
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Classical realism states that it is fundamentally the nature of man that pushes states and individuals to act in a way that places interests over ideologies. Classical realism is defined as the “drive for power and the will to dominate [that are] held to be fundamental aspects of human nature” [3]
Modern realism began as a serious field of research in the United States during and after World War II. This evolution was partly fueled by European war migrants like Hans Morgenthau.
• George F. Kennan - Containment
• Nicholas Spykman - Geostrategy, Containment
• Herman Kahn - Nuclear strategy
• E. H. Carr
• Reinhold Niebuhr
• John H. Herz
• Arnold Wolfers
• Charles Beard
• Walter Lippmann
Liberal realism or the English school or rationalism
Main article: English school of international relations theory
The English School holds that while the international system is anarchical, international law and society should be promoted through diplomacy. This school thus gives credence to establishing intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations.
Prominent liberal realists:
• Hedley Bull - argued for both the existence of an international society of states and its perseverance even in times of great systemic upheaval, meaning regional or so-called “world wars”.
• Martin Wight
Neorealism or structural realism
Main article: Neorealism (international relations)
Neorealism derives from classical realism except that instead of human nature, its focus is predominantly on the international system. While states remain the principal actors, greater attention is given to the forces above and below the states through levels of analysis or structure-agency debate. The international system is seen as a structure acting on the state with individuals below the level of the state acting as agency on the state as a whole.
While neorealism shares a focus on the international system with the English School, neorealism differs in the emphasis it places on the permanence of conflict. To ensure state security, states must be on constant preparation for conflict through economic and military build-up.
Prominent neorealists:
• Robert Jervis - Defensive realism
• Kenneth Waltz - Defensive realism
• Stephen Walt - Defensive realism
• John Mearsheimer - Offensive realism
• Robert Gilpin - Hegemonic theory
Neoclassical realism
Neoclassical Realism can be seen as the third generation of realism, coming after the classical authors of the first wave (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, and the neorealists (esp. Kenneth Waltz). Its designation of "neoclassical", then, has a double meaning: 1) It offers the classics a renaissance; 2) It is a synthesis of the neorealist and the classical realist approaches.
Gideon Rose is responsible for coining the term in a book review he wrote[4].
The primary motivation underlying the development of neoclassical realism was the fact that neorealism was only useful to explain political outcomes (classified as being 'theories of international politics'), but had nothing to offer about particular states' behavior (or 'theories of foreign policy'). The basic approach, then, was for these authors to "refine, not refute, Kenneth Waltz", by adding domestic intervening variables between systemic incentives and a state's foreign policy decision. Thus, the basic theoretical architecture of Neoclassical Realism is:
Distribution of power in the international system (independent variable) >>> Domestic perception of the system and/or domestic incentives (intervening variable) >>> Foreign Policy decision (dependent variable)
While neoclassical realism has only been used for theories of foreign policy so far, Randall Schweller notes that it could be useful to explain certain types of political outcomes as well.[5].
Neoclassical realism is particularly appealing from a research standpoint because it still retains a lot of the theoretical rigor that Waltz has brought to realism, but at the same time can easily incorporate a content-rich analysis, since its main method for testing theories is the process-tracing of case studies.
Prominent neoclassical realists[4]:
• Hans Morgenthau
• Randall Schweller
• Fareed Zakaria
• Thomas J. Christensen
• William Wohlforth
• Aaron Friedberg
• Nicholas Rengger
Realism in statecraft
Modern realist statesmen
• Henry Kissinger.[6]
• Zbigniew Brzezinski
• Brent Scowcroft
Criticisms
Democratic peace
Democratic peace theory advocates also that Realism is not applicable to democratic states' relations with each another, as their studies claim that such states do not go to war with one another. However, Realists and proponents of other schools have critiqued both this claim and the studies which appear to support it, claiming that its definitions of 'war' and 'democracy' must be tweaked in order to achieve the desired result. This is along with Archaic rule of law.
Federalism
Main article: federalism
The term refers to the theory or advocacy of federal political orders, where final authority is divided between sub-units and a centre. Unlike a unitary state, sovereignty is constitutionally split between at least two territorial levels so that units at each level have final authority and can act independently of the others in some area. Citizens thus have political obligations to two authorities. The allocation of authority between the sub-unit and centre may vary. Typically the centre has powers regarding defence and foreign policy, but sub-units may also have international roles. The sub-units may also participate in central decision-making bodies.
The basic idea behind federalism is that relations between states should be conducted under the rule of law. Conflict and disagreement should be resolved through peaceful means rather than through coercion or war. Its most important aspect is in recognizing that different types of institutions are needed to deal with different types of political issues.
See also
• Complex interdependence
• Flipism
• Game theory
• Global justice
• Peace through strength
• Real politik
References
1. ^ Political Realism, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
2. ^ see also Doyle, Michael. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (Paperback). 1997. London: W. W. Norton & Company, esp. pp. 41-204
3. ^ Baylis, J & Smith, S & Ownes, P, The globalization of world politics, Oxford university press, USA, pg. 95
4. ^ a b Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 144-172
5. ^ Randall L. Schweller, "The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism", pp. 311-347 in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman eds., Progress in International Relations Theory, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2003)
6. ^ But see Kahler, Mark. Rationality in International Relations International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics (Autumn, 1998), pp. 919-941 © 1998 MIT Press.
External links
• Global Power Barometer
• The Realist Persuasion by Andrew J. Bacevich, for the Boston Globe, November 6, 2005
• The National Interest
• The Indian National Interest
• Interview with neorealist Robert Jervis by Theory Talks (July 2008)
• The Neocons vs. The Realists
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_realism"
Neorealism (international relations)
Structural realism is also a position in the philosophy of science, originally held by Henri Poincaré and resurrected by John Worrall.
This article does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources (ideally, using inline citations). Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (May 2007)
This article may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. Please improve this article if you can. (April 2007)
For neorealism in film or literature, see Neorealism (art) or Italian Neorealism.
Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations, outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book Theory of International Politics. Waltz argues in favor of a systemic approach: the international structure acts as a constraint on state behavior, so that only states whose outcomes fall within an expected range survive. This system is similar to a microeconomic model in which firms set prices and quantity based on the market.
Neorealism, developed largely within the American political science tradition, seeks to reformulate the classical realist tradition of E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr into a rigorous and positivistic social science.
Contents
• 1 Theory
• 2 Notable neorealists
• 3 See also
• 4 References
Theory
Neorealism shuns classical realism's use of often essentialist concepts such as "human nature" to explain international politics. Instead, neorealist thinkers developed a theory that privileges structural constraints over agents' strategies and motivations.
Neorealism holds that the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, which is anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities, measured by the number of great powers within the international system. The anarchic ordering principle of the international structure is decentralized, having no formal central authority, and is composed of formally equal sovereign states. These states act according to the logic of self-help--states seek their own interest and will not subordinate their interest to another's.
States are assumed at a minimum to want to ensure their own survival as this is a prerequisite to pursue other goals. This driving force of survival is the primary factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures states develop offensive military capabilities, for foreign interventionism and as a means to increase their relative power. Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, there is a lack of trust between states which requires them to be on guard against relative losses of power which could enable other states to threaten their survival. This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called the security dilemma.
States are deemed similar in terms of needs but not in capabilities for achieving them. The positional placement of states in terms of abilities determines the distribution of capabilities. The structural distribution of capabilities then limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains made by other states, and the possibility of dependence on other states. The desire and relative abilities of each state to maximize relative power constrain each other, resulting in a 'balance of power', which shapes international relations. It also gives rise to the 'security dilemma' that all nations face. There are two ways in which states balance power: internal balancing and external balancing. Internal balancing occurs as states grow their own capabilities by increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending. External balancing occurs as states enter into alliances to check the power of more powerful states or alliances.
Neorealists contend that there are essentially 3 possible systems according to changes in the distribution of capabilities, defined by the number of great powers within the international system. A unipolar system contains only one great power, a bipolar system contains two great powers, and a multipolar system contains more than two great powers. Neorealists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system because balancing can only occur through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers with which to form alliances.[dubious – discuss][citation needed] Because there is only internal balancing in a bipolar system, rather than external balancing and internal balancing, there is less opportunity for miscalculations and therefore less chance of great power war.[dubious – discuss][citation needed]
Neorealists conclude that because war is an effect of the anarchic structure of the international system, it is likely to continue in the future. Indeed, neorealists often argue that the ordering principle of the international system has not fundamentally changed from the time of Thucydides to the advent of nuclear warfare. The view that long-lasting peace is not likely to be achieved is described by other theorists as a largely pessimistic view of international relations. One of the main challenges to neorealist theory is the democratic peace theory and supporting research such as the book Never at War. Neorealists answer this challenge by arguing that democratic peace theorists tend to pick and choose the definition of democracy to get the wanted empirical result. For example, Germany of Kaiser Wilhem II, the Dominican Republic of Juan Bosch, or Chile of Salvador Allende are not considered to be democratic or the conflicts do not qualify as wars according to these theorists. Furthermore they claim several wars between democratic states have been averted only by causes other than ones covered by democratic peace theory. (see WALTZ, K. 2001. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." International Security 25(1): 5-41)
Notable neorealists
• Robert J. Art
• Joseph Grieco
• Robert Jervis
• John Mearsheimer
• Randall Schweller
• Stephen Walt
• Kenneth Waltz
See also
• International relations theory
• Foreign interventionism
• Realism
• Neoliberalism
• Neofunctionalism
References
• Waltz, Kenneth Neal (1979). Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. ISBN 0201083493.
• Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: Norton. ISBN 0393020258.
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neorealism_(international_relations)"
Marxist international relations theory
Marxist and Neo-Marxist international relations theories are paradigms which reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation, instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. It purports to reveal how the economic trumps other concerns, which allows for the elevation of class as the focus of the study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. Thus, the period of colonialism brought in sources for raw materials and captive markets for exports, while decolonialization brought new opportunities in the form of dependence.
Marxist theories receive scant attention in the United States where even moderate socialist and social democratic parties lack mainstream political influence. Throughout Africa, Latin America, South & East Asia, and some parts of Europe, Marxist and other progressive theories are more incorporated into political and social discourse.
Contents
• 1 Leninism
• 2 Dependency theory
• 3 World-systems theory
• 4 Criticisms
• 5 See also
Leninism
Main article: Leninism
Dependency theory
Main article: Dependency theory
Linked in with Marxist theories is dependency theory which argues that developed countries, in their pursuit of power, penetrate developing states through political advisors, missionaries, experts and multi-national corporations (MNCs) to integrate them into the capitalist system in order to appropriate natural resources and foster dependence by developing countries on developed countries.
World-systems theory
Main articles: World-systems theory and Immanuel Wallerstein
Criticisms
Realists and liberals criticize Marxist theories for being outdated particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. Postpositivists disagree with Marxists' elevation of class as the most important aspect.
See also
• International relations theory
• Critical international relations theory
• Marxism
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marxist_international_relations_theory"
Dependency theory
Dependency theory is a body of social science theories, both from developed and developing nations, which are predicated on the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the "world system." This is based on the Marxist analysis of inequalities within the world system, but contrasts with the view of free market economists who argue that free trade advances poor states along an enriching path to full economic integration. As such, dependency theory features prominently in the debate over how poor countries can best be enriched or developed, a process usually carried out by MEDC's or More Economically Developed Countries.
Contents
• 1 Basics
• 2 Spread of theory
• 3 Quantitative dependency theory and the globalization of the dependency argument
• 4 Implications
• 5 Criticism by Neo-liberal Economists
• 6 Literature
• 7 See also
• 8 References
• 9 Links
Basics
The premises of dependency theory are as follows:
• Poor nations provide market access to wealthy nations (e.g., by allowing their people to buy manufactured goods and obsolete or used goods from wealthy nations), permitting the wealthy nations to enjoy a higher standard of living.
• Wealthy nations actively perpetuate a state of dependence by various means. This influence may be multifaceted, involving economics, media control, politics, banking and finance, education, culture, sport, and all aspects of human resource development (including recruitment and training of workers).
• Wealthy nations actively counter attempts by dependent nations to resist their influences by means of economic sanctions and/or the use of military force.
Consistent with these assumptions, many dependency theorists advocate social revolution as an effective means to the reduction of economic disparities in the world system.
Dependency theory first emerged as a reaction to liberal free trade theories in the 1950s, advocated by Raúl Prebisch, whose research with the Economic Commission on Latin America (ECLA) suggested that decreases in the wealth of poor nations coincided with increases in the wealth of rich nations. Paul A. Baran developed dependency theory from Marxian analysis. The theory quickly divided into diverse schools. Some, like Andre Gunder Frank, adapted it to Marxism. "Standard" dependency theory differs from Marxism, however, in arguing against internationalism and any hope of progress in less developed nations towards industrialization and a liberating revolution. Theotonio dos Santos described a 'new dependency', which focused on both the internal and external relations of less-developed countries of the periphery, derived from a Marxian analysis. Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso wrote extensively on dependency theory while in political exile, arguing that it was an approach to studying the economic disparities between the centre and periphery. The American sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein refined the Marxist aspect of the theory, and called it the "World-system." It has also been associated with Galtung's Structural Theory of Imperialism.
Spread of theory
"The inflow of capital from the developed countries is the prerequisite for the establishment of economic dependence. This inflow takes various forms: loans granted on onerous terms; investments that place a given country in the power of the investors; almost total technological subordination of the dependent country to the developed country; control of a country's foreign trade by the big international monopolies; and in extreme cases, the use of force as an economic weapon in support of the other forms of exploitation."
— Che Guevara, Marxist revolutionary [1]
The theory became popular in the 1960s and 1970s as a criticism of modernization theory (also known as development theory), which was falling increasingly out of favor due to continued widespread poverty in much of the world. As such, dependency theory stands in sharp contrast with views of development tied to classical and free-market economics. With the economic growth of India and some East Asian economies, however, dependency theory has itself lost some of its former influence. It is more widely accepted in disciplines such as history and anthropology[citation needed]. It also underpins some NGO campaigns, such as Make Poverty History and the Fair Trade movement.
Dependency was said to be created with the industrial revolution and the expansion of European empires around the world, due to their superior military power and accumulated wealth. Some argue that before this expansion, the exploitation was internal, with the major economic centres dominating the rest of the country (for example: Southeast England dominating Britain, or the Northeast United States dominating the South and West). The establishment of global trade patterns in the nineteenth century allowed capitalism to spread globally[citation needed]. The wealthy became more isolated from the poor, because they gained disproportionately from imperialistic practices[citation needed]. This minimized the dangers of domestic peasant revolts and rebellions by the poor[citation needed]. Rather than turn on their oppressors as in the French Revolution or in various communist revolutions, the poor could no longer reach the wealthy and thus the less developed nations became engulfed in regular civil wars[citation needed]. Once the imperialist rich nations established formal control, it could not be easily removed[citation needed]. This control ensures that all profits in less developed countries are remitted to the developed nations[citation needed], preventing domestic reinvestment, causing capital flight and thus hindering growth[citation needed].
Quantitative dependency theory and the globalization of the dependency argument
Dependency authors explain backwardness and stagnation by the insertion of these countries as dependents in the world economy. Starting with the writings of Perroux, Prebisch and Rothschild in the 1930s, leading spokespersons for dependency theory (Herb Addo, Paul A. Baran, Walden Bello, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Armando Cordova, Ernest Feder, Andre Gunder Frank, Walter Rodney, Pablo Gonzales Casanova, Keith Griffin, Kunibert Raffer, Paul Israel Singer, Osvaldo Sunkel, et al.) stressed the unequal and socially imbalanced nature of development in regions that are highly dependent on investment from the highly developed countries. Short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth will be imbalanced and unequal, and will tend towards high negative current account balances[citation needed]. Many of these authors focused their attention on Latin America; their leading spokesperson in the Islamic world is the Egyptian economist Samir Amin (Tausch 2003).
Later world systems theory - that started with the writings of the Austro-Hungarian socialist Karl Polanyi after the First World War - was offered as support and expansion of dependency arguments. Capitalism in the periphery, like in the center, is characterized by strong cyclical fluctuations[citation needed], and there are centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries. The rise of one group of semi-peripheries tends to be at the cost of another group, but the unequal structure of the world economy based on unequal exchange tends to remain stable (Tausch 2003).
Dependency and world system theory generally hold that poverty and backwardness in poor countries - like the third world - are caused by the peripheral position that these nations hold in the international division of labor. Ever since the capitalist world system evolved, there is a stark distinction between the nations of the center and the nations of the periphery. Former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, when he was still a social scientist, summarized the quantifiable essence of dependency theories as follows:
• there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery;
• this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers;
• this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery;
• this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations;
• these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance (Cardoso, 1979) (Tausch 2003).
Periphery capitalism, according to dependency theory, is characterized by the following main tendencies (Amin, 1973 - 1997):
1. regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism
2. unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of activities in export oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the periphery is possible under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that unequal exchange sets in (double factorial terms of trade < 1.0; see Raffer, 1987 )
3. these structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system
4. the development blocks of peripheral capitalism (chronic current account balance deficits, re-exported profits of foreign investments, deficient business cycles of the periphery that provide important markets for the centers during world economic upswings)
5. structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong 'compradore' element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class (Tausch 2003)
The analysis of development patterns in the 1990s and beyond is complicated by the fact that capitalism develops not smoothly, but with very strong and self-repeating ups and downs, called cycles. Relevant results are given in studies by Joshua Goldstein, Volker Bornschier, and Luigi Scandella (Tausch 2003).
Cyclical fluctuations have also a profound effect on cross-national comparisons of economic growth and societal development in the medium and long run. What could have been spectacular long-run growth, may in the end turn out to be just a short run cyclical spurt after a long recession. Cycle time plays an important role. Giovanni Arrighi believed that the logic of accumulation on a world scale shifts along time, and that we again witness during the 1980s and beyond a deregulated phase of world capitalism with a logic, characterized - in contrast to earlier regulatory cycles - by the dominance of financial capital (Tausch 2003).
At this stage, the role of unequal exchange in the entire relationship of dependency cannot be underestimated. Unequal exchange is given, if double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are < 1.0 (Raffer, 1987, Amin, 1975). Labor in the export sectors of the periphery is being exploited, while monopolistic structures of international trade let the centers profit from the high prices of their exports to the world markets in comparison to their labor productivity.
Implications
While there are many different and conflicting ideas on how developing countries can alleviate the effects of the world system, several of the following protectionist/nationalist practices were adopted at one time or another by such countries:
• Promotion of domestic industry and manufactured goods. By imposing subsidies to protect domestic industries, poor countries can be enabled to sell their own products rather than simply exporting raw materials.
• Import limitations. By limiting the importation of luxury goods and manufactured goods that can be produced within the country, the country can reduce its loss of capital and resources.
• Forbidding foreign investment. Some governments took steps to keep foreign companies and individuals from owning or operating property that draws on the resources of the country.
• Nationalization. Some governments have forcibly taken over foreign-owned companies on behalf of the state, in order to keep profits within the country.
Criticism by Neo-liberal Economists
Dependency theory has been criticized by free-market economists such as Peter Bauer and Martin Wolf, who believe that the promulgation of the theory leads to:
• Corruption. Free-market economists hold that state-owned companies have higher rates of corruption than privately owned companies.
• Lack of competition. By subsidizing in-country industries and preventing outside imports, these companies may have less incentive to improve their products, to try to become more efficient in their processes, to please customers, or to research new innovations.
• Sustainability. Reliance of industries on government support may not be sustainable for very long, particularly in poorer countries and countries which largely budget out of foreign aid.
• Domestic opportunity costs. Subsidies on domestic industries come out of state coffers and therefore represent money not spent in other ways, like development of domestic infrastructure, seed capital or need-based social welfare programs. At the same time, the higher prices caused by tariffs and restrictions on imports require the people either to forgo these goods altogether or buy them at higher prices, forgoing other goods.
Proponents of dependency theory claim that the theory of comparative advantage breaks down when capital (including both physical capital, like machines, as well as financial capital) is highly mobile, as it is under the conditions of globalization. For this reason, it is claimed that dependency theory can offer new insights into a world of highly mobile multinational corporations.
This has been countered by the argument that the conditions of globalization actually make comparative advantage more sound. Two of the key assumptions of comparative advantage - zero transportation costs and zero communication cost - are arguably more realistic in the contemporary global marketplace than in earlier times. While zero communication costs are supported by the internet, it would appear, however, that the theory of the tendency to zero transport costs is dependent on the costs of energy. Furthermore, the assumptions of free trade models only ever includes two factors of production - namely the globalisation of capital and resources, but not labour. Currently the free movement of labour is being restricted world-wide with various forms of immigration control.
Market economists cite a number of examples in their arguments against dependency theory. The improvement of India's economy after it moved from state-controlled business to open trade is one of the most often cited (see also economy of India, Commanding Heights). India's example seems to contradict dependency theorists' claims concerning comparative advantage and mobility, as much as its economic growth originated from movements such as outsourcing - one of the most mobile forms of capital transfer. However, South Korea was able to rise out of poverty while using many tenets which Dependency theory advises[citation needed].
Free market theorists see dependency theorists' complaints as legitimate, but their policy prescriptions as self-fulfilling prophecies, in that the policies only aggravate the disparity between the developed nations and the underdeveloped countries.
Literature
The voluminous literature on the subject is surveyed and documented in (among others):
Amin S. (1976), 'Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism' New York: Monthly Review Press.
Amin S. (1994c), 'Re-reading the postwar period: an intellectual itinerary' Translated by Michael Wolfers. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Amin S. (1997b), 'Die Zukunft des Weltsystems. Herausforderungen der Globalisierung. Herausgegeben und aus dem Franzoesischen uebersetzt von Joachim Wilke' Hamburg: VSA.
Bornschier V. (1976), 'Wachstum, Konzentration und Multinationalisierung von Industrieunternehmen' Frauenfeld and Stuttgart: Huber.
Bornschier V. (1996), 'Western society in transition' New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
Bornschier V. and Chase - Dunn Ch. K (1985), 'Transnational Corporations and Underdevelopment' N.Y., N.Y.: Praeger.
Köhler G. and Tausch A. (2002) Global Keynesianism: Unequal exchange and global exploitation. Huntington NY, Nova Science.
Sunkel O. (1966), 'The Structural Background of Development Problems in Latin America' Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 97, 1: pp. 22 ff.
Sunkel O. (1973), 'El subdesarrollo latinoamericano y la teoria del desarrollo' Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno ores, 6a edicion.
Tausch A. (1993, with Fred Prager as co-author), 'Towards a Socio - Liberal Theory of World Development' Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press.
Tausch A. and Peter Herrmann (2002) Globalization and European Integration. Huntington NY, Nova Science.
Tausch A., Social Cohesion, Sustainable Development and Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Implications from a Global Model, Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2(1) Spring 2003.
Yotopoulos P. and Sawada Y. (1999), FREE CURRENCY MARKETS, FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE GROWTH DEBACLE: IS THERE A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP?, Revised November 1999, Stanford University, USA, and University of Tokyo.
Yotopoulos P. and Sawada Y. (2005), Exchange Rate Misalignment: A New test of Long-Run PPP Based on Cross-Country Data (CIRJE Discussion Paper CIRJE-F-318), February 2005, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
See also
colonial situation as a social process
• World-systems theory
• Marxist International Relations theory
References
1. ^ "On Development" Speech delivered by Che Guevara at the plenary session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, Switzerland on March 25, 1964
Links
• Globalresearch.ca
• Centro Argentino de Estudios Internacionales
• ECLAC/CEPAL Santiago
• IPRD London
• Revista Entelequia
• The World Revolution
• University of Texas Inequality Project
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dependency_theory"
Multinational corporation
This article is written like a personal reflection or essay and may require cleanup. Please help improve it by rewriting it in an encyclopedic style. (March 2009)
A multinational corporation (MNC) or transnational corporation (TNC), also called multinational enterprise (MNE)[1], is a corporation or enterprise that manages production or delivers services in more than one country. It can also be referred to as an international corporation.
The first modern MNC is generally thought to be the British East India Company, established in 1600. Very large multinationals have budgets that exceed some national GDPs. Multinational corporations can have a powerful influence in local economies as well as the world economy and play an important role in international relations and globalization.
Contents
• 1 Market imperfections
• 2 International power
o 2.1 Tax competition
o 2.2 Market withdrawal
o 2.3 Lobbying
o 2.4 Patents
o 2.5 Government power
• 3 Micro-multinationals
• 4 See also
• 5 References
• 6 External links
Market imperfections
A multinational enterprise is facing the paradox that although it doesn't have the contacts and knowledge of local customs and business practices as indigenous competitors and located in one country, it does business in another country.[1] If there are unique assets of value overseas, why not sell or rent these assets to local entrepreneurs, who could then combine them with local factors of production at lower costs than those experienced by foreign direct investors?[1]
The reason to this paradox is that there might be circumstances under which using market exchange to coordinate the behavior of agents located in two separate countries is less efficient than organizing their interdependence within a multinational firm.[1] In this case, a firm located in one country may find it profitable to incur the additional costs of operating in a foreign environment.[1] The idea that MNEs owe their existence to market imperfections was first published by Hymer, Kindleberger and Caves.[2] The market imperfections were, however, structural imperfections in markets for final products.[1] Hymer considered two firms, each a final product monopolist in its own market, isolated from competition by high transportation costs and tariff and non-tariff barriers.[1] A decline in these costs exposed them to each other's competition and reduced of their profits.[1] A combination of the two firms, by merger or acquisition, into an MNE would then maximize their joint income by forcing them to take into account the gains and the losses competition inflicts on them.[1] The transformation of two domestic firms into one MNE thus internalized pecuniary externalities and produced a gain for the owners, but not necessarily for society, since it redistributed income towards the MNE and away from its customers.[1]
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A similar case arose when the technology had often few substitutes and the number of potential licensees in any given foreign market was also often limited, thus creating a biletaral monopoly.[1] The consolidation of licensor and licensee within an MNE (by acquisition or merger of the potential licensee or by vertical integration of the innovator into overseas manufacturing) reduced haggling and made it easier to enforce price discrimination schemes across countries.[3] This analysis of the reasons behind the emergence of multinational firms led Hymer to take a negative view of MNEs, which he considered an instrument for restraining competition between firms of different nations.[4]
According to Hymer, market imperfections are structural, arising from structural deviations from perfect competition in the final product market due to exclusive and permanent control of proprietary technology, privileged access to inputs, scale economies, control of distribution systems, and product differentation[5], but in their absence markets are perfectly efficient.[1] By contrast, the insight of transaction costs theories of the MNEs, simultaneously and independently developed in the 1970s by McManus (1972), Buckley and Casson (1976), Brown (1976) and Hennart (1977, 1982), is that market imperfections are inherent attributes of markets, and MNEs are institutions to bypass these imperfections.[1] Markets experience natural imperfections, i.e. imperfections that are due to the fact that the implicit neoclassical assumptions of perfect knowledge and perfect enforcement are not realized.[6]
International power
Tax competition
Multinational corporations have played an important role in globalization. Countries and sometimes subnational regions must compete against one another for the establishment of MNC facilities, and the subsequent tax revenue, employment, and economic activity. To compete, countries and regional political districts sometimes offer incentives to MNCs such as tax breaks, pledges of governmental assistance or improved infrastructure, or lax environmental and labor standards enforcement. This process of becoming more attractive to foreign investment can be characterized as a race to the bottom, a push towards greater autonomy for corporate bodies, or both.
However, some scholars, for instance the Columbia economist Jagdish Bhagwati, have argued that multinationals are engaged in a 'race to the top.' While multinationals certainly regard a low tax burden or low labor costs as an element of comparative advantage, there is no evidence to suggest that MNCs deliberately avail themselves of lax environmental regulation or poor labour standards. As Bhagwati has pointed out, MNC profits are tied to operational efficiency, which includes a high degree of standardisation. Thus, MNCs are likely to tailor production processes in all of their operations in conformity to those jurisdictions where they operate (which will almost always include one or more of the US, Japan or EU) which has the most rigorous standards. As for labor costs, while MNCs clearly pay workers in, e.g. Vietnam, much less than they would in the US (though it is worth noting that higher American productivity—linked to technology—means that any comparison is tricky, since in America the same company would probably hire far fewer people and automate whatever process they performed in Vietnam with manual labour), it is also the case that they tend to pay a premium of between 10% and 100% on local labor rates.[7] Finally, depending on the nature of the MNC, investment in any country reflects a desire for a long-term return. Costs associated with establishing plant, training workers, etc., can be very high; once established in a jurisdiction, therefore, many MNCs are quite vulnerable to predatory practices such as, e.g., expropriation, sudden contract renegotiation, the arbitrary withdrawal or compulsory purchase of unnecessary 'licenses,' etc. Thus, both the negotiating power of MNCs and the supposed 'race to the bottom' may be overstated, while the substantial benefits which MNCs bring (tax revenues aside) are often understated.
Market withdrawal
Because of their size, multinationals can have a significant impact on government policy, primarily through the threat of market withdrawal.[8] For example, in an effort to reduce health care costs, some countries have tried to force pharmaceutical companies to license their patented drugs to local competitors for a very low fee, thereby artificially lowering the price. When faced with that threat, multinational pharmaceutical firms have simply withdrawn from the market, which often leads to limited availability of advanced drugs. In these cases, governments have been forced to back down from their efforts. Similar corporate and government confrontations have occurred when governments tried to force MNCs to make their intellectual property public in an effort to gain technology for local entrepreneurs. When companies are faced with the option of losing a core competitive technological advantage or withdrawing from a national market, they may choose the latter. This withdrawal often causes governments to change policy. Countries that have been the most successful in this type of confrontation with multinational corporations are large countries such as United States and Brazil[citation needed], which have viable indigenous market competitors.
Lobbying
Multinational corporate lobbying is directed at a range of business concerns, from tariff structures to environmental regulations. There is no unified multinational perspective on any of these issues. Companies that have invested heavily in pollution control mechanisms may lobby for very tough environmental standards in an effort to force non-compliant competitors into a weaker position. Corporations lobby tariffs to restrict competition of foreign industries.[9] For every tariff category that one multinational wants to have reduced, there is another multinational that wants the tariff raised. Even within the U.S. auto industry, the fraction of a company's imported components will vary, so some firms favor tighter import restrictions, while others favor looser ones. Says Ely Oliveira, Manager Director of the MCT/IR: This is very serious and is very hard and takes a lot of work for the owner.
Multinational corporations such as Wal-mart and McDonalds benefit from government zoning laws, to prevent competitors from competing.[10]
Many industries such as General Electric and Boeing lobby the government to receive subsidies to preserve their monopoly.[11]
Patents
Many multinational corporations hold patents to prevent competitors from arising. For example, Adidas holds patents on shoe designs, Siemens A.G. holds many patents on equipment and infrastructure and Microsoft benefits from software patents.[12] The pharmaceutical companies lobby international agreements to enforce patent laws.
Government power
In addition to efforts by multinational corporations to affect governments, there is much government action intended to affect corporate behavior. The threat of nationalization (forcing a company to sell its local assets to the government or to other local nationals) or changes in local business laws and regulations can limit a multinational's power.
Micro-multinationals
Enabled by Internet based communication tools, a new breed of multinational companies is growing in numbers."How startups go global". http://money.cnn.com/2006/06/28/magazines/business2/startupsgoglobal.biz2/index.htm. These multinationals start operating in different countries from the very early stages. These companies are being called micro-multinationals. What differentiates micro-multinationals from the large MNCs is the fact that they are small businesses. Some of these micro-multinationals, particularly software development companies, have been hiring employees in multiple countries from the beginning of the Internet era. But more and more micro-multinationals are actively starting to market their products and services in various countries. Internet tools like Google, Yahoo, MSN, Ebay and Amazon make it easier for the micro-multinationals to reach potential customers in other countries.
Service sector micro-multinationals, like Indigo Design & Engineering Associates Pvt. Ltd.[13], Facebook, Alibaba etc. started as dispersed virtual businesses with employees, clients and resources located in various countries. Their rapid growth is a direct result of being able to use the internet, cheaper telephony and lower traveling costs to create unique business opportunities
See also
• Corporate Watch
• Corporation
• Finance capitalism
• Foreign direct investment
• Globalization
• Globally Integrated Enterprise
• Internationalization
• List of multinational corporations
• Fortune Global 500
• Forbes Global 2000
• OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
• Chart of different types of multinationals and their corresponding expatriate employees
• Transnationalism
• Transnationality Index
References
1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Pitelis, Christos; Roger Sugden (2000). The nature of the transnational firm. Routledge. p. 72. ISBN 0415167876. http://books.google.com/books?id=mXjeiQYR088C&printsec=frontcover#PPA72,M1.
2. ^ Pitelis, Christos; Roger Sugden (2000). The nature of the transnational firm. Hymer (1960, published in 1976), Kindleberger (1969) & Caves (1971). Routledge. p. 74. ISBN 0415167876. http://books.google.com/books?id=mXjeiQYR088C&printsec=frontcover#PPA74,M1.
3. ^ Pitelis, Christos; Roger Sugden (2000). The nature of the transnational firm. Hymer, 1976: 49-50. Routledge. p. 74. ISBN 0415167876. http://books.google.com/books?id=mXjeiQYR088C&printsec=frontcover#PPA74,M1.
4. ^ Pitelis, Christos; Roger Sugden (2000). The nature of the transnational firm. Hymer, 1970: 433. Routledge. p. 74. ISBN 0415167876. http://books.google.com/books?id=mXjeiQYR088C&printsec=frontcover#PPA74,M1.
5. ^ Pitelis, Christos; Roger Sugden (2000). The nature of the transnational firm. Bain, 1956. Routledge. p. 74. ISBN 0415167876. http://books.google.com/books?id=mXjeiQYR088C&printsec=frontcover#PPA74,M1.
6. ^ Pitelis, Christos; Roger Sugden (2000). The nature of the transnational firm. Dunning & Rugman (1985), Teece (1981). Routledge. p. 74. ISBN 0415167876. http://books.google.com/books?id=mXjeiQYR088C&printsec=frontcover#PPA74,M1.
7. ^ Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), esp. 122-195.
8. ^ Barnett, Richard, 1975: Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations.
9. ^ Murray Rothbard. "The Dangerous Nonsense of Protectionism". Mises Institute. http://mises.org/rothbard/protectionism.asp.
10. ^ Thomas DiLorenzo. "The Union Conspiracy Against Wal-Mart Workers". http://www.mises.org/story/2016.
11. ^ HOLMAN W. JENKINS. "What Is GM Thinking?". Business World. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121495482307421193.html.
12. ^ Kevin Carson, Tucker‘s Big Four: Patents., A Mutualist FAQ, http://www.mutualist.org/id74.html
13. ^ Investments & Income
External links
• Data on transnational corporations
• CorpWatch
• UNCTAD publications on multinational corporations
• UNCTAD - Lists of largest TNCs
• http://www.bartleby.com/65/fu/Fugger.html An early multinational business.
• ILO - Multinational Corporations
World-systems approach
The neutrality of this article is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (February 2009)
The World-systems approach is a post-Marxist view of world affairs, one of several historical and current applications of Marxism to international relations.
One of the basics of the approach is its view of imperialism, which for many Marxists during the 20th century represented "the highest stage of capitalism", a term coined by Vladimir Lenin, who also used the terms periphery and core as a means to analyze world politics and economy.
Immanuel Wallerstein, a leading advocate of the approach, uses the same terminology. He characterizes the world system as a set of mechanisms which redistributes resources from the periphery to the core. In his terminology, the core is the developed, industrialized, democratic part of the world, and the periphery is the underdeveloped, raw materials-exporting, poor part of the world; the market being the means by which the core exploits the periphery.
Wallerstein traces the origin of today's world-system to the 16th century in Western Europe, and defines it as:
"...a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. One can define its structures as being at different times strong or weak in terms of the internal logic of its functioning."[1]
Apart of these, Wallerstein defines four temporal features of that. Cyclical rhythms represent the short-term fluctuation of economy, while secular trends mean deeper long run tendencies, such as general economic growth or decline. In the theory the term contradiction means a general controversy in the system, usually concerning some short-run vs. long run trade-offs. For example the problem of underconsumption, wherein the drive-down of wages increases the profit for the capitalists on the short-run, but considering the long run, the decreasing of wages may have a crucially harmful effect by reducing the demand for the product. The last temporal feature is the crisis: a crisis occurs, if a constellation of circumstances brings about the losing of the system's structure, which also means the end of the system.
Technically speaking, World-systems analysis is not a theory, but an approach to social analysis and social change. It is based in part on the works of Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein with major contributions by Christopher Chase-Dunn, Volker Bornschier, Peter Turchin, Andrey Korotayev, Janet Abu Lughod, Thomas D. Hall, Kunibert Raffer, David Wilkinson, and others.
It should be noted that World-systems analysis is not only derived from the neo-Marxist literature on development but also from the French Annales School tradition(especially Fernand Braudel).
Contents
• 1 The world system perspective
• 2 Wallerstein's formulation of the world-system approach
• 3 Characteristics of the modern world-system
o 3.1 Core nations
o 3.2 Periphery nations
o 3.3 Semiperiphery nations
o 3.4 Core conflict and hegemony
• 4 New Developments of the World System Analysis
o 4.1 Abu Lughod's version
o 4.2 Other contributions
• 5 The question of cycles
• 6 Regaining a Schumpeterian perspective
• 7 Literature (Selection)
• 8 See also
• 9 References
• 10 External links
The world system perspective
The essence of world systems theory starts with the following assumption, as once was stated by the Latin American economist Osvaldo Sunkel, a representative of dependency theory:
“ The interpretation so far advanced suggests that the international capitalist system contains an internationalized nucleus of activities, regions and social groups of varying degrees of importance in each country. These sectors share a common culture and ‘way of life’, which expresses itself through the same books, texts, films, television programs, similar fashions, similar groups of organization of family and social life, similar style of decoration of homes, similar orientations to housing, building, furniture and urban design. Despite linguistic barriers, these sectors have a far greater capacity for communication among themselves than is possible between integrated and marginal persons of the same country who speak the same language (...) Modernization implies the gradual replacement of the traditional productive structure by another of much higher capital intensiveness (...) On the one hand, the process of modernization incorporates into the new structures the individuals and groups that are apt to fit into the kind of rationality that prevails there; on the other hand, it expels the individuals and groups that have no place in the new productive structure or who lack the capacity to become adapted to it. It is important to emphasize that this process does not only prevent or limit the formation of a national entrepreneurial class, as indicated by Furtado, but also of a national middle class (...) and even a national working class. The advancement of modernization introduces, so to speak, a wedge along the area dividing the integrated from the segregated segments (...) In this process, some national entrepreneurs are incorporated as executives into the new enterprises or those absorbed by the TRANCO (i.e. transnational corporations), and others are marginalized; some professionals, forming part of the technical staff and the segment of employees are incorporated, and the rest are marginalized; part of the qualified labor supply and those that are considered fit to be upgraded are incorporated, while the remainder are marginalized.
The effects of the disintegration of each social class has important consequences for social mobility. The marginalized entrepreneur will probably add to the ranks of small or artesanal manufacture, or will abandon independent activity and become a middle class employee. The marginalized sectors of the middle class will probably form a group of frustrated lower middle class people trying to maintain middle class appearance without much possibility of upward mobility and terrorized by the danger of proletarization. The marginalized workers will surely add to the ranks of absolute marginality, where, as in the lower middle class, growing pools of resentment and frustration of considerable demographic dimension will accumulate (...) Finally, it is very probable that an international mobility will correspond to the internal mobility, particularly between the internationalized sectors (...) The process of social disintegration which has been outlined here probably also affects the social institutions which provide the bases of the different social groups and through which they express themselves. Similar tendencies to the ones described for the global society are, therefore, probably also to be found within the state, church, armed forces, political parties with a relatively wide popular base, the universities etc. (Sunkel, 1972: 18-42) ”
Dependency and world system theory hold, that poverty and backwardness in poor countries are caused by the peripheral position that these nations have in the international division of labor. Ever since the capitalist world system evolved, there is a stark distinction between the nations of the center and the nations of the periphery.
Fernando Henrique Cardoso summarized the quantifiable essence of dependency theories as follows:
• there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery
• this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers
• this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery
• this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations
• these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inartuculateness and structural imbalance (Cardoso, 1979)
Wallerstein's formulation of the world-system approach
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The most well-known version of the world-system approach has been developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein analyzes the World System as follows: "A system is defined as a unit with a single division of labour and multiple cultural systems."
In Wallerstein’s 1987 publication, World-System Analysis, he defines World-System Analysis by contrast with various theses which he rejects.'The 'disciplines' of modern social science are intellectually coherent groupings of subject matter that refer to discrete 'logics.World-systems analysis rejects this and calls for an unidisciplinary historical social science, and contends that the modern disciplines, products of the 19th century, are deeply flawed because they are not separate logics, as is manifest for example in the de facto overlap of analysis among scholars of the 'disciplines.History is the study of events (the idiographic approach) and social science discovers universal rules of human/social behavior (the nomothetic approach).Wallerstein writes that "World-systems analysis offers the heuristic value of the via media between trans-historical generalizations and particularistic narrations...It argues that the optimal method is to pursue analysis within systemic frameworks, long enough in time and large enough in space to contain governing 'logics' which 'determine' the largest part of sequential reality, while simultaneously recognizing and taking into account that these systemic frameworks have beginnings and ends and are therefore not to be conceived of as 'eternal' phenomena.Modern countries or 'states' are societies, or there is a society underlying each state.World-systems analysis argues that modern states have never been societies, but are the political units of modern society's interstate system and economy.
In Wallerstein's view, there have been three kinds of societies across human history: mini-systems or what anthropologists call bands, tribes, and small chiefdoms, and two types of world-systems (single state world-empires and multi-polity world-economies). World-systems are larger, and ethnically diverse. Modern society, called the "modern world-system" is of the latter type, but unique in being the first and only fully capitalist world-economy to have emerged, around 1450 - 1550 and to have geographically expanded across the entire planet, by about 1900.Capitalism is a system based on competition between free producers using free labor with free commodities, 'free' meaning its available for sale and purchase on a market.
World-systems analysis argues that capitalism, as a historical social system, has always integrated a variety of labor forms within a functioning division of labor (world-economy). Countries do not have economies, but are part of the world-economy. Far from being separate societies or worlds, the world-economy manifests a tripartite division of labor with core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral zones. In core zones businesses, with the support of states they operate within, monopolize the most profitable activities of the division of labor. In recognizing a tripartite pattern, world-systems analysis criticized dependency theory with its bimodal system of only cores and peripheries. There are many ways to attribute a specific country to the core, semi-periphery, or periphery. Using an empirically-based sharp formal definition of "domination" in a two-country relationship, Piana in 2004 defined the "core" as made up of "free countries" dominating others without being dominated, the "semi-periphery" as the countries which are dominated (usually—but not necessarily—by core countries) while at the same time they dominate others (usually in the periphery)and "periphery" as the countries which are dominated. Based on 1998 data, the full list of countries in the three regions—together with a discussion of methodology—can be found. The late 18th and early 19th centuries marked a great turning point in the development of capitalism in that capitalists achieved state-societal power in the key states which furthered the industrial revolution marking the rise of capitalism.World-systems analysis contends that capitalism as a historical system formed earlier, that countries do not "develop" in stages, but rather the system does, and these events have a different meaning as a phase in the development of historical capitalism; namely the emergence of the three ideologies of the national developmental mythology (the idea that countries can develop through stages if they pursue the right set of policies): conservatism, liberalism, and radicalism.
Characteristics of the modern world-system
Proponents of world-systems analysis see the world stratification system the same way Karl Marx viewed class (ownership versus non-ownership of the means of production) and Max Weber viewed class (which, in addition to ownership, stressed occupational skill level in the production process). The core nations primarily own and control the major means of production in the world and perform the higher-level production tasks. The periphery nations own very little of the world’s means of production (even when they are located in periphery nations) and provide less-skilled labor. Like a class system with a nation, class positions in the world economy result in an unequal distribution of rewards or resources. The core nations receive the greatest share of surplus production, and periphery nations receive the least. Furthermore, core nations are usually able to purchase raw materials and other goods from noncore nations at low prices, while demanding higher prices for their exports to noncore nations. Chirot (1986) lists the five most important benefits coming to core nations from their domination of periphery nations:
1. Access to a large quantity of raw material
2. Cheap labor
3. Enormous profits from direct capital investments
4. A market for exports
5. Skilled professional labor through migration of these people from the noncore to the core.
[2]
Core nations
• The most economically diversified, wealthy, and powerful (economically and militarily)
• Highly industrialized
• Tend to specialize in information, finance and service industries
• Produce manufactured goods rather than raw materials for export
• More often in the forefront of new technologies and new industries. Examples today include high-technology electronic and biotechnology industries. Another example would be assembly-line auto production in the early twentieth century.
• Have more complex and stronger state institutions that help manage economic affairs internally and externally
• Have a sufficient tax base so these state institutions can provide infrastructure for a strong economy
• Have more means of influence over noncore nations
• Relatively independent of outside control
Periphery nations
• Least economically diversified
• Tend to depend on one type of economic activity, such as extracting and exporting raw materials to core nations
• Are often targets for investments from multinational (or transnational) corporations from core nations that come into the country to exploit cheap unskilled labor for export back to core nations
• Tend to have a high percentage of their people that are poor and uneducated.
• Inequality tends to be very high because of a small upper class that owns most of the land and has profitable ties to multination corporations
• Have relatively weak institutions with little tax base to support infrastructure development
• Tend to be extensively influenced by core nations and their multinational corporations. Many times they are forced to follow economic policies that favor core nations and harm the long-term economic prospects of periphery nations.
Semiperiphery nations
Semiperiphery nations are those that are midway between the core and periphery. They tend to be countries moving towards industrialization and a more diversified economy. “While they are weaker than core societies, they are trying to overcome this weakness and are not as subject to outside manipulation as peripheral societies.” [3]
Core conflict and hegemony
Throughout the history of the modern world-system there has been a group of core nations competing with one another for access to the world’s resources, economic dominance, and hegemony over periphery nations. There has been one core nation with clear dominance over others since the beginning of the world-system. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, a core nation is dominant over all the others when it has a lead in three forms of economic dominance over a period of time:
1. Productivity dominance allows a country to produce products of greater quality at a cheaper price compared to other countries.
2. Productivity dominance may lead to trade do trade dominance. Now, there is a favorable balance of trade for the dominant nation since more countries are buying the products of the dominant country than it is buying from them.
3. Trade dominance may lead to financial dominance. Now, more money is coming into the country than going out. Bankers of the dominant nation tend to receive more control of the world’s financial resources. [4]
Military dominance is also likely after a nation reaches these three rankings. However, it has been found that throughout the modern world-system, no nation has been able to use its military to gain economic dominance. Each of the past dominant nations became dominant with fairly small levels of military spending, and began to lose economic dominance with military expansion later on. [5]
According to Wallerstein, there have only been three periods in which a core nation has dominated in the modern world-system, with each lasting less than one hundred years. Around 1450, Spain and Portugal took the early lead when conditions became right for a capitalist world-economy. They lead the way in establishing overseas colonies. However, Portugal and Spain lost their lead primarily due to becoming overextended with empire building. It became too expensive to dominate and protect many colonial territories around the world. [5] [6] [3]
Dutch fluyts of the seventeenth Century
The first nation to gain clear dominance was the Netherlands in the 1600s, after their revolution led to a new financial system many historians consider revolutionary. [5] An impressive shipbuilding industry also contributed to their economic dominance through more exports to other countries. [2] Eventually, other countries began to copy the financial methods and efficient production created by the Dutch. After the Dutch gained its dominant status, the standard of living rose, pushing up production costs. [4]
Dutch bankers began to go outside of the country seeking profitable investments, and the flow of capital moved, especially to England. [5] By the end of the 1600’s, conflict among core nations increased as a result of the economic decline of the Dutch. Dutch financial investment helped England gain productivity and trade dominance, and Dutch military support helped England to defeat the French, the other country competing for dominance at the time.
Map showing British Empire in 1921
As a result of the new British dominance, the world-system became relatively stable again during the 1800’s. The British began to expand all over, with many colonies in the New World, Africa, and Asia. The colonial system began to place a strain on the British military, and along with other factors, led to an economic decline. Again, there was a great deal of core conflict after the British lost their clear dominance. This time it was Germany, and later Italy and Japan providing the new threat.
By 1900, the modern world-system was much different than it was 100 years earlier. Most of the periphery societies had already been colonized by one of the older core nations. [2] In 1800, the old European core claimed 35% of the world’s territory, but by 1914 it claimed 85% of the world’s territory. [5] Now, if a core nation wanted periphery areas to exploit as had done the Dutch and British, these periphery areas would have to be taken from another core nation. This is what Germany, and then Japan and Italy, began to do early in the 20th century.
While these countries were moving into core status, so was the United States. The American civil war led to more power for Northern industrial elites, who were now better able to pressure the government for policies favorable to industrial expansion. Like the Dutch bankers, British bankers were putting more investment toward the United States. Like the Dutch and British, the U.S. had a small military budget compared with other industrial nations at the time. [5]
The U.S. began to take the place of the British as the new dominant nation after World War I. With Japan and Europe in ruins after World War II, the U.S. was able to dominate the modern world-system more than any other country in the history of the world-system. After World War II, the U.S. accounted for over half of the world’s industrial production, owned two-thirds of the gold reserves in the world, and supplied one-third of the world’s exports. [5]
New Developments of the World System Analysis
Abu Lughod's version
Janet Abu Lughod argues that a pre-modern World System extensive across Eurasia existed in the 13th Century prior to the formation of the modern world-system identified by Wallerstein. Janet Abu Lughod contends that the Mongol Empire played an important role in stitching together the Chinese, Indian, Muslim and European regions in the 13th century, before the rise of the modern world system.[7] In debates, Wallerstein contends that her system was not a "world-system" because it did not entail integrated production networks, but was instead a vast trading network.
Other contributions
Andre Gunder Frank goes even further and claims that a global-scale world system that includes Asia, Europe and Africa has existed since the 4th millennium BCE.[8] The center of this system was in Asia, specifically China.
Europe only prospered when Asian economy was in its contracting phase of long-term economic cycle and Europe had access to virtually free silver and gold from the Americas. There was no European miracle, Europe simply had geographical advantage in the discovery of Americas. This contracting phase is now coming to an end and the center is moving back to Asia. In a joint critique, Wallerstein, Arrighi, and Samin attacked the empirical data of this argument.
Archaeologically too the idea of a World System was extended to the Late Chalcolithic-Early Bronze Age, looking at the period of dominance of ancient Uruk, within the system that stretched from Egypt to the Indus.
These debates have seen a split in the identification of world-systems analysis and "world systems theory."
An important contribution to the study of the history of the World System was produced by Christopher Chase-Dunn and Tom Hall who discovered a significant synchrony in the urban dynamics of the western and eastern parts of Afroeurasia starting from the 1st millennium BCE (Chase-Dunn, C., and T. Hall. Rise and Demise: Comparing World-Systems. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1997). The possible mechanisms of this synchrony were analyzed by Peter Turchin and Tom Hall (Turchin, Peter and Thomas D. Hall. 2003. Spatial Synchrony among and within World-Systems: Insights from Theoretical Ecology. Journal of World-Systems Research 9:37-66).
Modern applications of the theory have sought to incorporate the changing relations between the First World and the Second World with the collapse of the Soviet Union, describing attempts by the United States and Europe to "colonize" or "absorb" the Newly Indepenent States of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into the New World Order. David Lempert's description of "Pepsi-stroika" builds on the "Coca-colonization" theme. Michael Burawoy has also focused on these transformations.
Looking at World Systems Theory (as distinct from world-systems analysis) from this perspective demonstrates similarity to the concept of the Oecumene, used by cultural historians like William McNeill. Historically World Systems Theory have been very useful as an antidote to the exceptionalism of Globalisation Theorists who argue that the current system is wholly without precedent in world history.[9]
The question of cycles
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World systems theory has become part and parcel of the debate in major international peer-reviewed journals in the social sciences. For one, the entire notion of business cycles fascinates the profession. Without question, the notion of business cycles and war cycles dominates the debate about the time-series trajectory of the world system.
Although many contemporary economists don't consider the ideas of Nikolai Kondratiev on long term swings in economic activity relevant, several major figures of economics of the 20th Century, among them Economic Nobel Prizewinners, were deeply impressed by Nicolai Kondratiev's research, which forms the starting point of the world systems theory notion of long cycles. Among them were not just Joseph Alois Schumpeter and also in a way Simon Kuznets, but Ragnar Frisch; Gottfried Haberler; Alvin Hansen; Walt Rostow; and Jan Tinbergen. The revival of Kondratiev research in the 1960s and beyond is linked to the simulation efforts of Jay Forrester at the MIT in the context of his world modeling for the Club of Rome. IIASA developed a highly sophisticated debate on the issue, centered mainly on the works of the physicist Cesare Marchetti and the Portuguese systems scientist Tessaleno Devezas. Devezas' research is particularly noteworthy here, because it combines sociological insights into values and generations with the mathematics of cyclical swings in economics and demography. Forrester reproduced a 50-year pattern for the US-economy, based on his System Dynamics National Model (NM-model) which is based on 15 sectors. Marchetti moved the debate away from price series to physical quantities, including production and energy consumption. Unfortunately, as sophisticated and statistically satisfying as this IIASA debate might sound, it has been rather overlooked by both the mostly Marxist and world system supporters of Kondratiev waves and by their economist detractors.
Early on, the United States Central Intelligence Agency commissioned a research paper by Ehud Levy-Pascal in the 1970s on Kondratiev cycles, and it was published in 1976. The Swiss world system sociologist Volker Bornschier also carried out quantitative sociological surveys of Kondratiev type of waves. In addition, a decisive breakthrough in the entire debate was the Ph. dissertation by Joshua Goldstein at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under supervision of Hayward Alker., which was published in 1988. NATO's interest in the entire question has an obvious background - long cycle theory allows long-term predictions that are important for military and political contingency planning. Finally yet importantly, Kondratiev's native Russia fully rehabilitated one of her greatest social scientists of all times and now devotes a state research institute to scientific investigation in his memory.
Kondratiev downswings were always particularly severe in the Russian periphery of the world system, and the vicissitudes of reform and the re-centralization of government are closely linked to the Kondratiev cycle. The cyclical swings in the periphery are by far more pronounced than in the center and the depressions more severe. The level of inequality is historically higher in the periphery than in the center, but inequality also increases in the centers. Such comparisons clearly suggest three tendencies:
a) first, a faster growth in the peripheries during the beginning B-phase of the Kondratiev cycle
b) a more severe depression in the peripheries than in the center
c) a belated recovery in the periphery
The very logic of industrial processes and basic innovations, as well as the societal models, connected with them, would suggest building cyclical fluctuations into more general theories of development (Amin, 1997). Blast furnaces and other important components of the industrial process, too, have a certain life cycle, comparable with the Juglar cycle and Kuznets cycle, just as technical innovations are scattered in a non-random fashion along time, coinciding with the Kondratiev cycle (Bornschier, 1988 and 1995; for a very comprehensive summary Scandella, 1998). There are short term instabilities of 3 to 5 years duration (Kitchin cycles), 8–11 years duration (Juglar cycles), 18–22 years duration (Kuznets waves), and longer, 40-60 year Kondratiev waves. The following dating scheme, taken here from Tausch/Ghymers, 2006 could be suggested in the light of the Schumpeterian theory tradition (Scandella, 1998). Global capitalism since 1740 had the following Kuznets cycles (calculations based on the untransformed rates of global industrial production growth, 1740 - 2004), based on polynomial expressions of the sixth order:
1741-1756; R^2 = 23.5 %
1756-1774; R^2 = 36.1 %
1774-1793; R^2 = 34.8 %
1793-1812; R^2 = 39.7 %
1812-1832; R^2 = 16.4 %
1832-1862; R^2 = 25.7 %
1862-1885; R^2 = 36.3 %
1885-1908; R^2 = 56.2 %
1908-1932; R^2 = 44.2 %
1932-1958; R^2 = 19.1 %
1958-1975; R^2 = 60.9 %
1975-1992; R^2 = 75.8 %
The period between 1756 and 1832 is then the first Kondratiev cycle of the industrial age, the period between 1832 and 1885 as the second Kondratiev cycle, the period between 1885 and 1932 as the third Kondratiev cycle, and the period between 1932 and 1975 as the fourth Kondratiev cycle. Therefore, according to this logic, we are now in the fifth Kondratiev cycle of the industrial age; with one Kuznets cycle after the depression of the mid-1970s already well behind us, and the second Kuznets cycle since 1992 pointing in a downward direction.
For Volker Bornschier, there are the following phases in the K-cycle:
• Upswing
• Prosperity
• Prosperity-recession
• Crisis
• Temporary recovery
• Depression
Tests, provided by Tausch/Ghymers show that the Bornschier dating scheme much better corresponds to the structure of world production data than the alternative, proposed by Goldstein. This scheme is in line with the dating scheme proposed by Joshua Goldstein, Phil O'Hara, and Ernest Mandel, among many others.
The question of war cycles has received enormous international attention. Joshua Goldstein was led to the conclusion that the capitalist world systems tends continuously towards wars and violent conflicts. The international system is characterized according to him by
global war -> world hegemony of the dominant power -> de-legitimization of the international order -> de-concentration of the global system -> global war et cetera
The duration of these phases of the international order is approximately one Kondratieff cycle, so the unit of time of the international system can be symbolized by the expression 1K.
At a time of major shifts in world politics and economics, it is no wonder that systematic studies in the evolution of the international order have gained ground. Goldstein's quantitative approach (1988 ff.) concentrated on the major power confrontations as the `watershed' in international relations. Ample empirical evidence supports both Arrighi's and Goldstein's theories. Each world political cycle up to now corresponded to a `W'-pattern of untransformed annual battle fatalities from major power wars in thousands. The war cycle 1495-1648 is a polynomial expression of the 6th order; R^2 is 91.7%; 1649-1816 yields an R^2 of 33.6%; while a polynomial expression of the 6th order explains 50.1% of war intensity 1817-1945. The x-axis in our graph is the number of years after the end of the major power wars, i.e. 1648, 1816, and 1945. The same, deadly function explains 49.5% of annual battle fatalities in thousands from 1946 to 1975 (Tausch, 2007).
Now, one of the most intriguing features of contemporary capitalism seems to be the fact that vigorous upswings need to be supported by a tightly organized new world political hegemonic order, while the strength of the downswings and the severity of the depressions always are a function of the waning world political order. All real major depressions in the world system were hegemonic transition phases, and all these major crises thus had the character of what the present author calls a "Tsunami wave" of world politics that each time was also connected with terrible social upheavals, depressions and the onsets of major power wars, like the great crash of the early 1340s, which marked the beginning of the Genoese age (Arrighi) or Portuguese and Genoese age (Modelski), the crash of the 1560s, which marked the beginning of the Dutch era, the depression of the 1750s and 1760s, which marked the beginning of the British era, and the Great Depression in the 1930s, which was the terminal crisis of British world capitalist dominance (Arrighi, 1995).
By re-analyzing latest conflict data (great power battle fatalities from all wars, Goldstein, 1988 and COW/PRIO, 2005, from 1945 to 2002 and as yet unpublished UNIDO data about the growth of world industrial production 1740 - 2004) it was shown in Tausch/Ghymers that the long Kuznets and Kondratiev swings and cycles of capitalist world development that play such an important role in the analysis of global war since 1945 have indeed not ended after the end of Communism, and that instability, and not stability, characterize the world economy, and that there is an indented "W" shaped pattern of global conflict since 1945 that did not end with the end of the Cold War. World hegemonies that characterize the workings of world capitalism arise and they end. As it is well known in world system research, especially from the works of Arrighi and Silver, there are signal crises of world capitalism (the usual Kondratiev depressions), and there are terminal crises of the world system, when hegemonies end. Peaceful transitions from one hegemony to the other are among the most intricate questions of peace research and peace policy of our time.
Regaining a Schumpeterian perspective
Authors like Joseph Alois Schumpeter, and later world system and dependency writers like Samir Amin, Volker Bornschier, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Raul Prebisch, and Osvaldo Sunkel were always aware of the crises, cyclical imbalances, regional shifts, and of the rise and decline of entire regions and even continents in the process of capitalist development.
Like many other development theorists of the first generation of development economists after the Second World War, whose stars began to rise long after Schumpeter in the post-war period, and who all greatly influenced “dependency theory” in the world periphery, like Kurt Mandelbaum, Paul Narcyz Rosenstein-Rodan, and Hans Wolfgang Singer, capitalism for Schumpeter never was a smooth equilibrium process, whose end result is crisis-free growth, full employment, environmental sustainability and an end to social exclusion.
Quantitative world systems debate has to mention the name of the Swiss sociologist Volker Bornschier, who throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and beyond, has been a critical voice on the long-run detrimental effects of transnational penetration on the host countries in world capitalism, dynamizing the host countries of transnational foreign investment only in the short run, but leading towards inequality and stagnation in the long run, thus enormously enriching earlier work on dependency theories, pioneered by Peter Heintz and the Latin American "dependency theory school". His theoretical and empirical developments made "dependency theory" truly global and linked it up to the evolving world system school, and by his networking and collaboration –especially with Christopher Chase Dunn – firmly entrenched the "quantitative approach" in the world system school. His later work, related to the long cyclical fluctuations in the world economy, has shown that instability is also an overwhelming element in the historical evolution of capitalism, and that the world would need a new social contract similar in its encompassing nature to the one that shaped the world after the Great Depression in the 1930s. Bornschier put high hopes into the European Union as an alternative, more "social" pole in the world economy.
Literature (Selection)
• Amin S. (1973), 'Le developpement inegal. Essai sur les formations sociales du capitalisme peripherique' Paris: ions de Minuit.
• Amin S. (1992), 'Empire of Chaos' New York: Monthly Review Press.* Arrighi G. (1989), 'The Developmentalist Illusion: A Reconceptualization of the Semiperiphery' paper, presented at the Thirteenth Annual Political Economy of the World System Conference, University of Illinois at Urbana - Champaign, April 28 - 30.
• Arrighi G. (1995), ‘The Long 20th Century. Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times’ London, New York: Verso.
• Arrighi G. and Silver, B. J. (1984), 'Labor Movements and Capital Migration: The United States and Western Europe in World - Historical Perspective' in 'Labor in the Capitalist World - Economy' (Bergquist Ch. (Ed.)), pp. 183 – 216, Beverly Hills: Sage.
• Arrighi G. et al. (1991), 'The Rise of East Asia. One Miracle or Many?' State University of New York at Binghamton: Fernand Braudel Centre.
• Arrighi G. et al. (1996a), ‘Modelling Zones of the World-Economy: A Polynomial Regression Analysis (1964-1994)’ State University of New York at Binghamton: Fernand Braudel Center.
• Arrighi G. et al. (1996b), ‘The Rise of East Asia in World Historical Perspective’ State University of New York at Binghamton: Fernand Braudel Center.
• Arrighi G. et al. (1996c), ‘Beyond Western Hegemonies’ State University of New York at Binghamton: Fernand Braudel Center.
• Bornschier V. (Ed.) (1994), ‘Conflicts and new departures in world society’ New Brunswick, N.J. : Transaction Publishers.
• Bornschier V. (1976), 'Wachstum, Konzentration und Multinationalisierung von Industrieunternehmen' Frauenfeld and Stuttgart: Huber.
• Bornschier V. (1988), 'Westliche Gesellschaft im Wandel' Frankfurt a.M./ New York: Campus.
• Bornschier V. (1992), 'The Rise of the European Community. Grasping Towards Hegemony or Therapy against National Decline in the World Political Economy?'. Vienna: paper, presented at the First European Conference of Sociology, August 26 - 29.
• Bornschier V. (1996), ‘Western society in transition’ New Brunswick, N.J. : Transaction Publishers.
• Bornschier V. and Chase - Dunn Ch. K (1985), 'Transnational Corporations and Underdevelopment' N.Y., N.Y.: Praeger.
• Bornschier V. and Heintz P., reworked and enlarged by Th. H. Ballmer - Cao and J. Scheidegger (1979), 'Compendium of Data for World Systems Analysis' Machine readable data file, Zurich: Department of Sociology, Zurich University.
• Bornschier V. and Nollert M. (1994); 'Political Conflict and Labor Disputes at the Core: An Encompassing Review for the Post - War Era' in 'Conflicts and New Departures in World Society' (Bornschier V. and Lengyel P. (Eds.)), pp. 377 – 403, New Brunswick (U.S.A.) and London: Transaction Publishers, World Society Studies, Volume 3.
• Bornschier V. and Suter Chr. (1992), 'Long Waves in the World System' in 'Waves, Formations and Values in the World System' (Bornschier V. and Lengyel P. (Eds.)), pp. 15 – 50, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.
• Bornschier V. et al. (1980), 'Multinationale Konzerne, Wirtschaftspolitik und nationale Entwicklung im Weltsystem' Frankfurt a.M.: Campus
• Böröcz, József (2005), 'Redistributing Global Inequality: A Thought Experiment', Economic and Political Weekly, February 26:886-92.
• Böröcz, József (1992) 'Dual Dependency and Property Vacuum: Social Change in the State Socialist Semiperiphery' Theory & Society, 21:74-104.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. (1975), 'The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and Inequality: a Cross - national Study' American Sociological Review, 40: 720 - 738.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. (1983), 'The Kernel of the Capitalist World Economy: Three Approaches' in 'Contending Approaches to World System Analysis' (Thompson W.R. (Ed.)), pp. 55 – 78, Beverly Hills: Sage.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. (1984), 'The World - System Since 1950: What Has Really Changed?' in 'Labor in the Capitalist World - Economy' (Bergquist Ch. (Ed.)), pp. 75 – 104, Beverly Hills: Sage.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. (1991), 'Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy' London, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. (1992a), 'The National State as an Agent of Modernity' Problems of Communism, January - April: 29 - 37.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. (1992b), 'The Changing Role of Cities in World Systems' in 'Waves, Formations and Values in the World System' (Bornschier V. and Lengyel P. (Eds.)), pp. 51 – 87, New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. (Ed.), (1982), 'Socialist States in the World System' Beverly Hills and London: Sage.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. and Grimes P. (1995), ‘World - Systems Analysis’ Annual Review of Sociology, 21: 387 - 417.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. and Hall Th. D. (1997), ‘Rise and Demise. Comparing World - Systems’ Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
• Chase - Dunn Ch. K. and Podobnik B. (1995), ‘The Next World War: World - System Cycles and Trends’ Journal of World Systems Research 1, 6 (unpaginated electronic journal at world - wide - web site of the World System Network: http://jwsr.ucr.edu/).
• Frank A. G. (1978), ‘Dependent accumulation and underdevelopment’ London: Macmillan.
• Frank A. G. (1978), ‘World accumulation, 1492 - 1789’ London: Macmillan.
• Frank A. G. (1980) ‘Crisis in the world economy’ New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers.
• Frank A. G. (1981), ‘Crisis in the Third World’ New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers.
• Frank A. G. (1983), 'World System in Crisis' in 'Contending Approaches to World System Analysis' (Thompson W.R. (Ed.)), pp. 27 – 42, Beverly Hills: Sage.
• Frank A. G. (1990), 'Revolution in Eastern Europe: lessons for democratic social movements (and socialists?),' Third World Quarterly, 12, 2, April: 36 - 52.
• Frank A. G. (1992), 'Economic ironies in Europe: a world economic interpretation of East - West European politics' International Social Science Journal, 131, February: 41 - 56.
• Frank A. G. and Frank - Fuentes M. (1990), 'Widerstand im Weltsystem' Vienna: Promedia.
• Frank A. G. and Gills B. (Eds.)(1993), 'The World System: Five Hundred or Five Thousand Years?' London and New York: Routledge, Kegan&Paul.
• Gernot Kohler and Emilio José Chaves ( ors) “Globalization: Critical Perspectives” Haupauge, New York: Nova Science Publishers (http://www.novapublishers.com/) ISBN 1-59033-346-2. With contributions by Samir Amin, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein
• Korotayev A., Malkov A., Khaltourina D. Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth. Moscow: URSS, 2006. ISBN 5-484-00414-4 .
• Raffer K. (1987), 'Unequal Exchange and the Evolution of the World System Reconsidering the Impact of Trade on North - South Relations' London, Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan/Saint Martin's Press.
• Raffer K. (1989), 'Sovereign Debts, Unilateral 'Adjustment', and Multilateral Control: The New Way to Serfdom' (Singer H.W. et al. (Eds.)), New Delhi: Ashish Publishing House (quoted here from the author's typescript).
• Raffer K. (1992), ‘The Least developed and the oil - rich Arab countries: dependence, interdependence, or patronage?’ New York, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press.
• Raffer K. (1993), ‘Trade, transfers, and development: problems and prospects for the twenty - first century’ Aldershot, Hants, England; Brookfield, Vt., USA: E. Elgar Pub. Co.
• Raffer K. and Singer H.W. (1996), ‘The Foreign Aid Business. Economic Assistance and Development Cooperation’ Cheltenham and Borookfield: Edward Alger.
• Sunkel O. (1966), 'The Structural Background of Development Problems in Latin America' Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 97, 1: pp. 22 ff.
• Sunkel O. (1972/3), 'Transnationale kapitalistische Integration und nationale Disintegration: der Fall Lateinamerika' in 'Imperialismus und strukturelle Gewalt. Analysen ueber abhaengige Reproduktion' (Senghaas D. (Ed.)), pp. 258 – 315, Frankfurt a.M.: suhrkamp. English version: ‘Transnational capitalism and national disintegration in Latin America’ Social and Economic Studies, 22, 1, March: 132 - 76.
• Sunkel O. (1973), ‘El subdesarrollo latinoamericano y la teoria del desarrollo’ Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno ores, 6a edicion.
• Sunkel O. (1978a), 'The Development of Development Thinking' in 'Transnational Capitalism and National Development. New Perspectives on Dependence' (Villamil J.J. (Ed.)), pp. 19 – 30, Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press.
• Sunkel O. (1978b), 'Transnationalization and it’s National Consequences' in 'Transnational Capitalism and National Development. New Perspectives on Dependence' (Villamil J.J. (Ed.)), pp. 67 – 94, Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press.
• Sunkel O. (1980), ‘Transnacionalizacion y dependencia‘ Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispanica del Instituto de Cooperacion Iberoamericana.
• Sunkel O. (1984), ‘Capitalismo transnacional y desintegracion nacional en America Latina’ Buenos Aires, Rep. Argentina : Ediciones Nueva Vision.
• Sunkel O. (1990), ‘Dimension ambiental en la planificacion del desarrollo. English The environmental dimension in development planning ‘ 1st ed. Santiago, Chile : United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
• Sunkel O. (1991), ‘El Desarrollo desde dentro: un enfoque neoestructuralista para la America Latina’ 1. ed. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Economica.
• Sunkel O. (1994), ‘Rebuilding capitalism: alternative roads after socialism and dirigisme’ Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press
• Tausch A. (1993, with Fred Prager as co-author), 'Towards a Socio - Liberal Theory of World Development' Basingstoke and New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's Press.
• Tausch A. (2003), "Social cohesion, sustainable development and Turkey's accession to the European Union: implications from a global model" Alternatives. Turkish Journal of International Relations, 2(1), 1 - 41.
• Tausch A. (2007), 'Global terrorism and world political cycles' History and mathematics (Moscow), special issue, 1(1), 99 - 126.
• Tausch A. and Christian Ghymers (2006), 'From the “Washington” towards a “Vienna Consensus”? A quantitative analysis on globalization, development and global governance'. Haupauge, NY: Nova Science
See also
• General systems theory
• Globalization
• List of cycles
• Social cycle theory
• Sociocybernetics
• Systems philosophy
• Systems thinking
• War cycles
References
1. ^ Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) the Modern World-System, New York, Academic Press, pp. 347-57.
2. ^ a b c Chirot, Daniel. 1986. Social Change in the Modern Era. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
3. ^ a b Chirot, Daniel. 1977. Social Change in the Twentieth Century. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
4. ^ a b Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1980. The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600-1750. New York: Academic Press.
5. ^ a b c d e f g Kennedy, Paul. 1987. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House.
6. ^ Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the 16th Century. New York: Academic Press.
7. ^ Abu-Lugod, Janet (1989), "Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250-1350"
8. ^ Andrey Korotayev et al. go even further than Frank and date the beginning of the World System formation to the 10th millennium BCE, connecting it with the start of the Neolithic Revolution in the Middle East - see: Korotayev A., Malkov A., Khaltourina D. (2006). Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth. Moscow: KomKniga. ISBN 5-484-00414-4
9. ^ An overview of current world systems theory debates is to be found, among others, in the volume: Globalization. Critical Perspectives. ors: Gernot Kohler and Emilio José Chaves. Nova Science Publishers, Hauppauge, New York, 2003, with key-note contributions by Samir Amin, Patrick Bond, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein.
External links
• Institute for Research on World-Systems
• Journal of World-Systems Research
• World-Systems Archive
• Working Papers in the World Systems Archive
• World-Systems Archive Books
• World-Systems Electronic Seminars
• Preface to ReOrient by Andre Gunder Frank
• Andre Gunder Frank resources
• The Modern World-System by Immanuel Wallerstein
• Immanuel Wallerstein resources
• The African Crisis - World Systemic and Regional Aspects by Giovanni Arrighi
• The Rise of East Asia in World Historical Perspective by Giovanni Arrighi
• Neo-marxist Political Economy
• Resilience, Panarchy, and World-Systems Analysis
• A Dynamic Map of the World Cities' Growth
• Revista Entelequia
• Read an interview with World-System Theorist Immanuel Wallerstein at Theory Talks (August 2008)
• Arno Tausch (2005) 'Is Islam really a development blockade? 12 predictors of development, including membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference, and their influence on 14 indicators of development in 109 countries of the world with completely available data'. Ankara Institute for Turkish Policy Studies, ANKAM, Insight Turkey
Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth
Functionalism in international relations
Functionalism is a theory of international relations that arose during the inter-War period principally from the strong concern about the obsolescence of the State as a form of social organization. Rather than the self-interest of nation-states that realists see as a motivating factor, functionalists focus on common interests and needs shared by states (but also by non-state actors) in a process of global integration triggered by the erosion of state sovereignty and the increasing weight of knowledge and hence of scientists and experts in the process of policy-making (Rosamond, 2000). Its roots can be traced back to the liberal/idealist tradition that started with Kant and goes as far as Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" speech. (Rosamond, 2000)
Functionalism is a pioneer in globalisation theory and strategy. States had built authority structures upon a principle of territorialism. State-theories were built upon assumptions that identified the scope of authority with territory (Held 1996, Scholte: 1993, 2000, 2001), aided by methodological territorialism (Scholte 1993). Functionalism proposed to build a form of authority based in functions and needs, which linked authority with needs, scientific knowledge, expertise and technology, i.e. it provided a supraterritorial concept of authority.
According to functionalism, international integration - the collective governance and 'material interdependence' (Mitrany, 1933:101) between states - develops its own internal dynamic as states integrate in limited functional, technical, and/or economic areas. International agencies would meet human needs, aided by knowledge and expertise. The benefits rendered by the functional agencies would attract the loyalty of the populations and stimulate their participation and expand the area of integration. There are strong assumptions underpinning functionalism: 1) That the process of integration takes place within a framework of human freedom, 2) That knowledge and expertise are currently available to meet the needs for which the functional agencies are built. 3) That states will not sabotage the process.
Contents
• 1 Neofunctionalism
• 2 Comparing Functionalism to Realism
• 3 Further reading
• 4 External links
• 5 Notes
• 6 See also
Neofunctionalism
Main article: Neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalism reintroduced territorialism in the functional theory and downplayed its global dimension. Neofunctionalism is simultaneously a theory and a strategy of regional integration, building on the work of David Mitrany. Neofunctionalists focused their attention in the process of integration among states, i.e. regional integration. Initially, states integrate in limited functional or economic areas. Thereafter, partially integrated states experience increasing momentum for further rounds of integration in related areas. This "invisible hand" of integration phenomenon was termed "spill-over." by the neofunctionalist school. Although integration can be resisted, it becomes harder to stop integration's reach as it progresses.[1]
According to neofunctionalists, there are two kinds of spillover: functional and political. Functional spillover is the interconnection of various economic sectors or issue-areas, and the integration in one policy-area spilling over into others. Political spillover is the creation of supranational governance models, as far-reaching as the European Union, or as voluntary as the United Nations.
One of its protagonists was Ernst B. Haas, a US-political scientist. Jean Monnet's approach to European integration, which aimed at integrating individual sectors in hopes of achieving spill-over effects to further the process of integration, is said to have followed the neofunctional school's tack. Unlike previous theories of integration, neofunctionalism declared to be non-normative and tried to describe and explain the process of regional integration based on empirical data. Integration was regarded as an inevitable process, rather than a desirable state of affairs that could be introduced by the political or technocratic elites of the involved states' societies. Its strength however was also its weakness: While it understood that regional integration is only feasible as an incremental process, its conception of integration as a linear process made the explanation of setbacks impossible.
Comparing Functionalism to Realism
John McCormick compares functionalism's fundamental principles with realism's thus (comments added to emphasise key distinctions) :
Realism Functionalism Comments
Dominant goals of actors Military security Peace and prosperity security through: Power vs collaboration
Instruments of state policy Military force and economic instruments Economic instruments and political acts of will State policy of assertion vs negotiation
Forces behind agenda formation Potential shifts in the balance of power and security threats Initial emphasis on low politics, such as economic and social issues Agenda sought: maintenance of position vs reaching consensus
Role of international organizations Minor; limited by state power and the importance of military force Substantial; new, functional international organizations will formulate policy and become increasingly responsible for implementation International involvement: minimal vs substantial
Further reading
• Caporaso, J. 1998: "Regional integration theory: understanding our past and anticipating our future." Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1):1-16.
• Haas, Ernst B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe; Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Haas, Ernst B. (1964). Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
• Held, D. (1996) Models of Democracy, Polity Press, Cambridge.
• Keohane, R. O. and S. Hoffmann 1991: The New European Community: Decision-making and Institutional Change. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
• McCormick, John. The European Union. Westview Press. January 1, 1999. ISBN 0-8133-9032-X
• Mitrany, D. (1933) The Progress of International Government. New Haven: Yale university press.
• Mitrany, D. (1965) "The Prospect of European Integration: Federal or Functional", Journal of Common Market Studies
• Mitrany, D.(1966) A Working Peace System. Chicago: Quadrangle books.
• Mitrany, D.(1976) The Functional Theory of Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press.
• Rosamond, B. (2000) Theories of European integration, Macmillan ; New York : St. Martin's Press, Basingstoke.
• Scholte, J. A. (2000) Globalization: a critical introduction, St. Martin's Press Inc., New York.
• Scholte, J. A. (2001) In The Globalization of World Politics, The globalization of world politics, (Eds, Baylis, J. and Smith, S.) Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 13-34.
• Scholte, J. A. (1993) International Relations of Social Change, Open University Press, Buckingham.
• Wallace, William (ed.) 1990: The Dynamics of European Integration. London: Pinter Publishers.
External links
• Global Power Barometer
Notes
1. ^ McCormick pp. 13.
2. ^ McCormick pp. 14.
See also
• Intergovernmentalism
• International relations theory
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_in_international_relations"
Neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalism is a theory of regional integration, building on the work of Ernst B. Haas, an American political scientist. Jean Monnet's approach to European integration, which aimed at integrating individual sectors in hopes of achieving spill-over effects to further the process of integration, is said to have followed the neofunctional school's tack. Haas later declared the theory of neofunctionalism obsolete, after the process of European integration started stalling in the 1960s, when Charles de Gaulle's "empty chair" politics paralyzed the institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community, and European Atomic Energy Community. Neofunctionalism has also been called too eurocentric and hence incapable of describing the process of integration in general.
Unlike previous theories of integration, neofunctionalism was non-normative and tried to describe and explain the process of regional integration based on empirical data. Integration was regarded as an inevitable process, rather than a desirable state of affairs that could be introduced by the political or technocratic elites of the involved states' societies. Its strength however was also its weakness: While it understood that regional integration is only feasible as an incremental process, its conception of integration as a linear process made the explanation of setbacks impossible.
Neofunctionalism holds that functional spill-over occurs from the cooperation and social-integration of technocrats into increasingly political realms.
Neofunctionalism nonetheless remains an important theory in the study of international relations. Neofunctionalism is often contrasted with intergovernmentalism.
Neofunctionalism and the European Union
Neofunctionalism argues that the supranational institutions of the European Union themselves have been a driving force behind European integration; reinterpreting agreed results from Intergovernmental Conferences in order to expand the mandate of EU legislation into new and more diverse areas. The theory of neofunctionalism is felt by some to be important as it may explain much of the thinking behind the early proponents of the European Union, such as Jean Monnet, who saw increased European integration as the most important precursor to a peaceful Europe.
Neofunctionalism assumes a decline in importance of nationalism and the nation-state; it sees the executive power and interest groups within states to be pursuing a welfarist objective which is best satisfied by integration of EU states. The thinking behind the neofunctionalist theory can be best described by considering the three mechanisms which neofunctionalists see as key to driving the process of integration forwards. These are positive spillover, the transfer of domestic allegiances and technocratic automaticity:
• Positive spillover effect is the concept that integration between states in one economic sector will quickly create strong incentives for integration in further sectors; in order to fully capture the benefits of integration in the original sector.
• The mechanism of a transfer in domestic allegiances can be best understood by first noting that an important assumption within neofunctionalist thinking is of a pluralistic society within the relevant nation states. Neofunctionalists claim that, as the process of integration gathers pace, interest groups and associations within the pluralistic societies of the individual nation states will transfer their allegiance away from national institutions towards the supranational European institutions. They will do this because they will, in theory, come to realise that these newly formed institutions are a better conduit through which to pursue their material interests than the pre-existing national institutions.
• Finally, technocratic automaticity describes the way in which, as integration hastens, the supranational institutions set up to oversee that integration process will themselves take the lead in sponsoring further integration as they become more powerful and more autonomous of the member states.
Intergovernmentalism is an alternative theory of political integration, where power in international organizations is possessed by the member-states and decisions are made by unanimity. Independent appointees of the governments or elected representatives have solely advisory or implementational functions. Intergovernmentalism is used by most international organizations today. An alternative method of decision-making in international organizations is supranationalism.
Intergovernmentalism is also a theory on European integration which rejects the idea of neofunctionalism. The theory, initially proposed by Stanley Hoffmann and refined by Andrew Moravcsik suggests that governments control the level and speed of European integration. Any increase in power at supranational level, he argues, results from a direct decision by governments. He believed that integration, driven by national governments, was often based on the domestic political and economic issues of the day. The theory rejects the concept of the spill over effect that neofunctionalism proposes. He also rejects the idea that supranational organisations are on an equal level (in terms of political influence) as national governments.
Literature:
• Thomas Conzelmann: Neofunktionalismus in: Siegfried Schiedler/Manuela Spindler (Hrsg.) Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen, Opladen 2003, S.141-161 (German)
• Ernst B Haas: The Uniting of Europe, Stanford 1958
• Ben Rosamond: Theories of European Integration (Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire, 2000)
External links
• Global Power Barometer
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neofunctionalism"
Critical international relations theory
Critical international relations theory is a set of schools of thought in international relations (IR) that have criticized the status-quo—both from positivist positions as well as postpositivist positions. Positivist critiques include Marxist and Neo-Marxist approaches and Neo-Gramscianism. Some may also consider Social Constructivism as a positivist theory. Postpositivist critiques include postmodernist, postcolonial and feminist approaches, which differ from both realism and liberalism in their epistemological and ontological premises. Critical theory is also widely deployed by scholars working in this area.
Such theories are now widely recognized and taught and researched in most universities, but are as yet less common in the United States. They are taught at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels in many major universities outside the US, where a major concern is that "a myopic discipline of IR might contribute to the continued development of a civil society in the U.S. that thinks, reflects and analyzes complex international events through a very narrow set of theoretical lenses"[1]
Contents
• 1 Marxist theories
• 2 Social Constructivism
o 2.1 Criticisms
• 3 Postpositivist theories
o 3.1 Feminism
3.1.1 Criticisms
o 3.2 Postcolonialism
3.2.1 Criticisms and Defence
• 4 References
• 5 Bibliography
• 6 External links
Marxist theories
Main article: Marxist international relations theory
Marxist and Neo-Marxist international relations theories are positivist paradigms which reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation; instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. It makes the assumption that the economy trumps other concerns; allowing for the elevation of class as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. The ultimate goal of Marxist theory is to transform the international society into a collective utopia.
Social Constructivism
Main article: Constructivism in international relations
Social Constructivism is an attempt at bringing some of the epistemological and ontological premise of postpositivistic theories into positivism. Its proponents claim it is a middle ground between positivist and postpositivist theories. Social Constructivism focuses on the power of ideas in defining the international system—its founder, Alexander Wendt, noted that anarchy is what states make of it, implying that the international structure is not only a constraint on state action, but in fact constitutes state action through constituting the identities and interest of state agents.
Criticisms
Social Constructivism is considered by many postpositivists as being positivist as the focus of analysis is the state (at the ignorance of other factors such as ethnicity, class, race or gender); and considered by many positivists as postpositivist, as it forgoes many positivist assumptions.
Postpositivist theories
Postpositivist (or reflectivist) theories of IR attempt to integrate a larger variety of security concerns. Supporters argue that if IR is the study of foreign affairs and relations, it ought to include non-state actors as well as the state. Instead of studying solely high politics of the state, IR ought to study world politics of the everyday world—which involves BOTH high and low politics. Thus, issues such as gender (often in terms of feminism which generally holds salient the subordination of women to men—though newer feminisms allow for the reverse too) and ethnicity (such as stateless actors like the Kurds or Palestinians) can be problematized and made into an international security issue—supplanting (not replacing) the traditional IR concerns of diplomacy and outright war.
The postpositivist approach can be described as incredulity towards metanarratives—in IR, this would involve rejecting all-encompassing stories that claim to explain the international system. It argues that neither realism nor liberalism could be the full story. A postpositivist approach to IR does not claim to provide universal answers but seeks to ask questions instead. A key difference is that while positivist theories such as realism and liberalism highlight how power is exercised, postpositivist theories focus on how power is experienced resulting in a focus on both different subject matters and agents.
Often, postpositivist theories explicitly promote a normative approach to IR, by considering ethics. This is something which has often been ignored under traditional IR as positivist theories make a distinction between positive facts and normative judgements—whereas postpostivists argue that discourse is constitutive of reality; in other words, that it is impossible to be truly independent and factual as power-free knowledge cannot exist. (#)
Postpositivist theories do not attempt to be scientific or a social science. Instead, they attempt to in-depth analysis of cases in order to "understand" international political phenomena by asking relevant questions to determine in what ways the status-quo promote certain power relations.
Feminism
For more details on this topic, see Feminism in international relations.
Feminist IR is a broad term given to those scholars who have sought to bring a concern with gender into the academic study of international politics. In terms of IR theory it is important to understand that feminism is derived from the school of thought known as reflectionism. One of the most influential works in feminist IR is Cynthia Enloe's Bananas, Beaches and Bases(Pandora Press 1990). This text sought to chart the many different roles that women play in international politics: as plantation sector workers, diplomatic wives, sex workers on military bases etc. The important point of this work was to emphasise how when we look at international politics from the perspective of women we are forced to reconsider what we think international politics is 'all about'. However, it would be a mistake to think that feminist IR was solely a matter of identifying how many groups of women are positioned in the international political system. From its inception, feminist IR has always shown a strong concern with thinking about men and, in particular, masculinities. Indeed, many IR feminists argue that the discipline is inherently masculine in nature. For example, in her article "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" Signs (1988), Carol Cohn identified how a highly masculinised culture within the defense establishment contributed to the divorcing of war from human emotion.
What is evident, therefore, is that a feminist IR involves looking at how international politics effects and is affected by both men and women and also at how the core concepts that are employed within the discipline of IR (e.g. war, security etc) are themselves thoroughly gendered. It should also be noted that feminist IR has not only concerned itself with the traditional focus of IR on states, wars, diplomacy and security - feminist IR scholars have also emphasied the importance of looking at how gender shapes the current global political economy. In this sense, there is no clear cut division between feminists working in IR and those working in the area of International Political Economy (IPE).
Feminist IR emerged largely from the late 1980s onwards. The end of the Cold War and the re-evaluation of traditional IR theory during the 1990s opened up a space for gendering International Relations. Because feminist IR is linked broadly to the critical project in IR, by and large most feminist scholarship has sought to problematise the politics of knowledge construction within the discipline - often by adopting methodologies of deconstructivism associated with postmodernism/poststructuralism. It should be noted however, that the growing influence of feminist and women-centric approaches within the international policy communities (for example at the World Bank and the United Nations) is more reflective of the liberal feminist emphasis on equality of opportunity for women.
Criticisms
By focusing on 'traditional' women’s roles (as victims or being used by men), feminist IR may exclude those women participating as diplomats or soldiers as well as ignoring men's issue such as why it is generally men are forced to fight in wars. Furthermore, as with criticisms with feminism in general, feminism almost always treats women as the subject of analysis at the exclusion of men—whether as agents or victims. In defence, some feminisms do consider men—though it still often makes the assumption that due to patriarchy, a certain, rational man is privileged. This may result in a confirmation bias.
Two of the most well known scholars to raise criticisms of feminist IR have been Robert Keohane and Francis Fukuyama. Keohane's target was not feminist IR per se but the attachment of many feminist IR scholars to postmodernist methodologies and theories. For Keohane, feminist IR need to develop scientific testable theories—a claim that J. Ann Tickner responded to with her piece 'You Just Don't Understand!'. Fukuyama suggested that the problem with feminist IR was that it put forward the view that if women ran the world then we would live in a much more peaceful world, a claim that he disputed.[citation needed] In fact, few feminist IR scholars have argued this,[citation needed] and even those that have would put forward a much more nuanced and sophisticated argument than that suggested by Fukuyama.
Postcolonialism
Postcolonial IR challenges the eurocentrism of IR—particularly its parochial assumption that Western Enlightenment thinking is superior, progressive and universally applicable. Postcolonialists argue that this is enabled through constructing the Other as irrational and backwards.[2]
Postcolonial IR attempts to expose such parochial assumptions of IR; for example, in the construction of white versus coloured peoples. An example is the IR story of a white men's burden to educate and liberate coloured men and women, to protect coloured women from coloured men. Often this is linked to other postpositivist theories, for example, through Postcolonial feminism, which analyze issues in IR through the lenses of both gender and culture.
Examples of the parochialistic nature of IR include geographical parochialism and cultural chauvinism. For the former, the construction of the Cold War era as a time of peace ignores the reality that major conflicts continued in the developing world. Furthermore, the oft-cited history of IR is constructed in western terms (more information under history); and IR has been used to justify everything from imperialism to a playground for skirmishes between the two Cold War superpowers. For the latter, the West (through IGOs such as the IMF's quick rush to "save" Asia in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–8 could be seen as both a white men's burden to save Asia or to reformulate Asian capitalism in a Western image.[3]
Criticisms and Defence
Such IR stories are purposefully limited in scope in terms of statecentric modelling, cataloguing and predicting in formal terms; and like other postpositivist theories, they do not attempt to form an overarching theory as after all, postpositivism is defined as incredulity towards metanarratives. This is replaced by a sensitivity and openness to the unintended consequences of metanarratives and their negative impacts on the most marginalised actors in IR. In defence, postpositivists argue that metanarratives have proven unworkable. Thus, such theories, although limited in scope, provide for much greater possibilities in the normative work of developing an emancipatory politics, formulating foreign policy, understanding conflict, and making peace, which takes into account gender, ethnicity, other identity issues, culture, methodology and other common issues that have emerged from problem-solving, rationalist, reductive accounts IR.
References
1. ^ Smith, Steve (2002). "The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline?". International Studies Review 4 (2): 67–86. doi:10.1111/1521-9488.00255.
2. ^ Edward Said (1979), Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books
3. ^ Cultural Chauvinism and the Liberal International Order - ‘West vs Rest’ in Asia’s Financial Crisis - Forthcoming in G. Chowdhry and S. Nair (eds), Power in a Postcolonial World: Race, Gender and Class in International Relations (London: Routledge) http://www.isanet.org/archive/ling2.html
Bibliography
• Critical Theory and International Relations: A Reader, ed. by Steven C. Roach, Routledge, 2007, 432 p., ISBN 0415954193
• Women, Culture, and International Relations (Critical Perspectives on World Politics) ed. By Vivienne Jabri, Eleanor O'Gorman, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, US, 1999, ISBN 155587701X
• Jenny Edkins, Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back in (Critical Perspectives on World Politics), Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, US, 1999, ISBN 1555878458
• Cynthia Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire (Paperback), University of California Press 2004, ISBN 0520243811
• Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Introduction to International Relations, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc,US, 1994, ISBN 1555874460
• Emin Fuat Keyman, Globalization, State, Identity/Difference: Toward a Critical Social Theory of International Relations, Prometheus Books, 1997, ISBN 1573926051
• Richmond OP, Peace in IR, London: Routledge, 2008.
• Carne Ross, Independent Diplomat: Despatches from an Unaccountable Elite (Crisis in World Politics), C. Hurst & Co, 2007, ISBN 1850658439
• Christine Sylvester, Feminist international relations: an unfinished journey. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 2002
• Cynthia Weber, International Relations Theory. A Critical Introduction, 2nd ion, Taylor & Francis 2004, ISBN 0415342082
External links
• Global Power Barometer
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_international_relations_theory"
Constructivism in international relations
In the discipline of international relations, constructivism is the application of constructivist ontology to the study of world affairs.
Contents
• 1 Development
• 2 Theory
o 2.1 Challenging Realism
o 2.2 Identities and interests
o 2.3 Research areas
• 3 Notable constructivists in IR
• 4 See also
• 5 External links
• 6 Notes
Development
This field is perhaps most closely associated with Alexander Wendt as he has applied the ideas of social constructionism to the field of international relations. Wendt’s article "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics" (1992) in International Organization laid the theoretical groundwork for challenging what he considered to be a flaw shared by both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, namely, a commitment to a (crude) form of materialism. By attempting to show that even such a core realist concept as "power politics" is socially constructed—-that is, not given by nature and hence, capable of being transformed by human practice--Wendt opened the way for a generation of international relations scholars to pursue work in a wide range of issues from a constructivist perspective. Wendt further developed these ideas in his central work, Social Theory of International Politics (1999).
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, constructivism has become one of the major fields within international relations. John Ruggie[1] and others have identified several strands of constructivism. On the one hand, there are constructivist scholars such as Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, Peter Katzenstein, and Alexander Wendt whose work has been widely accepted within the mainstream IR community and has generated vibrant scholarly discussions among realists, liberals, institutionalists, and constructivists. On the other hand, there are radical constructivists who take discourse and linguistics more seriously. Richard Ashley, Friedrich Kratochwil, Nicholas Onuf, and others still work in this area of constructivism.
Theory
Constructivism primarily seeks to demonstrate how many core aspects of international relations are, contrary to the assumptions of Neorealism and Neoliberalism, socially constructed, that is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interaction. Alexander Wendt calls two increasingly accepted basic tenets of Constructivism "(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature"[2].
Challenging Realism
Because Neorealism was, during Constructivism's formative period, the dominant discourse of International Relations, much of Constructivism's initial theoretical work is in challenging certain basic Neorealist assumptions. Neorealists are fundamentally causal Structuralists, in that they hold that the majority of important content to international politics is explained by the structure of the international system, a position first advanced in Kenneth Waltz's Man, the State and War and fully elucidated in his core text of Neorealism, Theory of International Politics. Specifically, international politics is primarily determined by the fact that the international system is anarchic - it lacks any overarching authority, instead it is composed of units (states) which are formally equal - they are all sovereign over their own territory. Such anarchy, Neorealists argue, forces States to act in certain ways, specific, they can rely on no-one but themselves for security (they have to Self-help). The way in which anarchy forces them to act in such ways, to defend their own self-interest in terms of power, Neorealists argue, explains most of international politics. Because of this, Neorealists tend to disregard explanations of international politics at the 'unit' or 'state' level[3][4]. Such a focus Kenneth Waltz attacked as being reductionist[5].
Constructivism, particularly in the formative work of Wendt, challenges this assumption by showing that the causal powers attributed to 'Structure' by Neorealists are in fact not 'given', but rest on the way in which Structure is constructed by social practice. Removed from presumptions about the nature of the identities and interests of the actors in the system, and the meaning that social institutions (including Anarchy) have for such actors, Neorealism's 'structure' reveals, Wendt argues, very little, "it does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on"[6]. Because such features of behavior are not explained by Anarchy, and require instead the incorporation of evidence about the interests and identities held by key actors, Neorealism's focus on the material structure of the system (Anarchy) is misplaced[7]. But Wendt goes further than this - arguing that because the way in which Anarchy constrains states depends on the way in which States conceive of Anarchy, and conceive of their own identities and interests, Anarchy is not necessarily even a 'self-help' system. It only forces states to self-help if they conform to Neorealist assumptions about states as seeing security as a competitive, relative concept, where the gain of security for any one state means the loss of security for another. If States instead hold alternative conceptions of security, either 'co-operative', where states can maximise their security without negatively affecting the security of another, or 'collective' where states identify the security of other states as being valuable to themselves, Anarchy will not lead to self-help at all[8]. Neorealist conclusions, as such, depend entirely on unspoken and unquestioned assumptions about the way in which the meaning of social institutions are constructed by actors. Crucially, because Neorealists fail to recognize this dependence, they falsely assume that such meanings are unchangeable, and exclude the study of the processes of social construction which actually do the key explanatory work behind Neorealist observations.
Identities and interests
As Constructivists reject Neorealism's conclusions about the determining effect of anarchy on the behavior of international actors, and move away from Neorealism's underlying materialism, they create the necessary room for the identities and interests of international actors to take a central place in theorizing international relations. Now that actors are not simply governed by the imperatives of a self-help system, their identities and interests become important in analyzing how they behave. Like the nature of the international system, Constructivists see such identities and interests as not objectively grounded in material forces (such as dictates of the human nature that underpins Classical Realism) but the result of ideas and the social construction of such ideas.
Martha Finnemore has been influential in examining the way in which international organizations are involved in these processes of the social construction of actor's perceptions of their interests[9]. In National Interests In International Society, Finnemore attempts to "develop a systemic approach to understanding state interests and state behavior by investigating an international structure, not of power, but of meaning and social value"[10]. "Interests", she explains, "are not just 'out there' waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction"[10]. Finnemore provides three case studies of such construction - the creation of Science Bureaucracies in states due to the influence of UNESCO, the role of the Red Cross in the Geneva Conventions and the World Bank's influence of attitudes to poverty.
Studies of such processes are examples of the Constructivist attitude towards state interests and identities. Such interests and identities are central determinants of state behavior, as such studying their nature and their formation is integral in Constructivist methodology to explaining the international system. But it is important to note that despite this refocus onto identities and interests - properties of States - Constructivists are not necessarily wedded to focusing their analysis at the unit-level of international politics: the state. Constructivists such as Finnemore and Wendt both emphasize that while ideas and processes tend to explain the social construction of identities and interests, such ideas and processes form a structure of their own which impact upon international actors. Their central difference from Neorealists is to see this International Structure as being primarily ideational rather than material in nature[11][12].
Research areas
Many constructivists analyze international relations by looking at the goals, threats, fears, cultures, identities, and other elements of "social reality" on the international stage as the social constructs of the actors. In a key ed volume,[13] constructivist scholars[14] challenge many traditional realist assumptions about how the international system operates, especially with regard to military security issues. Another approach is offered by "Defending the West"[15], in which James Gow studies contemporary issues of peace and security through empirical studies of the Western powers. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber[16] have applied constructivism to understand the evolution of state sovereignty as a central theme in international relations. In international political economy, the application of constructivism has been less frequent. A notable effort is by Jalal Alamgir, who applies constructivist logic to analyze international rivalries and India's economic policy.[17]
By focusing on how language and rhetoric are used to construct the social reality of the international system, constructivists are seen as more optimistic about progress in international relations than versions of realism loyal to a purely materialist ontology.
Constructivism is often presented as an alternative to the two leading theories of international relations, realism and liberalism, but is not necessarily inconsistent with either. Wendt shares some key assumptions with leading realist and neorealist scholars, such as the existence of anarchy and the centrality of states in the international system. However, Wendt renders anarchy in cultural rather than materialist terms; he also offers a sophisticated theoretical defense of the state-as-actor assumption in international relations theory. This is a contentious issue within segments of the IR community as some constructivists challenge Wendt on some of these assumptions (see, for example, exchanges in Review of International Studies, vol. 30, 2004).
Notable constructivists in IR
• Emanuel Adler
• Wasim Ahmed
• Jalal Alamgir
• Richard D. Anderson
• Anthony Clark Arend
• Michael Barnett
• Thomas J. Biersteker
• Didier Bigo
• Mark Blyth
• Barry Buzan
• Jeffrey T. Checkel
• David Evangelidis
• Karin Fierke
• Martha Finnemore
• Patricia Goff
• James Gow
• Ernst B. Haas
• Rodney Bruce Hall
• Ted Hopf
• Peter J. Katzenstein
• Elizabeth Kier
• Audie Klotz
• Friedrich Kratochwil
• Richard Ned Lebow
• Jeffrey Legro
• Nicholas Onuf
• Thomas Risse
• John Ruggie
• Chris Reus-Smit
• Frank Schimmelfennig
• Kathryn Sikkink
• J. Ann Tickner
• Ole Wæver
• Alexander Wendt
• P. Stephen Waring
See also
• Constructivism
• Constructivist epistemology
• English school of international relations theory
External links
• Global Power Barometer
• Read an Interview with Social Constructivist Alexander Wendt
Notes
1. ^ John Gerard Ruggie (1998). "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge". International Organization (CUP) 52 (4): 855.
2. ^ Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cabridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.1
3. ^ Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cabridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.8-15
4. ^ Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave Publishing, 2005), pp.40-43
5. ^ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 1979)
6. ^ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics" in International Organization (46:2, Spring 1992), p.396
7. ^ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics" in International Organization (46:2, Spring 1992), pp.396-399
8. ^ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics" in International Organization (46:2, Spring 1992), pp.399-403
9. ^ Stephen Walt writes on the back cover of Finnemore's book "Many writers have asserted that social structures assert a powerful impact on national preferences...but Finnemore is the first to present sophisticated evidence for this claim."
10. ^ a b Martha Finnemore, National Interests In International Society (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), p.2
11. ^ Martha Finnemore, National Interests In International Society (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996), pp.6-7
12. ^ Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cabridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.29-33
13. ^ The Culture of National Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996)
14. ^ Elizabeth Kier, Jeffrey Legro, Peter Katzenstein, and many others
15. ^ Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005
16. ^ Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty As Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)
17. ^ Jalal Alamgir, India's Open-Economy Policy: Globalism, Rivalry, Continuity (London: Routledge, 2008)
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constructivism_in_international_relations"
Feminism in international relations
Feminism in international relations is a broad term given to works of those scholars who have sought to bring gender concerns into the academic study of international politics.
In terms of international relations (IR) theory it is important to understand that feminism is derived from the school of thought known as reflectionism.[citation needed] One of the most influential works in feminist IR is Cynthia Enloe's Bananas, Beaches and Bases (Pandora Press 1990). This text sought to chart the many different roles that women play in international politics - as plantation sector workers, diplomatic wives, sex workers on military bases etc. The important point of this work was to emphasize how, when looking at international politics from the perspective of women, one is forced to reconsider his or her personal assumptions regarding what international politics is 'all about'. However, it would be a mistake to think that feminist IR was solely a matter of identifying how many groups of women are positioned in the international political system. From its inception, feminist IR has always shown a strong concern with thinking about men and, in particular, masculinities. Indeed, many IR feminists argue that the discipline is inherently masculine in nature. For example, in her article "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" Signs (1988), Carol Cohn claimed that a highly masculinised culture within the defense establishment contributed to the divorcing of war from human emotion.
A feminist IR involves looking at how international politics affects and is affected by both men and women and also at how the core concepts that are employed within the discipline of IR (e.g. war, security, etc.) are themselves gendered. Feminist IR has not only concerned itself with the traditional focus of IR on states, wars, diplomacy and security, but feminist IR scholars have also emphasized the importance of looking at how gender shapes the current global political economy. In this sense, there is no clear cut division between feminists working in IR and those working in the area of International Political Economy (IPE).
Feminist IR emerged largely from the late 1980s onwards. The end of the Cold War and the re-evaluation of traditional IR theory during the 1990s opened up a space for gendering International Relations. Because feminist IR is linked broadly to the critical project in IR, by and large most feminist scholarship has sought to problematise the politics of knowledge construction within the discipline - often by adopting methodologies of deconstructivism associated with postmodernism/poststructuralism. However, the growing influence of feminist and women-centric approaches within the international policy communities (for example at the World Bank and the United Nations) is more reflective of the liberal feminist emphasis on equality of opportunity for women.
References
• Carol Cohn, Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals, Signs, (1988)
• Cynthia Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire (Paperback), University of California Press 2004, ISBN 0520243811
• Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases (Pandora Press 1990)
• Vivienne Jabri, Eleanor O'Gorman, Lynne Rienner, Women, Culture, and International Relations (Critical Perspectives on World Politics). Publishers Inc, US, 1999, ISBN 155587701X
See also
• Tickner, J. Ann. Gendering World Politics. Columbia University Press (May 15, 2001). ISBN 0231113676
• Read an interview with feminist IR-scholar Marysia Zalewski by Theory Talks here
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feminism_in_international_relations"
THE ORIGINS AND TRADITIONS OF MAYDAY
By Eugene W. Plawiuk
The international working class holiday; Mayday, originated in pagan Europe. It was a festive holy day celebrating the first spring planting. The ancient Celts and Saxons celebrated May 1st as Beltane or the day of fire. Bel was the Celtic god of the sun.
The Saxons began their May day celebrations on the eve of May, April 30. It was an evening of games and feasting celebrating the end of winter and the return of the sun and fertility of the soil. Torch bearing peasants and villager would wind their way up paths to the top of tall hills or mountain crags and then ignite wooden wheels which they would roll down into the fields.
The May eve celebrations were eventually outlawed by the Catholic church, but were still celebrated by peasants until the late 1700's. While good church going folk would shy away from joining in the celebrations, those less afraid of papal authority would don animal masks and various costumes, not unlike our modern Halloween. The revelers, lead by the Goddess of the Hunt; Diana (sometimes played by a pagan-priest in women's clothing) and the Horned God; Herne, would travel up the hill shouting, chanting and singing, while blowing hunting horns. This night became known in Europe as Walpurgisnacht, or night of the witches.
The Celtic tradition of Mayday in the British isles continued to be celebrated through-out the middle ages by rural and village folk. Here the traditions were similar with a goddess and god of the hunt.
As European peasants moved away from hunting gathering societies their gods and goddesses changed to reflect a more agrarian society. Thus Diana and Herne came to be seen by medieval villagers as fertility deities of the crops and fields. Diana became the Queen of the May and Herne became Robin Goodfellow (a predecessor of Robin Hood) or the Green Man.
The Queen of the May reflected the life of the fields and Robin reflected the hunting traditions of the woods. The rites of mayday were part and parcel of pagan celebrations of the seasons. Many of these pagan rites were later absorbed by the Christian church in order to win over converts from the 'Old Religion'.
Mayday celebrations in Europe varied according to locality, however they were immensely popular with artisans and villagers until the 19th Century. The Christian church could not eliminate many of the traditional feast and holy days of the Old Religion so they were transformed into Saint days.
During the middle ages the various trade guilds celebrated feast days for the patron saints of their craft. The shoemakers guild honored St. Crispin, the tailors guild celebrated Adam and Eve. As late as the 18th century various trade societies and early craft-unions would enter floats in local parades still depicting Adam and Eve being clothed by the Tailors and St. Crispin blessing the shoemaker.
The two most popular feast days for Medieval craft guilds were the Feast of St. John, or the Summer Solstice and Mayday. Mayday was a raucous and fun time, electing a queen of the May from the eligible young women of the village, to rule the crops until harvest. Our tradition of beauty pageants may have evolved , albeit in a very bastardized form, from the May Queen.
Besides the selection of the May Queen was the raising of the phallic Maypole, around which the young single men and women of the village would dance holding on to the ribbons until they became entwined, with their (hoped for) new love.
And of course there was Robin Goodfellow, or the Green Man who was the Lord of Misrule for this day. Mayday was a celebration of the common people, and Robin would be the King/Priest/Fool for a day. Priests and Lords were the butt of many jokes, and the Green Man and his supporters; mummers would make jokes and poke fun of the local authorities. This tradition of satire is still conducted today in Newfoundland, with the Christmas Mummery.
The church and state did not take kindly to these celebrations, especially during times of popular rebellion. Mayday and the Maypole were outlawed in the 1600's. Yet the tradition still carried on in many rural areas of England. The trade societies still celebrated Mayday until the 18th Century.
As trade societies evolved from guilds, to friendly societies and eventually into unions, the craft traditions remained strong into the early 19th century. In North America Dominion Day celebrations in Canada and July 4th celebrations in the United States would be celebrated by tradesmen still decorating floats depicting their ancient saints such as St. Crispin.
Our modern celebration of Mayday as a working class holiday evolved from the struggle for the eight hour day in 1886. May 1, 1886 saw national strikes in the United States and Canada for an eight hour day called by the Knights of Labour. In Chicago police attacked striking workers killing six.
The next day at a demonstration in Haymarket Square to protest the police brutality a bomb exploded in the middle of a crowd of police killing eight of them. The police arrested eight anarchist trade unionists claiming they threw the bombs. To this day the subject is still one of controversy. The question remains whether the bomb was thrown by the workers at the police or whether one of the police's own agent provocateurs dropped it in their haste to retreat from charging workers.
In what was to become one of the most infamous show trials in America in the 19th century, but certainly not to be the last of such trials against radical workers, the State of Illinois tried the anarchist workingmen for fighting for their rights as much as being the actual bomb throwers. Whether the anarchist workers were guilty or innocent was irrelevant. They were agitators, fomenting revolution and stirring up the working class, and they had to be taught a lesson.
Albert Parsons, August Spies, George Engle and Adolph Fischer were found guilty and executed by the State of Illinois.
In Paris in 1889 the International Working Men's Association (the First International) declared May 1st an international working class holiday in commemoration of the Haymarket Martyrs. The red flag became the symbol of the blood of working class martyrs in their battle for workers rights.
Mayday, which had been banned for being a holiday of the common people, had been reclaimed once again for the common people.
May Day in the USA: A Forgotten History
by Michael Thomas
Every year on May 1st, for over a century, workers around the world have marked Labor Day with rallies and speeches, picnics and celebrations, demonstrations and riots. Traditionally, these May Day events have provided a primary occasion for workers, especially in Europe, to collectively express their unity, their enthusiasm, and their commitment to social change. Today, the United States stands virtually alone among the industrialized nations in officially ignoring the historical and political significance of May Day for the Labor movement.
When Americans do look past the occasional rites of spring, our responses are usually dominated by fearful Cold War images of May Day riots in Europe or tanks and mobile missile-launchers parading before the Kremlin. Few Americans realize that the seemingly foreign celebrations of labor held worldwide on May 1st actually commemorate historical events here in the United States.
During the late 19th century, while corporate power was growing at an unprecedented rate, American workers faced a political and legal system that failed to recognize even the most basic rights of workplace safety, community sanitation, and child protection, let alone the right to organize and strike. On May 1st, 1886, the American Federation of Labor declared a national strike to demand an eight-hour work day and 350,000 workers across the country responded.
In particular, the city of Chicago was virtually paralyzed; railroads, stockyards, and other businesses were forced to close. Two days later, police fired randomly into crowds of fleeing strikers, killing four and wounding many more. Angry workers began to call for armed retaliation.
The next day, when police attempted to disperse a peaceful rally in Haymarket Square, a bomb was tossed into their midst, wounding nearly 70 officers, some mortally. Again firing randomly into the crowd, police wounded another 200 citizens, killing many. With no clues as to the source of the bomb, police arrested eight revolutionary labor leaders, seven of whom had not even been present in Haymarket at the time. In the absence of any evidence linking them to the bomb, the "Chicago Eight" were tried solely on the basis of their political beliefs. All eight were sentenced to death; most were eventually executed.
News of the trial electrified labor groups everywhere; protests were held around the world. In 1889, the Socialist International declared May 1st a day of demonstrations, and since 1890 these have been held annually worldwide by a variety of labor movements, in many cases eventually forcing official recognition of the holiday. Soon, labor advocates in the United States, too, pressed for a national holiday recognizing workers. Although by the 1890s, May 1st was already being celebrated as Labor Day in some states, other states celebrated in early September.
Proponents of the September date emphasized that this filled a long gap between the Fourth of July and Thanksgiving holidays. Presented thus, flanked between patriotic celebrations of national origin and family unity, this Labor Day was obviously attractive to business and government leaders opposed to labor militancy, and had the additional advantage of being as far away as possible from the "subversive" May Day, while still promising good summer weather for outdoor festivities. Thus, the first Monday in September received official recognition.
Nevertheless, neither labor militancy nor public interest in May Day celebrations showed any signs of abating. May Day rallies were held, for example, in New York City's Union Square every year since 1924. And soon, the simple displacement of Labor Day was no longer deemed a sufficient tactic; conservatives began renaming May Day itself in an effort to finally erase its unsettling symbolism from the American consciousness.
In 1947, amidst the anti-Communist Cold War hysteria, the U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars renamed May 1st "Loyalty Day" and a joint session of Congress later made the pronouncement official. Loyalty Day was explicitly designed as a weapon against leftist labor tendencies, and specifically the American Communist Party, by encouraging citizens to reaffirm their commitment to the State. The right of citizens to join legal political parties of their own choosing without harassment was apparently not an American value to be celebrated on this holiday.
During the 1950s, Loyalty Day flourished at the expense of traditional May Day events. For example, the Loyalty Day parade in New York City, one of the largest in the nation, was designed to lure citizens away from the long-standing Union Square rallies and to distract attention from the Communist Party march on the same day. Ten years later, however, the association of such parades with support for the American war in Vietnam led to a drastic decline in public participation across the land. Nevertheless, despite this waning interest, these conservative holidays actually succeeded in their objective; for if Loyalty Day has now been all but officially forgotten, so too has the historic significance of May Day.
The tragic irony is that this historic memorial to American labor, which continues to inspire workers abroad, has been largely forgotten by workers at home. Mention a Labor Day picnic in May to most people today and they will assume that you have misplaced your calendar. Sadly, what has really been lost, or should I say stolen, is a powerful symbol of the historical struggle by average working Americans for freedom and democracy.
OUTQUOTES
Few Americans realize that the seemingly foreign celebrations of labor held worldwide on May 1st actually commemorate historical events here in the United States.
In the absence of any evidence linking them to the bomb, the "Chicago Eight" were tried solely on the basis of their political beliefs. All eight were sentenced to death; most were eventually executed.
In 1947, amidst the anti-Communist Cold War hysteria, the U.S. Veterans of Foreign Wars renamed May 1st "Loyalty Day" and a joint session of Congress later made the pronouncement official. Loyalty Day was explicitly designed as a weapon against leftist labor tendencies, and specifically the American Communist Party, by encouraging citizens to reaffirm their commitment to the State.
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